THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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INTRODUCTION

What do we know about the integration of immigrant families within the United States—the progress these families are making and their reception in the communities where they settle? How are immigrants affected by the nation’s integration policies or lack thereof? What directions might immigrant integration and the policies governing it take in the future?

In examining these issues, this paper proceeds from two straightforward assumptions:

- The nation may be ready for a period of constructive engagement on the issue of how best to integrate immigrant families into U.S. society.
- A basic mismatch exists between the nation’s essentially liberal, if highly regulated immigration policies and its historically laissez-faire immigrant policies. That is, despite the fact that the nation admits more immigrants who are on track for citizenship than any other country, U.S. immigrant integration policies have essentially been ad hoc and small-scale.

We begin the paper by noting several reasons for starting a discussion of the integration of immigrant families now. We proceed to examine some of the demographic imperatives for an integration agenda and selected trends in immigrant integration. With these trends in mind, we explore some of the conceptual and design issues that should inform an integration agenda for immigrant families. We then document trends in recent spending on immigrant integration and conclude by touching on several substantive areas and issues that we believe bear further work.

Because the reach of the paper is rather broad, we should note several of its limitations. The paper relies heavily on analyses conducted by the Urban Institute, and as such our themes and findings are drawn less from the rich literature on integration than our own institution’s analyses. We also
acknowledge that our demographic measures and our metrics of integration do not include several important trends such as political participation. Despite our own past emphasis on the merits of disaggregating the immigrant population by legal status, duration of residence, national origin, and the like, we have presented more aggregated findings than we might have preferred, owing to data and resource limits.

The reader will find that we do not advance a firm, narrowly drawn definition of immigrant family integration—the term will have different meanings for different people. We do believe, however, that a definition should involve not only an accounting of immigrants’ mobility over time, but encompass notions of community change as well.
WHY DISCUSS THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES?

We believe that there are several powerful reasons to expand the quite limited current national discussion of immigrant family integration.¹ They include:

*Continuing mismatch between immigration and immigrant policies.* Despite unprecedented numbers of entrants, few mainstream institutions—schools, the military, departments of transportation, child welfare agencies—have directly confronted the significance of immigration-driven demographic change for their policies and programs.

Schools may offer the best example. In 1997, one in five school-age children in the U.S. was the child of an immigrant, a share that had tripled since 1970. (By way of contrast, 16 percent of school-age children in the United States are black.) Even so, debates over educational opportunity—including vouchers, high stakes testing, standards of learning, and the like—rarely take into account the needs of the children of immigrants (Ruiz de Velasco and Fix 2000).

*Averting unintended consequences.* *Integration* as well as *immigration* policies can have unintended effects on immigrant families. With welfare reform, for example, bars on immigrants’ use of benefits appear to have chilled use of health and other services, not just by noncitizen adults, but by many of their citizen children as well. Although immigration policy is in some ways quite family–friendly, recent reforms aimed at toughening immigration controls have had the unexpected effect of separating some immigrant families, as noncitizens are deported for minor crimes committed years earlier. Similarly, the imposition of new income requirements for sponsors may be keeping some families apart. Presumably, such unintended effects could be minimized by a more deliberate set of policies,

¹The rather limited discussion of immigrant integration in the United States can be contrasted with much broader political and academic interest in Europe. See, for instance, Favell 2000.
developed with an understanding of immigration flows, the mixed legal statuses within immigrant families, and immigrant integration trends.

**Population dispersal** Another reason to focus on the integration of immigrant families is that immigrants are increasingly moving to nontraditional receiving states and communities. These communities not only find themselves with more immigrant families, but, in the wake of welfare reform, with more power to determine immigrants’ rights to benefits, and more power to shape their own integration policies. One corollary of this new authority is communities’ increased responsibility for financing the services they decide to offer.

**Shifting political climate.** The time for a greater focus on this topic may also be ripe because of the shifting political crosscurrents in immigration and immigrant policy since the strikingly anti-immigrant period of the mid-1990s. Since then, we have seen the Congress (1) restore food stamps and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits to some legal noncitizens; (2) authorize some Central Americans and Haitians who had become—or would soon become—deportable to seek legal status; (3) expand the number of temporary visas made available to high-tech workers; and (4) extend temporary visas to many family unification applicants awaiting a green card. At the same time, though, we have seen California voters overwhelmingly support an initiative to severely limit the use of bilingual education. We have also seen efforts to revive California’s Proposition 187, which barred undocumented immigrant children from attending elementary and secondary schools. Meanwhile, most of the core provisions of the 1996 welfare and illegal immigration reform laws limiting legal immigrants’ rights remain in force. Although Congress may still consider proposals to restore food stamps to noncitizen parents and to extend health insurance coverage to some children and pregnant women, current debate suggests that legislators have not yet taken the reality of mixed-status families to heart.
**Strong but faltering economy.** No doubt some of the more inclusive political actions of the past several years could be at least partially ascribed to the sustained economic expansion—an expansion that not only created new demand for immigrant workers, but may have allayed some natives' concerns about their own job security. Of course, these developments beg the question whether policies that promote immigrant integration will come under attack as the economy worsens.

**Deeper knowledge base.** Another reason to begin discussing immigrant family integration is a broad, recent expansion in family and integration-related scholarship. Examples include recent work by the National Research Council on the health and well-being of children in immigrant families and on teaching English-language learners; analyses of the integration of second generation immigrants in New York City; and results from the Rand Corporation’s survey of new immigrants. This scholarship has deepened our understanding of immigration and its impact, and we can expect a further expansion with the release of the 2000 Census and as other data sets with large immigrant samples become available.\(^2\)

**Policy targets: PRWORA and ESEA reauthorizations.** The timing of this discussion may also be right for political and policy purposes. Almost all federal aid programs for elementary and secondary education are in the process of being reauthorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the 107th Congress. Furthermore, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—which had far-reaching impacts on the membership of legal noncitizens—is due for reauthorization in 2002. That reauthorization may prove to be an opportunity for a first-principle discussion of the rights and entitlements of noncitizens. In addition

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\(^2\)These include the New Immigrant Survey funded by the National Institutes of Health, the Urban Institute's Los Angeles/New York City Immigrant Survey (LANYCIS), and the second and successor waves of the Urban Institute's 44,000 household National Survey of American Families (NSAF).
to revisiting immigrant eligibility issues, the reauthorization of PRWORA offers a chance to address a number of implementation issues related to immigrant families and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). These issues include whether immigrant families face additional application barriers, have access to English as a Second Language, child care, and transportation assistance, and whether public and private agencies providing this assistance have the linguistic and cultural capacity to serve immigrant families. Reauthorization may also address whether immigrant families are more likely than others to remain on the welfare rolls.
HOW IS THE IMMIGRANT FAMILY CHANGING?

Promoting family unity has long been the main imperative of U.S. immigration policy. About three-quarters of all immigrants coming to the U.S. enter through family unification channels, as close relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents. What is not widely understood, however, is the degree to which employment and diversity immigration is family driven as more than half of all immigrants entering under these categories are actually the spouses or children of the primary beneficiaries.\(^3\) Taken together, approximately 80 percent of all immigrant admissions in FY1998 either entered to join family

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members in the United States or came as part of a family. Family unity also plays an important role in humanitarian admissions, as refugees with family members in the U.S. are given special preference. In fact, most refugees coming to the U.S. are joining family members.

While a detailed treatment of the flows of immigrant families to the United States is beyond the scope of this paper, we sketch several pertinent immigration trends below.

**High flows.** The obvious starting point is the high rate of U.S. immigration. Annual immigration flows have tripled over the past generation with more immigrants entering the U.S. during the 1990s than any other decade (see figure 1). Not only has the number of immigrants risen

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4 Due to data limitations, we made this estimate by applying the FY1997 shares of employment and diversity immigrants who were accompanying family members to FY1998 admission numbers.
substantially, but the share of the total U.S. population that the foreign-born represent—now roughly 10 percent—has almost doubled since 1970. That said, the share remains below the 15 percent that the foreign-born represented at the turn of the last century (see figure 2).

