Greeks Abroad: Social Organisation and Food among the Ten Thousand
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GREEKS ABROAD: SOCIAL ORGANISATION AND FOOD AMONG THE TEN THOUSAND

This study of the Ten Thousand on their way home will consider, with regard to some important aspects of their social behaviour, whether they were adopting and adapting the Greek city way of life, or that of a mercenary army, and whether other possible models may help us to understand their problems and their success.

The Ten Thousand had been part of an army and many of them would form part of one again. The assumption that in the meanwhile they were really just like an army justifies the space given to them by Parke, by Marinovich and by Griffith in books which are studies of Greek mercenary warfare. Of course the men's aim when they were Cyrus's mercenaries (like the aims of other mercenaries) had been to follow what instructions had come to them from above and to take home, individually, what pay and profit they could. But once Cyrus was killed they were no longer mercenaries nor employed by any authority, and their aim, decided by themselves, was to find a way home. Their entirely different status, and their ability to succeed in these new circumstances, mean that it is unwise in investigating the patterns of behaviour either of mercenaries or of the Ten Thousand to assume without question that the two patterns will be the same.

The comparison of the Ten Thousand to a generalised Greek city-state has become a commonplace. Marinovich considers Nussbaum's book to be the extreme proponent of this

1 I am grateful for the comments on earlier versions of this paper made by Jane Rowlandson, James Roy, Michael Crawford and Gerald Mars. Faults in it are not theirs.

2 It is not, of course, the first. Anderson, Griffith, Marinovich, Nussbaum, Parke and Roy are among modern authors who have followed Diodorus Siculus (see n. 8) in giving close attention to this undeniably gripping historical episode.


I have found myself citing Roy's two papers most frequently. The French translation of Marinovich was, for me, very timely: without it I would have missed Marinovich's insights. On the Ten Thousand see 122-177 (135-196 of the translation: references will be given to both).

3 Decisions made by Cyrus and discussed with the men who shared his table (syntrapezoí, Xenophon Anabasis i 9.31) were transmitted to Clearchus, who had most de facto authority among the mercenary generals (i 3.8, i 6.5 etc. References in this form are to Xenophon's Anabasis. See Roy, 'Mercenaries' 292-3 on Clearchus's position). Syntrapezoí is no doubt the appropriate term here but it is an uncommon word in classical Greek because it was not applicable to (e.g.) Athenian dining customs, in which tables were seldom shared. Hence homotrapezoí is more often found, e.g. i 8.25, also Xenophon, Cyropaedia vii 1.30, Plato, Laws 868e (cf. synestios lb. 868d), Deinarchus, Against Demosthenes 24, Strabo i 3.5, Chariton, Chaereas and Callirhoe vii 2.5.

4 On their aims see also n. 22.

5 Marinovich 174-5/192-5.
view of their behaviour, which she accepts up to a point, rightly adding, however, that 'the army's organisation and its internal relations, as well as its aims, were wholly different [from those of a city]'. It should be remembered, too, that of the 66 individuals whose origins are recorded, only eight were Athenian: hence, if it is legitimate to postulate the 'typical Greek city-state', Athens, with its unusually large population, extensive territory and complex institutions, must not colour our view of what was typical.

In some ways closer to the position of the Ten Thousand than a settled city was a city on the move, a colonising expedition. There is nothing new about this comparison. It must have been in Xenophon's mind during the march, while Thucydides attributed a similar idea to Nicias concerning the Athenian army in Sicily: on both, see the next section, where something will be said on the demography of the Ten Thousand as compared with cities and with colonising expeditions. Let us add that in the case of the numerous foundations that drew colonists from more than one city, the task of determining social norms and laws for the new independent city must have been urgent and difficult, and the decisions less consciously made and less coldly considered than in Plato's Laws. Cyrus's mercenaries were more miscellaneous in their origins, probably, than any normal group of Greek colonists; but the sudden need for such a group to find ways of living together and making decisions was nothing new in contemporary Greek experience.