**Dispersal.** Over the past decade, these large numbers have meant that immigration's impact has been felt beyond the six states that have been traditional receiving areas for immigrants. As figure 3 shows, during the 1990s, the immigrant population in what we term “new immigrant states” grew twice as fast (61 versus 31 percent) as the immigrant population in the six states that receive the largest numbers of immigrants.⁵

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⁵For purposes of the analysis, we divide the 50 states and the District of Columbia into three categories: (1) the six large receiving states that have settled roughly 75 percent of immigrants over the past decade (CA,NY,FL,TX,IL,NJ); (2) the eight “traditional receiving states” that contained 250,000 or more foreign-born in 1920 that no longer ranked among the top six in 1999 (MA,CT,PA,OH,MI,WI,MN,WA); and (3) the remaining 37 “New Immigrant” states that are not included in (1) or (2) above.
It could be argued that immigration and integration politics have been largely centered on the six traditional receiving states. But now, with greater numbers of immigrants settling in states without the experience or infrastructure to promote incorporation, integration issues may attract broader political attention. Further, it seems that the tensions and successes surrounding the settlement of immigrant families will be increasingly reported and judged through the lens of nontraditional receiving areas’ experiences.

What is driving this dispersal? According to a recent Urban Institute analysis, the states to which immigrants migrated during the period 1995 to 1999 were not the states that extended more generous benefits to noncitizens following welfare reform. Moreover, some of the most generous states when it comes to providing benefits to noncitizens—most notably California—saw more out-of-state than in-
Changing origins and rapid rise in Mexican migration. Who is coming to the United States? It is widely recognized that the national origins of immigration flows have changed dramatically over the past thirty years—shifting from primarily European to Asian and Latin American sources (see figure 4). But the degree to which Mexico accounts for recent flows may be less widely appreciated.

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6The findings are not definitive, however, because they have not controlled for poverty or welfare use among the movers.
As figure 5 indicates, Mexicans today represent almost 30 percent of both the total immigrant population and the annual immigrant flow. Between 1990 and 1999 alone, the Mexican population rose by 70 percent, from 4.3 to 7.2 million persons, making Mexico the single largest source of both legal and undocumented immigration. In fact, the Mexican population in the United States has almost doubled in the past decade; it has quadrupled since 1980; and has grown ten-fold since 1970.

**Increased share of undocumented.** One corollary of increasing Mexican immigration is increased undocumented immigration. In 1994, 13 percent of the nation's foreign-born population was undocumented (Fix and Passel 1994). According to the 2000 Census, that share had risen to 28 percent (see figure 6) and the total number of undocumented immigrants residing within the United States—8.5 million—exceeded the highest estimates of the population's size before enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (see figure 7). Further, it is estimated that anywhere...
from a quarter to a third of the current annual immigration flow is undocumented, returning the nation to patterns that held before IRCA's legalization program.

One large difference, though, between the current and prior policy contexts is the new restrictions imposed on undocumented immigrants' ability to adjust status following illegal immigration reform. As a result, the stock of the undocumented population may well grow faster than in the past as fewer illegal immigrants are able to convert to legal status. These developments are likely to exert continuing pressure to enact an IRCA-like legalization program that reaches well beyond the expansion of temporary visas for legalizing immigrants that was enacted as part of the FY 2001 budget.⁷

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Although many imagine undocumented immigrants to be single adults, a 1998 Urban Institute study found that half of all undocumented immigrant-headed households in the state of New York contain children.\(^8\) Growing illegal immigration therefore raises the question of how an immigrant family integration agenda should take into account undocumented nonmembers and their mostly citizen children.

**Figure 8. Household Type by Nativity of Household Head: 1998**

![Figure 8: Household Type by Nativity of Household Head: 1998](image)

*Source: Urban Institute tabulations of March 1998 Current Population Survey. Also includes households with two or more unrelated persons.*

Large share of immigrants in families. The importance of using the family as a lens on immigrant integration is underscored by the fact that households headed by noncitizens are significantly more likely to contain children than those headed by citizens (55 versus 35 percent). Along similar lines,

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\(^8\) Background data from Jeffrey S. Passel and Rebecca Clark, “Immigrants in New York: Their Legal Status, Incomes
families with children are a larger share of foreign-headed households than native households: 44 versus 33 percent (see figure 8).

**Predominance of mixed status families.** The demographic phenomenon that holds perhaps the most far-reaching implications for an integration agenda is mixed status families. According to the census, 85 percent of immigrant families with children are mixed legal status families—that is, families where at least one parent is a noncitizen and one child is a citizen. The metrics of mixed status families are striking:

**Figure 9. “Mixed” Families are Common**

*Percentage of Children in “Mixed” Families*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York State</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fix and Zimmermann 1999.*

< Nationwide, 1 in 10 U.S. children lives in a mixed status family (see figure 9);

< Seventy-five percent of all children in immigrant families (those headed by a noncitizen) are

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and Taxes, “The Urban Institute, April 1998.
Twenty-seven percent of all children in New York City, and 47 percent of all children in Los Angeles, live in mixed status families;

In the state of New York, 70 percent of families with children headed by undocumented immigrants contain citizen children.

Mixed status families are not just demographically important; they should be of central concern to social welfare policy, as:

Fifteen percent of all poor children nationwide (i.e., under 200 percent of the federal poverty level) live in mixed status families (see figure 10);

Sixty percent of the poor children in Los Angeles, and 30 percent of New York's poor children live in mixed status families;

**Figure 10. Large Share of Low-Income Families with Children are Mixed**

* Mixed families are those in which at least one parent is a noncitizen and one child is a citizen.

Source: Fix and Zimmermann 1999.
Twenty-one percent of poor uninsured children nationwide and fully one half of uninsured children in California live in mixed status families.

As we discuss later, these mixed status families present design challenges for policymakers who seek to ration rights or benefits on the basis of citizenship status. On the one hand, the imposition of benefit restrictions for noncitizens tend to spill over to their citizen children. On the other, policies intended to extend benefits to noncitizen children are limited in their reach because most children in immigrant families are already citizens.
HOW WELL ARE IMMIGRANT FAMILIES FARING?

Despite recent concerns about a decline in immigrant quality and slowing incorporation rates, our analyses suggest that the immigrant family integration story remains a largely successful one. However the data also reveal several emerging trends that are cause for concern.

Before proceeding to our analysis of integration patterns, it is worth briefly discussing how we approach the elusive term immigrant “integration.” In this regard, we note that the data we present focus less on cultural measures of integration than on measures more directly correlated with economic and social mobility. We also use the term “integration” and not “assimilation” to reflect our expectation of continued diversity, not homogeneity.

We recognize that integration is not simply a function of the traits and efforts of the immigrant family. It is also a function of the context in which newcomers find themselves, including the economic, political, and demographic trends that characterize the nation at the time of entry. Integration’s pace is also influenced by the fiscal and other strengths of the receiving community and its institutions, such as schools. Of course, integration is also influenced by the receptivity of the community to newcomers and the degree to which the community itself changes in response to migrant flows.

Finally, rather than draw our measures of integration from the rich store of data and analysis that have been developed over the years, we focus largely on data recently developed by the Urban Institute that have not been widely reported. We believe that the data highlight important recent trends.

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9 McDonnell and Hill note that a large share of immigrants’ children go to school in large central city school districts, districts that are often unable to provide a sound education to the majority of their students (McDonnell and Hill 1993, p. 107.). It is hard to disentangle the progress of any student within those school systems, including immigrant students, from the endemic failures of the systems themselves, (id at 108).

that should help frame a discussion about immigrant family integration.

The reader should also be aware that the measures of integration that we include are incomplete, as we have omitted a number of key issues (e.g., civic and political participation and homeownership). Nor have we included a number of measures that could be used to gauge the receptivity of the receiving community to immigrants.¹¹

**Change across generations.** Jeffrey Passel and Jennifer Van Hook have analyzed *cross-generational* integration trends. They explore differences between persons 20 to 30 years old in the first generation, the one and a half generation (i.e., immigrants who arrived in the United States before they were 10 years old), and the second generation (i.e., U.S.-born children to one or more foreign-born parents) as captured by the 1995 to 1998 Current Population Surveys. They find that by the second generation, immigrants *overall* end up doing as well as, or in some instances, better than *third generation non-Hispanic white natives*¹² in terms of their:

- educational attainment;
- labor force participation
- wages; and
- household income.

There is, however, substantial divergence across the ethnic and racial groups that compose the

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¹¹ Several such measures might include: trends in anti-immigrant hate crimes; measures of bilingualism and biliteracy of the immigrant and receiving communities; and the presence of ethnic and immigrant community institutions. (We are grateful to Laurie Olsen of California Tomorrow for these suggestions.)

¹² Note that the analysis benchmarks immigrant progress against an historically advantaged comparison group: third generation non-Hispanic whites. This means that the comparisons are to standards of income, labor force participation, schooling, and so on that are likely to be higher than would be the case if progress were compared to national averages, thus implicitly setting a high comparative standard against which integration is measured.
immigrant population, with Asians typically doing better than whites, Hispanics doing worse, and black immigrants experiencing more mixed outcomes.\textsuperscript{13} However, Passel and Van Hook find \textit{no difference} in wage outcomes across racial and ethnic groups in the second generation when education is standardized. Overall, then, these economic trends appear to us to represent positive, hopeful results.

But a different picture emerges from an analysis of trends in family formation and cohesion across generations. On the one hand, we see high intermarriage rates among immigrants of all races and ethnicities. Yet at the same time we see that immigrants’ cross-generational gains and economic integration are paralleled by an all-too-American pattern of immigrant family disintegration. Passel and Van Hook find that though first generation families are less likely than natives to be divorced, the share of immigrant families that are divorced or separated doubles from the first to the second generation, equaling the rates of non-Hispanic white natives. Along similar lines, they find that the share of unmarried parents also rises rapidly from the first to the second generation, with the second generation’s rates exceeding white natives by more than 30 percent. (In each instance, the family dissolution and single parenthood rates of immigrants lag substantially behind those of native blacks.)

We see similarly negative cross-generational integration patterns regarding child health. A 1998 report by the National Academy of Sciences that examined a wide range of child health outcomes found that children in immigrant families “are healthier than U.S.-born children in U.S.-born families.” However, the report went on to conclude that “(T)his relative advantage tends to decline with length of time in the United States and from one generation to the next.” (National Research Council 1998; Rumbaut 1999).

\textsuperscript{13} We do not mean to suggest that all Asian, Black, and Hispanic subgroups do equivalently well. There is wide variation depending, among other things, on national origin.
**Language acquisition among school-age children.** Cross-generational analyses of language acquisition among school-age children reveal more positive trends. There is a rapid, if expected, decline from the first to the second generation in the share of children that are limited English proficient. However, LEP status varies quite widely among populations whose native language is not English. Hence we see that in both the first and second generation, Mexicans are twice as likely to be LEP as Asians.

**Household income growth.** Turning now to other types of integration measures, we find that the incomes of households headed by naturalized citizens who have lived in the U.S. for 10 years or more slightly exceeds that of natives (see figure 11). The result owes to both rising incomes in the period following settlement and the fact that immigrant households are larger than natives' and contain more

![Figure 11. Integration is Dynamic](source: Urban Institute based on March 1997 Current Population Survey.)
earners. The incomes of undocumented immigrants remain well below those of natives and rise little with time in the U.S.

**Benefitting from the boom economy.** It appears that, at least in some respects, immigrant families benefitted strongly from the recent economic boom. As figure 12 indicates, immigrants' unemployment rates fell faster than natives' from 1996 to 1999. Particularly steep declines are evident among foreign-born Hispanic males. Despite the decline, immigrants' unemployment rates remained higher than natives' in 1999 (although they were substantially lower than native blacks).

Our analysis of wage trends during the same period (see figure 13) tells a different story. Here we see that between 1996 and 1999 natives' median wages rose more than 50 percent faster than immigrants'. In short, the recent economic boom appears to have produced more significant

![Figure 12. Immigrant Unemployment Rate Declines](source)
employment than wage gains for immigrants.

A look at employees' health insurance rates confirms that while immigrants may be finding jobs, the jobs they are finding are worse than natives'. We find that immigrants are less likely to hold jobs that carry employer-provided health insurance than natives and that the gap widened slightly between 1996 to 1999 (see figure 14).

**Increased naturalizations.** One traditional measure of immigrant integration is naturalization. As figure 15 indicates, there has been a surge in petitions for naturalization as well as approved applications in the wake of IRCA's legalization program, Proposition 187, and the 1996 welfare and illegal immigration reforms. These rapid increases are particularly prominent among some national origin groups that historically have shown little propensity to naturalize. To illustrate, in 1992
only 16 percent of Mexicans who had been legally admitted in 1977 had naturalized. Five years later, that share had doubled to 32 percent.¹⁴ Colombians evidence similar patterns as 36 percent of 1977 entrants had naturalized by 1992. By 1997 however, 61 percent of the 1977 cohort had become citizens. These rising naturalization rates can be ascribed to at least four phenomena:

< IRCA's legalization of almost 3 million formerly undocumented immigrants;

< Immigrants' reactions to the political environment of the early, mid-, and even late 1990s:

symbolized by the broad voter approval of California's Propositions 187 and 227;

¹⁴These data are collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and are the products of an ongoing longitudinal survey of the naturalization patterns of selected cohorts of legal immigrants. The data presented here are drawn from the cohort of immigrants legally admitted in 1977.
Greater tolerance of dual citizenship both within the United States and sending countries such as Mexico;

The increased instrumental value of citizenship following welfare and illegal immigration reform. These greater “returns to citizenship” include expanded eligibility for public benefits, especially for noncitizens entering after August 22, 1996.

The first two (legalization, fear-based responses) might be viewed as more or less one-time or at most as episodic events. The latter (dual citizenship, greater returns to naturalization), can be seen as the products of more enduring changes that should have a continuing, longer-term effect on immigrants' increased propensity to naturalize. Overall, these differing sources of rising naturalizations raise the question whether naturalization in the post-Proposition 187/welfare-reform era should be viewed as a
metric of integration in the way it once was.

Growing numbers of naturalized immigrants will also have a positive impact on immigrant families. Although the number of immediate relatives of permanent residents who can be admitted in a given year is capped, there is no limit on admissions of citizens’ spouses and children. Hence, higher naturalization rates could produce an increase in this type of family-related immigration flow.

*Increased poverty among school-age children.* We see a sharp rise in poverty among the children of immigrants. As recently as 1970, poverty rates among immigrant children only narrowly exceeded non-Hispanic whites’. However, by 1997, their poverty rate was more than double that of non-Hispanic whites’, rising from 17 to 39 percent (see figure 16). Further, from 1970 to 1995

**Figure 16. More Immigrant Children are Poor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African-American</th>
<th>Foreign-born Children</th>
<th>All Children of Immigrants</th>
<th>White, not Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the overall child poverty rate rose from 14.7 to 20.4 percent. Roughly 60 percent of this growth in child poverty could be ascribed to the children of immigrants (Ruiz de Velasco, Fix, and Clewell 2000). (Much of this increase in immigrant poverty is probably due to the large recent growth in low-income Mexican and undocumented immigration discussed above.)

**Segregation of LEPs in schools.** Another troubling trend we see among children in immigrant families is their segregation within schools. Figure 17 illustrates disturbing trends in the nation's schools, where half of limited English proficient (LEP) children attend schools in which a third or more of their fellow students are also LEP. This means that they are going to schools that are not just ethnically and economically segregated, but linguistically isolated as well.