One or two parallels with the Iliad will also suggest themselves. The Iliad had such vast influence over classical and later Greeks that we need not be surprised if Homeric incidents and patterns of behaviour were consciously or unconsciously in men's minds during the march. There is also room for re-examination of the nature of the Greek army outside Troy as the poet visualised it: for its behaviour was in some details noticeably different from that of any historical Greek army. It is easy to see why. Perhaps, long before the eighth century, some state in Greece had been able to send an army to besiege a city in Asia Minor for ten years; but no Greek state was able to do such a thing at the time when the Iliad was composed. So the poet, not being a pure antiquarian, will have had present in his mind expeditions that did take place in his time, and these would have been expeditions of a very different scale and purpose: piracy, brigandage, wars between neighbouring towns, colonisation within or beyond the Aegean.

The life of the Ten Thousand is described by Xenophon, our only source, in considerable detail and with apparent artlessness. A study on the basis of a single source risks being coloured or invalidated by its prejudices and errors. Xenophon was a member of the group he described; he was aware of the importance, for successful commanders, of observing the social behaviour of soldiers; he knew how crucially food and comfort can affect men's morale. He was not an enthusiast for democracy, so one might look for unsympathetic reporting of mass meetings. He wrote the Anabasis perhaps three or four decades after the events; his own part in them might easily have become distorted in his mind during that period, and might easily be

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6 Roy, 'Mercenaries' 303-8.
7 On the Sicilian expedition see Mosse; on Xenophon, n. 22-23 below.
8 Three centuries later Diodorus Siculus (Library, xiv 27.1-37.4) wrote a fairly full narrative of the retreat; where this differs from Xenophon it does so by over-simplifying. Cf. Roy, 'Mercenaries' 294-5. It has nothing independent to offer. There were other memoirs of the retreat by participants, now lost. Diodorus (and later Plutarch, Artaxerxes) had independent sources for Cyrus's advance, cf. Anderson 80-84.
9 It is fair to infer this from the generous space given in the Anabasis (examples below) and Hellenica (e.g. ii 1.1-5) to soldiers' opinions and to their morale.
10 Examples from Anabasis below; cf. Hellenica vii 5.15, vii 5.20, etc. Socrates, in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii 2.4), argues explicitly the prime importance to a general of his men's morale.
11 On Xenophon's political views see Anderson, especially 40-45.
coloured or magnified in the narrative, and we have no way of knowing for sure.\textsuperscript{12} He was, at all events, a writer of books that he intended to be useful,\textsuperscript{13} and there is no clear sign that he spoilt the usefulness of the Anabasis by intentionally falsifying the actions or motives of participants other than himself, though we are quite at liberty to suppose that he misinterpreted or misunderstood them.

**DEMOGRAPHY**

In discussing the comparison of the Ten Thousand to a city, Marinovich observes that, like a city, they had ‘lower ranks’ comprising (in their case) camp followers and slaves.\textsuperscript{14} Let us be as precise as possible. There were—just before Cunaxa—12,940 free males of fighting age. They were of widely different origins, though all surely able to understand some dialect of Greek.\textsuperscript{15} The number of old people was evidently negligible. Some of the soldiers had brought attendants,\textsuperscript{16} or used enslaved prisoners of war as attendants: these were of both sexes and included children.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, it is evident from later episodes that there were, at least, prostitutes and mule drivers,\textsuperscript{18} and no doubt there were other professions too, among free camp-followers of the Ten Thousand at this stage. These non-combatants were tenaciously part of the community and sometimes had to be taken account of in its decisions;\textsuperscript{19} they and the soldiers were so essential to one another that their number grew inexorably. By the time they were among the Carduchi there were perhaps more slaves and camp-followers than soldiers.\textsuperscript{20}

There is substance in Xenophon’s joke in his speech to the assembly just as they all determine to set out on the long walk home. He says that even if everything fails,