Figure 17. LEPs are Linguistically Segregated

High dropout rates. This spatial segregation may be partially responsible for the high dropout rates among immigrant children, whose dropout rates exceed those of native students. While drop-out rates for the second generation are lower than the first, they turn upward again for the third generation. (In constructing these dropout rates we have only included children who attended school in the U.S., that is, those who have chosen to drop in at some point.) Mexican dropout rates for each of the first, second, and third generations are roughly double the national average. By contrast, first generation Asians drop out at a rate that is less than a quarter of the average for all foreign-born immigrants.15

High but rapidly falling rates of welfare use. We conclude this discussion by exploring
recent trends in immigrant families’ use of public benefits. When comparing across all families, we see that noncitizen families were more likely than citizens’ to receive welfare in 1994, before the enactment of federal welfare reform (8.7 versus 6.5 percent).\textsuperscript{16} Both groups were almost equally likely to receive benefits in 1999, following welfare reform's implementation (4.9 versus 4.8 percent).\textsuperscript{17} (See figure 18).

However, the picture changes when the presence of children and poverty are taken into account.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure19.png}
\caption{Low Income Immigrant Families with Children Use Less Welfare}
\end{figure}

Percentage Receiving Welfare among Families with Children Under 200\% of the Federal Poverty Level

\textsuperscript{15} See, generally, Rumbaut, 1995.

\textsuperscript{16} The unit of analysis for families is the “minimal household unit” or MHU; MHUs include married couples, either alone or with dependent children, and single adults. The MHUs approximate nuclear families and, in many cases, welfare eligibility units better than either households, individuals, or CPS family units. See Van Hook, Glick and Bean 1999. For our analyses, the category of noncitizen excludes all refugees.

\textsuperscript{17} This owes in part to the fact that benefit use by citizen children in noncitizen-headed households is ascribed to the immigrant household.
account. Noncitizens' families are substantially more likely to contain children than citizens' (40 versus 27 percent). Noncitizens' families are substantially more likely to be poor (that is, under 200 percent of the federal poverty level) than citizens' (59 versus 39 percent). When we restrict our analysis to poor families with children, we find that noncitizen families used fewer benefits than citizens both before and after welfare reform. In fact, following reform, noncitizens' use of benefits is less than two-thirds that of citizens' (10.7 versus 18.5 percent) (See figure 19).

Between 1994 and 1999, noncitizen use rates declined faster than those of citizens. The steeper declines among noncitizens were accounted for in part by precipitous declines in food stamps, Medicaid, and TANF benefits among refugees, especially those in California. These results make plain

**Figure 20. Program Percentage Change for All Families:**
**1994-1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Noncitizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamps</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI*</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANF</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage change for citizen participation is not significant. The category for noncitizen includes refugees.*

Source: Urban Institute tabulations from March CPS, 1995 to 2000. Also, see Fix and Passel 1999.
that welfare reform resulted in steeper caseload declines between 1994 and 1999 among noncitizen families than citizen families. The rapid decline likely owes less to increased eligibility restrictions than to welfare reform’s chilling effects, stemming from confusion, concern about the consequences of using welfare, and misinterpretation of the rules.

**Rising uninsurance rates.** Due at least in part to these chilling effects on Medicaid enrollment, immigrants’ rates of uninsurance have been rising. The share of poor (under 200 percent of the federal poverty level) nonelderly noncitizens without health insurance rose from 54 to 59 percent between 1995 and 1998. According to the 1999 National Survey of American Families, the uninsurance rate of the children of immigrants were twice the rate for children of natives (22 versus 10 percent) (Capps 2001). Moreover, results from the Urban Institute’s National Survey of American Families reveal that even before welfare reform went into effect, poor noncitizen children not only had far fewer average health care visits than natives, they also had dramatically fewer emergency room visits (0.2 versus 0.7 percent) (Ku and Matani 2000). In short, these NSAF results paint a picture of immigrant families’ disengagement from the health care system, a disengagement that appears to have deepened following welfare reform.

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18 These lower rates of health care use could also reflect better health status among immigrants.
Several guiding principles might help frame an integration policy for immigrant families. A partial list might be:

- Promoting the social and economic mobility of immigrant families; most notably vulnerable groups such as refugees and limited English speakers;
- Advancing antidiscrimination principles that treat legal immigrant family members who are here with our consent on a par with citizen family members;
- Ensuring that sponsors play a central but equitable role in supporting the family members for whom they have petitioned;
- Promoting intergovernmental fiscal equity regarding collecting taxes from, and providing support to, newcomer populations;
- Leveraging the capacity and support of the private sector; and
- Acknowledging that integration is a bidirectional process involving both the immigrant family and receiving community adaptations.

These principles raise difficult design and conceptual questions that are addressed below.

*Setting expectations for immigrant families’ integration.*

Although it may be obvious that an immigrant family integration agenda should promote the social and economic mobility of immigrants, deciding on goals and expectations for immigrant integration is far more complicated. A logical question, then, is over what time period should we expect to observe immigrant integration? What should we expect for the period immediately following entry? Over the parent’s or child’s life course? By the second or third generation? Given immigrants’ historically strong mobility, when do lagged outcomes justify public interventions?
Next, against what benchmark should we measure that progress? Should immigrant families be expected to reach parity with their U.S.-born ethnic counterparts? With national averages? With established populations that, for the most part, have not been subjected to discrimination: that is, third-plus generation whites? Given the special virtues we rightly or wrongly ascribe to immigrants (their strong families, solid work ethic, healthier diets, etc.) when should we expect that their outcomes will exceed natives’ and when should policymakers intervene when they do not?

Finally, should differing types of immigrant families—refugees, employment versus family-based immigrants—be held to different mobility standards because the rationales for their admission differ so widely? Should we expect immigrants who enter later in life to achieve the same outcomes as those who enter at younger ages? Should we expect immigrants from Anglophone countries to fare better than those from non-English speaking countries?

**Determining the reach of antidiscrimination principles.**

Another framing question for an integration agenda is: When should policymakers discriminate between legal noncitizens and citizens, and between different classes of legally present noncitizens (such

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19. Rainer Bauböck has suggested that basic measures of immigrant social integration are “proportionality and mobility.” He writes:

In a narrower sense of the word social integration refers to the distribution of particular groups over positions in social and economic life and the stability of such distributions over time. Such positions may be arranged vertically (as is, for example, the case with hierarchies of income, of professional prestige, of education, etc.) or horizontally (residential areas, spatial location of organizations of the same kind such as firms, schools, etc.) When measuring how well a society is integrated with respect to a particular group distinction, one may use segregation indices which compare the proportional distribution of one group over all relevant positions with that of the rest of the population. Systematic group deviation from the average patterns be it by concentration in certain residential areas or segments of the labour market or by a lower position in the hierarchies of education, income and wealth would then count as social disintegration (Bauböck, 1994).

20. Recall that the third-plus non-Hispanic white generation was the standard that Passel and Van Hook employ to assess integration of the first, 1.5, and second generations.
as those arriving before and after 1996)? Put differently, what justifies the abandonment of transparent antidiscrimination principles, given the fact that legal immigrants are encumbered with virtually all responsibilities that attach to membership in U.S. society. In some respects, distinctions drawn between citizens and noncitizens represent settled legal arrangements. Hence, the right to vote in national elections and to hold national office has been reserved to citizens. The same is also true of the superior immigration rights held by citizens, most of whom can unite as a matter of right with their immediate family members.21 Because the number of slots for immediate relatives of permanent residents is capped, they must often wait years to unite with their families. Further, there is a more or less settled political consensus that the obligations of the state to humanitarian entrants—refugees and asylees—exceed those owed to other legal immigrants.22

In other instances, however, U.S. policy has drawn new distinctions between the rights and privileges of citizens and noncitizens and between differing classes of legal permanent residents. These new distinctions, embedded in welfare and illegal immigration reforms, create divisions within many mixed status families. They also represent a controversial departure from prior policy that more or less treated citizens and noncitizens on a par. The changes place U.S. policy out of sync with European policies that increasingly consider legal immigrants’ membership rights as essentially equivalent to those of citizens.