And if the rivers will not let us through and no guide appears, even then we need not worry. We know that the Mysians (we would not say they were better than us) here in the King’s country, against the King’s wishes, have plenty of big prosperous towns; and we know the Pisidians are the same; and we saw the Lycaonians, how they have taken the strong points in the plains and so get the produce of the Persians’ territory. So, I should say, we ought not to be so obvious yet about setting off home, but get ready as if to settle here! I know the King would give the Mysians plenty of guides and plenty of guarantees to get them safe away, and make roads for them, and even if they chose to drive off with horses four abreast. And for us I know he would do it happily three times over, once he had seen us getting ready to stay. But I am afraid, if we once learn to live like lazy lords and bed down with the lovely big wives and daughters of the Medes and Persians, that like the lotus eaters we shall forget the road home.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} But see n. 44, with its reference to Roy, ‘Evidence’, for one line of enquiry. In the same paper is a full discussion of Xenophon’s method of work; references there too, 45 n. 29, on the date of composition. But whatever Roy may say, we have really no idea whether Xenophon kept notes, nor whether there were ‘official records’ of the Ten Thousand, nor whether he would have had access to them later if there were.
\item \textsuperscript{13} This again is inference: Xenophon wrote few prefaces. But most of his works overtly instruct novices (On Hunting, On Horsemanship) or correct misleading statements by others (Ways and Means, Symposium: see the opening sections of these two) or propound ideals (Spartan Constitution, Education of Cyrus).
\item \textsuperscript{14} Marinovich 176/194 and 140-141/154-5; see further Marinovich, ‘Nayemniki’ 76-7 and n. 26-39.
\item \textsuperscript{15} i 7.10. For the calculation, and for what is known of origins, see Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ 301-9.
\item \textsuperscript{16} ii 5.32, cf. iv 1.12. Strangely, Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ 310 argues that soldiers did not have personal servants, although there is plenty of evidence that it was common practice: for references see Pritchett, 16 n. 50, 49-51.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Dancing girl, vi 1.12; boys, mostly from among the captives, took part in wrestling, iv 8.27; women and boys as sexual partners, iv 1.14. What was the age and status of the dyo neanisko, two youngsters, at iv 3.10? Thucydidcs vii 60.3 implies that there was a certain number of children with the Athenian army in Sicily.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Prostitutes vi 3.19, cf. v 4.33; mule-driver v 8.
\item \textsuperscript{19} iii 2.36.
\item \textsuperscript{20} vi 1.12-14: ‘with the large number of people, twice the quantity of food had to be obtained and transported.’ It was at this point that the generals attempted to reduce supply problems by expelling the slaves who had been acquired most recently.
\item \textsuperscript{21} iii 2.23-26. P. G. van Soesbergen saw that this was a joke (‘Colonisation as a solution to social-economic problems in fourth-century Greece’ in Ancient society vol. xiii/xiv [1982/3] 131-145). Parke (33) took it seriously: ‘their plan,’ he says, ‘was to fight their way northward and westward ... or if they failed to find a way, to settle and defy the
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It was a joke, certainly, said (if indeed it was said) to get the assembly laughing. But it was not exactly a fantasy, for Xenophon really did consider founding a city on the Black Sea coast: an unrealistic idea, as he was to find, if only because too many of these mercenaries had set out from homes or families to which they wanted to return.\(^{22}\) The reference to the Pisidians was accurate enough; the independent Pisidians had been one of Cyrus's original excuses for gathering his mercenary army.\(^{23}\) At any rate, 'settling there' like Greek colonists elsewhere, or like Pisidians and Lycaonians on Anatolian hilltops, must have been something that men in that position could imagine themselves doing and feel capable of doing; otherwise the suggestion would have lowered morale, not raised it.