21 Other nations have arrived at differing concepts of citizenship. Several European countries permit long-term residents to vote in local elections. Further, scholars have argued for a right of immediate family unification, not just for citizens, but for legal noncitizens (Transatlantic Learning Community 2000). We should also note that recent U.S. legislation limited the rights of even some citizens to sponsor relatives by imposing a minimum income requirement (125 percent of the federal poverty level) on them.

22 Low-income refugees are eligible for special cash and medical assistance for their first eight months in the United States even if they do not meet the requirements for TANF and Medicaid.
Several goals of recent U.S. policies have been used to justify discriminating against noncitizens in granting access to benefits. These include:

- discouraging flows of poor immigrants likely to become public charges;
- shifting greater responsibility for immigrants' support to their families;
- providing immigrants with an incentive to naturalize; and
- conserving federal and community resources by barring noncitizens from public assistance.

Whatever the legitimacy of these values and reforms, policies that discriminate against noncitizens in this way appear to have unintended spillover effects on citizens, most notably, citizen children in mixed status families.

Applying antidiscrimination policies will not only involve reforming policies that treat immigrants less favorably than natives, they will involve making special accommodations for newcomers. One example is Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which has been found to require that special programming be made available to non-English speaking students so they can meaningfully participate in schools. Along similar lines, legal challenges have recently been brought to ensure that Los Angeles County’s welfare program provides immigrant and refugee families with written materials in their own languages, interpreter services and access to ESL, and vocational classes.

**Limiting immigrant families’ support obligations.**

Antidiscrimination principles raise a related conceptual issue: balancing the responsibilities of the immigrant family with those of the state. While family support for newcomers has long been an integral part of U.S. immigration policy, the question remains: To what degree should we impose obligations on
the families of immigrants that exceed those imposed on citizens' families?\(^{23}\) (This is, obviously, a variant on the antidiscrimination question posed above.)

Two issues present themselves. First, what types of support should immigrant families be expected to provide: Cash assistance? Housing? Health coverage? Second, how long should families remain obligated to provide support: for 3 years? 5 Years? 10 years? Until the sponsored immigrant naturalizes? Should there be some stopping point to families' contingent liability, whether the sponsored immigrant naturalizes or not?

The difficulties associated with shifting the full support burden to families are thrown in sharp relief by policies that restrict the eligibility of immigrants arriving after 1996 for Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).\(^{24}\) The data make clear that poor noncitizens make far lower use of the nation's health care system at all levels than do citizens and that they have higher uninsurance rates. (Ku and Matani 2000). Given this fact, are there alternatives to current federal restrictions that might make sense? One alternative approach is embedded in the distinctions drawn by the Immigration and Naturalization Service's recently released public charge guidance. The guidance states that only cash assistance and long-term institutionalization can be taken into account when making a public charge determination (i.e., a decision to deny a green card or to deport an immigrant for past or expected dependency on public benefits). Medicaid, in-kind benefits such as food stamps, Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) benefits, and emergency health care are not considered.\(^{25}\)

\(^{23}\) One way that immigrants have been able to demonstrate that they are not likely to become a public charge, and are therefore admissible, is by demonstrating that they have family who will help support them.

\(^{24}\) Part of the rationale for the restrictions on these post-enactment immigrants was that they were required to have sponsors sign a legally enforceable affidavit promising to support the incoming immigrant.

\(^{25}\) If current public charge guidance were to serve as a policy model, it would seemingly return policy to the status
Apportioning intergovernmental roles and responsibilities.

The framing of an immigrant family integration agenda also raises issues regarding intergovernmental roles and financial responsibilities. Two central design questions dominate. The first is: when should subnational levels of government have the power to discriminate against noncitizens in the granting of rights and benefits? Where program costs are not shared between state and federal governments there is extraordinarily wide variation in the states' willingness to provide safety net services to immigrants (i.e., to immigrants who arrive after 1996). Moreover, the access that states grant to their safety net programs influences immigrants' incentives to naturalize, and in effect defines the meaning of citizenship, begging the question whether wide interstate variation is advisable.

Second, what continuing obligation does the federal government have to pay for the costs associated with immigration, given that the federal government exercises exclusive power as the nation's gatekeeper? On one hand, welfare reform's restrictions on immigrants' access to federal services have resulted in fewer federal funds going to states and localities (Zimmermann and Tumlin 1999). At the same time, as we document in the next section, the law set in motion precipitous drops in immigrants' use of public benefits, in theory reducing state welfare and health insurance expenditures. In the late 1990s federal aid increased for the education, language acquisition, refugee, and other programs that make up what we have called the United States' express or targeted immigrant policy (Fix and Zimmermann 1993).

Looking to the future, does the growing dispersal of immigrant families to nontraditional

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Quo prior to welfare reform, when legal permanent residents’ access to food stamps, welfare (then Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and Supplemental Security Income (but not Medicaid) was subject to a three or five year deeming period. During that period the incomes of the immigrants’ sponsors were deemed to be theirs for the purposes of eligibility, resulting in an effective exclusion.
receiving states build or erode the case for what might be termed transitional federal aid? If justified, how should such a transitional aid program be targeted? Should funding be discretionary and based on judgements of need? Or should it be driven by population formulas? Should aid efforts focus on schools? If so, should they build on the comparatively small ($150 million in FY 1999) Emergency Immigrant Education Program (EIEP)? After all, schools represent the largest single area of public expenditure for both citizen and immigrant children. As we have seen, one in five school-age children is the child of an immigrant, and schools are an arena where tensions associated with immigration surface.

**Targeting integration policies to discrete populations.**

This leads logically to the next policy design issue: What should the population target or targets of an immigrant family integration agenda be? At one level, programs might be targeted to immigrant families whose mobility lags that of natives. Beyond this simple formulation, population targets will vary depending on the type of program contemplated. An education agenda, for example, could focus on impact assistance for students who have recently arrived in U.S. schools (the EIEP), or services for those with language and literacy needs (the Bilingual Education Act, the Migrant Education Act, or Title I of the ESEA). In some instances, these basic language and literacy efforts will target not just immigrant children but the family as a whole (e.g., Even Start). Efforts to credit foreign credentials and offer professional training to immigrants will focus not just on newcomers with low skills and education levels, but those who enter with high skills that are underutilized.

However, three issues related to targeting policy should be noted. The first is: How far beyond settlement should immigrant integration policies reach? The key here is a demographic fact. The number of immigrants who have been in the United States for 10 or more years is growing and will continue to

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28 In our judgement, there is no other population for which states hold comparable powers of exclusion.
increase rapidly. In 1970 the number was 7 million; by 2010 it will have tripled to 21 million.

Presumably the needs of a settled versus a settling population will differ widely.

Second, how can an integration agenda take account of the mixed immigration status of immigrant families? As we have noted, 75 percent of children in all immigrant families are citizens. Policies designed to restrict benefits to noncitizens spill over to their citizen children. Mixed status families also complicate reform efforts because policies that target benefits to noncitizen children's advantage affect a comparatively small share of immigrants' children—as most are already citizens. Moreover, such restorations may do little, in and of themselves, to overcome the chilling effects that flow from policies barring noncitizens (i.e., their parents) from services.

Third, how should an immigrant integration agenda account for the large and growing undocumented population living in the United States? Many of the 8 to 8.5 million undocumented immigrants are here to stay and many will adjust to legal status and eventually gain citizenship. Moreover, many live in families with citizen children. A study of the New York state immigrant population estimates that about two-thirds of children in undocumented families are U.S.-born citizens. Should an integration policy ignore the undocumented and their families or are there certain policy areas where their inclusion makes sense? Certain health initiatives, for example, might focus not just on legal but also undocumented immigrants in the interest of protecting the public’s health.

Choosing between mainstream and targeted programs.

Another conceptual issue is whether policies and programs should be targeted to immigrant families and employ dedicated institutions (such as the refugee program) or whether integration should be viewed as a goal of universal policies and mainstream institutions.