Demographically, how did the Ten Thousand compare with a colonising expedition?\(^{24}\) The answer (which must be a tentative one) is interesting. On the one hand the act of sending out a colony was one that involved the whole population of a city, as shown by the Thera decree concerning Cyrene,\(^{25}\) which included the sympathetic magic of the melting of wax models, all having come together, men and women and boys and girls.

The Locrians, according to Timaeus,\(^{26}\) began their instructions to the colonists of Locri Epizephyrii: 'As parents to children ...'

On the other hand it was carefully provided that the colonists themselves should be young men, one from each family. The Cyrene inscription is very clear:

> to sail in their fairness and their likeness by houses, one son to be chosen [of each house, their] full grown ones, to sail ... Let one who shall not wish to sail, the town having sent him, be liable to die, and his goods be public. Let one hiding or protecting whether a father a son or a brother a brother be punished like one not wishing to sail.\(^{27}\)

And one clause in the decree concerning the Locrian colonisation of Naupactus allows us to follow the underlying thought a little further.\(^{28}\)

If he wish to return, he may without forfeit if he leave a full grown son or a brother in his house.

How many wives, how many slaves, how many women and children, how many old people went along when Greeks migrated?\(^{29}\) These decrees suggest that there was variation as to how

King as the Mysians and other native tribes had succeeded in doing'. By 'native tribes' Parke means Asiatics: Xenophon's point is that the Pisidians and Lycaonians were not natives but recent migrants. Marinovich (131-2/145) takes the sentence about the Lotus-eaters as evidence that there really was a section of the army that wanted to stay in Babylonia, although Roy, 'Mercenaries' 318 n. 124 had rightly pointed out: 'The passage does not prove that the desires mentioned actually existed.'

\(^{22}\) vi 4.8, iii 4.46, cf. ii 6.13. Roy, 'Mercenaries' (316-320) and Marinovich (132-4/143-7) discuss the aims of Cyrus's mercenaries; on the aims of mercenaries in general see also P. McKechnie, Outsiders in the Greek cities in the fourth century BC (London 1989) 80. 90. These are by no means the most convincing passages of the Anabasis; see especially Roy's comments on vi 4.8.

\(^{23}\) i 2.4.

\(^{24}\) In a discussion of the fantasy of settling the Athenian army in Sicily, attributed by Thucydides (vii 77.4-5) to Nicias, Mosse examines its demography. There are not enough statistics to permit a firm conclusion, but she estimates that the proportion of hoplites (1500) to total population in that army was similar to the proportion in Attica as a whole.

\(^{25}\) For text and a translation see Graham, 224-6. The decree is a 4th century BC reconstitution, erected at Cyrene, which seems to contain old material.

\(^{26}\) Reported sceptically by Polybius xii 9.3. For a similar metaphor see Plato, Laws 754a.

\(^{27}\) Supported by Herodotus, iv 153, who adds that brothers drew lots to determine who was to sail. Accepting the evidence of the inscription and of Herodotus seems to entail rejecting the view of the Libyan historian Meneceles (schol. Pind. Pyth. 4.10) that the colony resulted from civil strife in Thera. What Meneceles may have thought of the inscription is unknown.


\(^{29}\) The question has been discussed by J. Rougé, 'La colonisation grecque et les femmes' in Cahiers d'histoire xv (1970) 307-317, by A. J. Graham, 'Religion, women and Greek colonization' in Atti del Centro Ricerche e Documentazione sull' Antichità Classica xii = n.s. i (1980/81) 293-314, and by R. van Compernolle, 'Femmes indigènes et colonisateurs' in Forme di contatto e processi di trasformazione nelle società antiche: Modes de contacts et processus
many went from each family\textsuperscript{30} but that whole families did not go,\textsuperscript{31} and imply that a new colony needed a preponderance of able-bodied men; intermarriage with local peoples is reported from many colonies. It seems fair, all in all, to hypothesise that the demography of the Ten Thousand was not unlike that of a colony on the move.