From an institutional perspective, mainstream institutions (e.g., public schools, welfare offices,
job training centers) offer advantages: They (1) typically have comparatively deep institutional capacity; (2) have developed bureaucratic structures (accounting, personnel offices, and the like); (3) are often bound by established due process norms and procedures that can limit arbitrariness; and (4) frequently have developed political constituencies. At the same time, though, they may not have the particularized cultural and linguistic knowledge of immigrants and their communities. They may be less responsive to immigrants' needs, and less able to combine needed services than institutions that are more closely identified with the immigrant communities (e.g., newcomer schools, voluntary agencies). Testing which institutional arrangements work best has been a continuing focus of the refugee resettlement program.27

More generally, maximizing immigrants’ integration into mainstream institutions can help minimize differences in treatment between immigrants and citizens.

Similar issues arise from a policy perspective. Policies that target immigrants (such as the Emergency Immigrant Education Program, or the refugee program) can stimulate the creation of dedicated community institutions and better ensure that funding responds to immigrants' needs. At the same time, programs that address immigrant families within the compass of more universal, mainstream programs (such as Even Start, the Adult Education Act, or Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act) may have broader political constituencies and enjoy greater relative stability and higher funding levels. Particularly in periods of anti-immigrant sentiment, they may be less visible, and hence less politically vulnerable. This may be the lesson from the 1994 reauthorization of the Title I Program under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, when the eligibility of LEP students for services was substantially, and quietly, expanded despite the more hostile national political environment.

As our work in education reform suggests, the policy fit between mainstream reforms and those that serve immigrant populations can be quite close. In the area of secondary education, for example, our analyses of demonstration programs finds that several innovations hold substantial promise. These include:

- Expanding the class period, school day, and school year so immigrant children have time to master both English and content-area courses such as science;

- Bringing together language development and content teachers, who typically operate in very separate worlds in U.S. secondary schools; and

- Improving our assessment tools for non–English-speaking students so they can make smoother transitions from sheltered to mainstream classrooms (Ruiz de Velasco and Fix 2000).

These are exactly the types of reforms that lie at the heart of the mainstream school reform movement and are readily funded under the universal Title I or Goals 2000 programs, as opposed to the dedicated and controversial Title VII bilingual education program.

**Identifying strategies for leveraging the private sector.**

The current strength of the U.S. economy, coupled with the general openness of the U.S. labor market, raise the question, what, if any, public policies are needed to stimulate private sector activity that accelerates integration? As we have seen, immigrant unemployment fell faster than that of natives during the recent economic boom. While incentives to stimulate hiring may not be necessary, policies may still be needed to encourage employers to teach English and skills in the workplace. Mechanisms that standardize professional and academic credentials awarded outside the U.S. would help relieve labor shortages and tap newcomers' full potential.

At the same time, the predominance of foreign workers in low-wage industries and the slow wage growth among immigrants during the economic boom suggest that greater policy attention should
be drawn to enforcement of wage, hour, health, safety, and other social regulations in the workplace. Because many employers of immigrants are themselves immigrants, regulatory initiatives could be combined with efforts to deepen the capacity of immigrant entrepreneurs—by providing technical assistance such as training in accounting and the like—so their businesses can become both more stable and more compliant with tax and other regulations.

**Assessing the merits of a national office for immigrant and refugee families.**

Given the dynamics of immigration as well as the constantly changing needs of receiving communities, it might make sense to consider the value of an office or institution whose sole purpose is to monitor and shape immigrant integration policy. In addition to ensuring that current policies take account of changing demographics and community needs, this office could play a role in ensuring that mainstream policies take into consideration the specific needs of immigrants.

Existing models include the state offices for immigrants and refugees that have evolved out of some state refugee programs. Maryland, Massachusetts, and Illinois all have state offices with a focus that goes beyond refugees to reach other immigrant populations. A similar national office could take the place of or be located within the national Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). ORR has a long institutional history of serving language minorities in mainstream programs, since many refugees receive AFDC/TANF and Medicaid. Of course, ORR has the deepest experience creating, refining, and implementing a proactive resettlement plan for newcomers.

**WHAT DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPEND ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION?**
How much does the federal government spend on the integration of immigrant families and what types of investments does it make? In this section we explore the limited set of federal programs and expenditures that are targeted to immigrant or language minority families. They constitute what we have referred to in the past as the nation's express immigrant policy.28 We then briefly discuss the federal spending that takes place within the context of mainstream programs that may serve immigrants, but were not expressly created for them. (An example is the Title I education program for the disadvantaged.29) We also touch on the growing role of state and local governments in providing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>FY 1999 Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EIEP (Emergency Immigrant Education Program)</td>
<td>$150.0 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Resettlement Program</td>
<td>$465.0 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Program for Refugee Children</td>
<td>$17.8 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Education</td>
<td>$230.0 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education/ESL</td>
<td>$365.0 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Education</td>
<td>$354.7 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$150.0 Million</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1582.5 Million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


29 We exclude transfers, in-kind payments, tax credits, and other direct payments to individuals. We also exclude spending on what are termed general goods such as roads, the military, and the like despite the fact that
services to immigrant families. Despite its importance, we do not tackle private foundation spending dedicated to newcomers.

**Federal Spending on Targeted Programs**

Targeted federal spending on immigrant families and the communities within which they live can be viewed as falling within two largely distinct categories. The first is formula-driven reimbursement to state and local governments to offset costs ascribed to immigrants (often thought of as “impact aid”). The second is funding to provide education and services to vulnerable newcomer populations such as non-English speakers, refugees, and the children of migrant workers.

The principal targeted immigrant policy programs are set out in table 1. Although this list of programs is not comprehensive, it does reflect the principal congressional initiatives that have been deliberately designed to help immigrants and their communities. Viewed collectively, at least three points can be made about these targeted programs. First, they were created in an ad hoc manner over the years, and not surprisingly, they fall short of constituting a coherent integration agenda for immigrant families. Second, total funding for the programs (roughly $1.6 billion in FY 1999) can be viewed as modest at best, since the 30 million immigrants in the United States now represent more than 10 percent of the nation’s population. Indeed, $1.6 billion is less than half the $4 billion in aid provided to states to offset service costs associated with legalizing 2.8 million immigrants following IRCA’s enactment.30 Third, while generally small in scale, spending on these programs grew significantly through FY 2000, after declining sharply through the 1980s and most of the 1990s.

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30 The State Legalization Impact Assistance Grant (SLIAG) program was created to help states offset the costs of providing services to immigrants newly legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. The program ended in 1995, but provides some lessons for the design of impact aid programs. Strict requirements for documenting spending by individual legalized aliens proved extremely cumbersome and led to significant delays in state
Impact Assistance. In the last several years the federal government has increased its efforts to help offset state and local costs incurred as a result of immigration, focusing in particular on education and incarceration costs. The single most notable type of impact assistance has been the Emergency Immigrant Education Program (EIEP) (see table 2).

The EIEP, enacted in 1984, provides funds to school districts based on the number of foreign-born students ages 3 to 21 who have been attending U.S. schools for three years or less. Program funding declined sharply during the 1980s and early 1990s. However, in FY 1997, Congress nearly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Appropriation (in millions)</th>
<th>Appropriation* (in millions)</th>
<th>EIEP Students</th>
<th>Per Student Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>$30.0</td>
<td>$48.1</td>
<td>348,287</td>
<td>$138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>422,549</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>436,612</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>428,688</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>427,870</td>
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<td>478,172</td>
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<td>30.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>616,604</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>687,334</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>778,508</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>825,968</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>773,976</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>823,149</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td>875,000**</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>157.1</td>
<td>886,000**</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>821,000**</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>808,400**</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Change

| 1984-2000 | 212% | 132% | 34% |

* Adjusted to 1999-2000 Dollars.


31 EIEP funds can be used to (1) increase parental involvement; (2) tutor, mentor, or counsel immigrant students; (3) acquire curricular materials; and (4) provide basic institutional services. (Osorio-O’Dea 1999a).
doubled the program's appropriation, from $55 to $107 million, with spending per student more than
doubling from $67 per student in FY 1996 to $186 per student in FY 2000. Although spending for
EIEP is higher than it has ever been, it remains far below the $500 per student that was initially
authorized. Reimbursement rates per student are also less than 10 percent of federal reimbursement
payments to states to offset the costs of incarceration under the State Criminal Alien Assistance
Program ($186 per student in FY 1999 versus $2307 per prisoner in FY 1998.)32

Targeted Services. As table 1 indicates, the U.S. has enacted a handful of programs geared to
providing services specifically to immigrants or language minorities.

Refugee resettlement program. The refugee resettlement program is run by the federal
government, but largely administered by states and private voluntary resettlement agencies. The program
provides cash assistance and social services to newly arriving refugees and represents the closest
approximation the federal government offers of a proactive integration policy. Following sharp declines
during the 1980s, funding per refugee has risen somewhat during the 1990s. Since 1984, ORR spending
per refugee has dropped 57 percent, after accounting for inflation. Since 1990, however, spending per
refugee has risen from about $4,000 per refugee in 1990 to $5,000 in 2000. (See table 3).
Nonetheless, this funding level remains far below that of the early 1980s when refugees received three
years rather than eight months of federally reimbursed assistance.

Although a minor element of ORR’s $433 million annual budget, the agency administers a $5.8
million Community and Family Strengthening and Integration program. The program supports a broad

32 The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program was created in 1995 to reimburse states and localities for the costs of
incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens. The program has grown rapidly from $138 million in FY 1995 to $573
million in FY 1999.
range of projects aimed at building the community’s capacity to serve refugee families and help them effectively participate in their new society. Activities funded under the program include school based parent involvement projects, neighborhood watch programs, cross-cultural training for child protective service agencies, and projects aimed at improving intergenerational family relations.

Refugee education. In 1999, the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement reinstated its program to fund states with substantial numbers of refugee school children. This program, which had been in place but had gone unfunded through the 1990s, provided $17.8 million to 36 states in 1999. The funds can be used for a variety of purposes so long as they relate to effectively integrating and educating refugee children and offsetting the financial impact of educating refugee children. Possible uses include ESL, cross-cultural activities, parental outreach programs, interpreter services for parent/teacher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Refugee Program Appropriations (thousands of dollars)</th>
<th>Refugee Program Appropriations* (thousands of dollars)</th>
<th>Refugees Admitted</th>
<th>Dollars per Refugee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$495,999</td>
<td>$822,050</td>
<td>70,604</td>
<td>$11,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>352,166</td>
<td>553,312</td>
<td>60,559</td>
<td>9,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>418,951</td>
<td>609,834</td>
<td>76,930</td>
<td>7,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>388,835</td>
<td>512,298</td>
<td>122,935</td>
<td>4,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>410,615</td>
<td>503,977</td>
<td>131,749</td>
<td>3,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>389,003</td>
<td>451,999</td>
<td>112,065</td>
<td>4,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>408,000</td>
<td>447,786</td>
<td>75,728</td>
<td>5,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>411,000</td>
<td>434,198</td>
<td>83,000 ***</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>454,000</td>
<td>454,000 **</td>
<td>90,000 ***</td>
<td>5,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Change

1984-2000 — -45% 27% -57%
1990-2000 — -11% -27% 21%

* Adjusted to 2000 Dollars
** Estimate
*** From Announced Fiscal Year Cap

meetings, and salaries for teachers and aides.  

Federal bilingual education. The Bilingual Education Act (BEA) authorizes competitive grants for local school districts to help them provide a wide range of language assistance (not just bilingual education) to limited English proficient students. In FY 1999 only roughly 10 percent of LEP children were served in projects funded under the BEA (Osorio-O’Dea 1999b). While funding for the federal bilingual education program declined from the early 1980s through the mid-1990s, this trend shifted in 1997 with spending rising from $174 million to $291 million in 2001. Nonetheless, the amount of bilingual education spending per LEP student nationwide (i.e., both those enrolled and not enrolled in funded services) remains far lower than it was in the early 1980s. (See table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Bilingual Education Appropriation (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Bilingual Education Appropriation (millions of dollars)*</th>
<th>Total LEP Students</th>
<th>Spending Per LEP Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$169</td>
<td>$213</td>
<td>2,198,778</td>
<td>$97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2,429,815</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>2,620,747</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>3,037,922</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>3,184,696</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3,228,799</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>3,452,073</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3,724,950**</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>3,936,443**</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>4,147,936**</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>4,359,429**</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Change

| 1991-2000  | 16%   | 89%  | -38% |

*Adjusted to 2000 Dollars.
** Projected estimate based on 1991-1997 trend.


33 Notice of Availability of FY 1999 discretionary funds to State Departments of Education for Costs to Local School Districts Associated with Educating Refugee Children.
34 We calculate spending per all LEP students estimated to be in U.S. schools in order to have a rough gauge of
Migrant education. The Migrant Education Program provides grants to states to help overcome education barriers faced by children of migrant workers. The migrant workforce has changed in recent decades from being predominantly U.S.-born to predominantly foreign-born, with slightly fewer than half of its members undocumented (Mines, Gabbard, and Steirman 1997). As a result the program has in effect been transformed into an element of the nation’s integration policies. Like bilingual education,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Appropriation (in thousands)</th>
<th>Appropriation in FY 2000 dollars (in thousands)</th>
<th>Overall Percent Change in FY 2000 Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$282,444</td>
<td>$372,126</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>294,592</td>
<td>372,458</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>308,298</td>
<td>378,396</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>300,038</td>
<td>357,554</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>302,458</td>
<td>351,439</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>305,475</td>
<td>345,163</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>305,474</td>
<td>335,262</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>305,473</td>
<td>327,741</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>305,473</td>
<td>322,714</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>354,689</td>
<td>366,611</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>354,689</td>
<td>354,689</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>373,493</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


funding for the Migrant Education Program declined from the 1980s through most of the 1990s but rose through the late 1990s. Although data on numbers of students participating are not available on a year-

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how the bilingual education program has kept up with growing immigration. The number served by federal bilingual education programs is much smaller the total number of LEP children enrolled in U.S. schools. It should also be noted that states and localities spend far more than the federal government on bilingual education. The FY 2000 and 2001 budget requests both indicate that bilingual education funding is attempting to keep up with the increasing dispersion of the immigrant population to new states. Those requests state that the Department of Education will emphasize awards to districts that have experienced a recent influx of LEP students and have little prior experience serving them.
by-year basis, in FY 1999 about 664,000 students were served under the program, representing spending of $534 per student (Osorio-O’Dea 1999c). (See table 5.)

**ESL for adults.** One area of education spending where we have seen steadily expanding federal funding throughout both the 1980s and 1990s is funding for English as a Second Language classes for adults. Significantly, these funds are not earmarked in the federal budget as ESL funds, but are distributed to states under the federal Adult Education program, which funds classes in literacy (Adult Basic Education), GED preparation (Adult Secondary Education), as well as English language acquisition. (See figure 21.)

**Figure 21. Enrollment in Adult Education Programs: 1994-1998**

![Bar chart showing enrollment in different adult education programs from 1993-1994 to 1997-1998.](image)

Funding for adult education grew by 56 percent between FY 1992 and 2001 to $452.1 million (table 6). Spending on ESL has been growing far faster than the other program components, however, because of enrollment trends. While enrollment in Adult Basic Education and Adult Secondary Education dropped by 9 and 28 percent respectively between 1994 and 1998, enrollment in ESL grew by 58 percent. Thus, while ESL students made up only 17 percent of all adult education enrollees in 1980, they represented 48 percent in 1998. In addition to this increased spending within the adult education program, the growing demand for ESL led the Clinton administration to include a separate $70 million English language and civics initiative in the FY 2001 budget.

**Spending on Immigrants in Mainstream Federal Programs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Federal (in thousands)</th>
<th>Federal* (in thousands)</th>
<th>Federal Spending Per Student</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$235,750</td>
<td>$289,352</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>254,824</td>
<td>303,672</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>254,624</td>
<td>295,859</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>252,345</td>
<td>285,130</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>247,440</td>
<td>271,569</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>340,339</td>
<td>365,149</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>345,339</td>
<td>364,831</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>377,269</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>452,123</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adjusted to 2000 Dollars.


Note: States and localities spend far more on adult education than the federal government. For example in 1996, they spent $1 billion compared with $263 million in federal spending.

As we indicate above, spending on immigrants within the compass of targeted programs is
dwarfed by spending on mainstream programs such as the Title I program for educating the disadvantaged. To illustrate, the Title I program's FY 1999 budget was $8 billion while the federal bilingual education act's budget was $235 million. According to recent reports, 306,000 LEP students were served in programs funded under the Bilingual Education Act in FY 1999 while the Title I Program was reported to reach 1.5 million LEP children (Osorio-O’Dea, 1999b).

Plainly, a full accounting of the types and amounts of federal spending within mainstream programs on immigrant and language minority families is beyond the reach of this paper. However, several broad federal policy developments should be noted that are relevant to the integration of immigrant families. First, the past decade has witnessed the creation of important new programs for low-wage and disadvantaged populations that, all things being equal, should benefit low-income immigrant families. These include the $20 billion State Children's Health Insurance Program, and the more than $4 billion Welfare-to-Work Program.

Second, we see rising funding levels within a number of key family programs such as child welfare assistance and child care programs. Among the most prominent are substantial budget increases in Head Start (from $1.8 billion in 1990 to 3.8 billion in FY 2000) and child care under the now consolidated Child Care Development Fund (from $1.3 billion in FY 1991 to $3.6 billion in FY 2000).35

However, immigrant and refugee families’ access to these new and growing programs is limited by shifts in eligibility. In most instances, immigrant families who entered after the 1996 welfare law are

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35 These support levels for child care do not include TANF-related expenditures. That said, there is growing evidence of a shortage of quality child care, especially for evening and weekend care, infant care, and after-school care. There is also anecdotal evidence that many immigrant families are having a particularly difficult time finding adequate child care, at least partly because of a mismatch between the language capacity of child care providers and languages spoken by immigrant families.
ineligible for federally funded TANF, Medicaid, SCHIP, food stamp, and SSI benefits. These shifts in eligibility have kept not only affected noncitizens from participating in programs, they have also chilled the participation of eligible citizen and noncitizen relatives.

Program implementation can also exclude immigrant families from services. Advocates claim that immigrants remain underserved by the Head Start program, despite funding increases. Furthermore, in promoting work over education and training in their welfare programs, many states have foreclosed providing English language instruction under their TANF programs.

However, recent expansions to general federal eligibility criteria advantage at least some members of the immigrant population. Examples include increased income eligibility levels for children in Medicaid and legislation that more clearly establishes that LEP children are eligible for Title I services. Both TANF and Welfare-to-Work have recently loosened some of their regulations, increasing potential spending on language and other training for immigrant and limited English speaking families. The final rules for the TANF program issued in April 1999 broaden state discretion in spending. States can, for example, provide a wide range of work supports to low-income families, even those not receiving welfare. The types of assistance they can provide include child care, transportation, and help with work expenses. Recent Department of Labor rules authorize ESL training as a postemployment service for the Welfare-to-Work program. Finally, and importantly, increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit and the federal minimum wage through the 1990s benefited many low-wage immigrant workers and their families.

SELECTED DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

We present below a short and inevitably arbitrary list of policy issues that we believe hold far-reaching significance for the integration of immigrant families.

1. Safety net

While Congress has restored eligibility to legal immigrants for a number of benefit programs, working-age immigrants remain ineligible for food stamps, regardless of their entry date. Further, the legal immigrants arriving since 1996, whose numbers continue to grow, remain ineligible for the five core federal means-tested programs: Food Stamps, SSI, Medicaid, SCHIP, and TANF. By 2002, the year that PRWORA is due to be reauthorized, approximately one third of all legal immigrants will have entered the U.S. after 1996. Within the compass of reauthorization, several issues that bear on restoration of benefits to legal immigrants should be revisited.

➢ Welfare reform effectively shifted the full burden of an immigrant’s support onto his family members and sponsors. Does that shift go too far? Should the sponsor’s support obligation and sponsor deeming (i.e., the attribution of the sponsor’s income to the immigrant for the purpose of qualifying for means-tested benefits) extend to citizenship as it now does, creating, in effect, an open-ended liability? Or should that obligation be limited to a term of years?

➢ Should sponsor deeming be limited to cash transfer and food programs and not be extended to health insurance programs? In practice, deeming leads to a denial of benefits. There was no deeming in Medicaid before welfare reform. Moreover, Australia and Britain introduced new sponsor deeming requirements at the same time the U.S. did—but excluded health insurance from sponsor obligations. (Fix and Laglagaron 2001.)

➢ Should refugees’ eligibility for public benefits be limited to their first five to seven years after
settlement, given the physical and mental health problems they may have suffered? Citizens who use these benefits face no comparable time limits. Unlike legal immigrants, refugees do not have sponsors who can be compelled to support them.

- Should other particularly vulnerable postenactment populations (e.g., pregnant women and children) be made eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP?
- By restricting immigrants’ access to federal benefits, welfare reform shifted substantial responsibilities to states to pay for immigrants’ assistance. Should the relative fiscal responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments be reexamined? In particular, as some governors have contended, should states be given the same authority to extend jointly funded federal means-tested programs (Medicaid, SCHIP, and TANF) to postenactment immigrants as to preenactment immigrants?

2. Education

The reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act this year (2001), coupled with the rapid adoption of performance and content standards in schools, raises a number of important issues regarding the education of immigrant youth.

- Are LEP learners and other immigrant students served by mainstream education programs such as Title I, Head Start, and Perkins Vocation Education programs? Do they receive appropriate services under these programs?
- What impact would the proposed block granting of federal education funds, including the Emergency Immigrant Education and Title VII bilingual programs, have on the provision of services to immigrant students and English language learners?
- Does the introduction of standards-based reforms and high-stakes testing (that determines whether
a student will advance a grade or graduate) lead to increased achievement among English language learners? Higher dropout rates? Both? What accommodations do school systems adopt for these populations?

- Which fiscal policies might correct the mismatch between the grade distribution of LEP students (many of whom are in secondary schools) and the availability of resources to promote English language learning (which is heavily concentrated in elementary schools)?

3. Employment

- Given that immigrant workers’ recent employment rate has risen more rapidly than their wage growth, what policies might accelerate their economic mobility? Should policymakers’ primary focus be on postemployment services that promote skill and language acquisition? What incentives are now provided to employers to offer such services?

- Given the concentration of immigrants in low-wage sectors, does it make sense to expand federal and state enforcement of regulatory programs (wage and hour, occupational safety and health) aimed at low-wage industries?

- Given foreign-born workers are far less likely to have heard of or received the Earned Income Tax Credit than their native counterparts, what strategies might be introduced to increase their participation?

4. Housing and Community Development

- Can we increase immigrant home ownership by adopting asset accumulation models, individual development accounts, or other strategies for establishing credit worthiness? What role can the public sector play?

- To what extent does the continuing withdrawal of Section 8 subsidized from housing markets affect
immigrant families? What if any local policies have successfully expanded housing opportunities for
low-income newcomer families?

5. **Creation of Institutions Focused on Immigrant Integration**

- Would it be advisable to create a National Commission on the Integration of Immigrant Families to
  frame a national and state policy agenda on these issues?

- Should a national Office for Refugees and Immigrants be created? Should it be housed, as the
  Office of Refugee Resettlement now is, within the Administration of Children and Families?

To sum up, while the larger patterns of immigrant integration remain hopeful—the lagged
progress of some immigrant groups, a rapidly expanding undocumented population, restricted access to
the social safety net—all raise integration concerns among policymakers that make the largely *laissez-
faire* approach of the past obsolete.
References