**UNANIMITY**

At the opening of the first midnight meeting of surviving officers and generals Xenophon, a friend of the missing Proxenus, was introduced by Proxenus’s oldest officer, Hieronymus of Elis. This privilege accorded to age is worth noticing. In armies authority tends not to go with age. In some communities imagined by Greeks (such as the Ithaca of *Odyssey* ii 13-34 and the utopia of Plato’s *Republic* 412c and 465a) old men do speak first in debate or with special authority: here, we may suppose, in a power vacuum, the officers found reassurance in a rule of procedure generally familiar from practice within families, from folklore, and from the politics of some Greek towns.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} One son to Cyrene; more might go to Naupactus. One man in every ten from Chalcis went via Delphi to found Rhegium, according to the story in Strabo vi 1.6 (257).

\textsuperscript{31} This is clear in the case of Cyrene. It is implied by the following clause in the Naupactus decree (which also has its parallel at Cyrene): ‘If the Hypocnemidian Locrians are driven out of Naupactus by force, they may go back, each to where he was, without forfeit.’ It would be difficult to make this promise if family homes were being given up.

\textsuperscript{32} Cf. *Odyssey* vii 155 and scholia; Plato, *Laws* 634d-e, 658e-660d, 680a-e, 690a.
Xenophon’s proposal was accepted; replacement leaders were chosen and called a general meeting of the soldiers. These, prompted by two generals, Cheirisophus and Cleanor, approved Xenophon’s plan which he set out to them persuasively and at length, having taken advantage of the good omen of a sneeze to get an initial audience response. Cheirisophus invited others to comment but he and Xenophon managed the end of the assembly (so Xenophon lets us understand) in such a way that no time was left and there was no debate.

One opposed the consensus at one’s own risk, as Apollonides (Xenophon’s one vocal critic at the officers’ meeting) found. A fellow officer pointed out that Apollonides had had his ears pierced like a Lydian: so, though he spoke Greek like a native Boeotian, Apollonides was expelled from the meeting. An interesting parallel arises with the army in the Iliad. Disagreement in assembly was expressed by Thersites: he too was violently driven away. His offence, it is generally said, was to have dared from his lowly position to attack Agamemnon. Was it rather that he was raising complaints when the assembly, carefully prepared by Odysseus, was waiting to be assured of victory by Calchas and to be urged on to fight by Nestor and Agamemnon? Thersites was speaking at the wrong time—and therefore he was bandy-legged, hunchbacked and balding.

Unanimous assemblies were, of course, not the whole story. If ordinary men happened to unite in opposition to authority they did indeed ‘count’: they were all-powerful, as demonstrated by the disagreements later on the march. Men who roared approval and derision en masse might well have been persuaded in small groups beforehand (we can see the process hinted at in both Iliad and Anabasis) less bluntly than in the words of Odysseus:

Friend, sit still and hear the word of others who are better than you: there is no fight and no strength in you; you do not count in fighting or in council. We Achaeans shall never all be masters; rule by many is not good: there should be one ruler, one master...

In groups without territory of their own, under continuous external threat, it is perhaps not unnatural that a dissenting opinion had no right to persist. Even when settled in towns and constituting democracies, Greeks demonstrated from time to time an intolerance for the proponents of minority views. The ultimate cure might be ‘ostracism’, exile without

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33 Here not called strategoi ‘generals’ but arkhontes ‘rulers’, iii 1.47, cf. also iii 2.29-30, as if to emphasise that the group was ceasing to be an army: the term strategoi is not dropped, however.

34 At the end of the officers’ meeting, iii 1.45-47, there was also somehow no opportunity for debate. Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ (288) observes that the election of generals had been ‘conducted entirely by the surviving officers; the ordinary soldiers had nothing to do with it, and did not even discuss ... these elections ... Democracy played no part.’

35 By no means all the army was of Greek origin. Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ (303-6) and Marinovich, ‘Nayemniki’ tabulate names and origins so far as known. The ‘foreigner with pierced ears’ accusation was, for all we know, simply a quick way to discredit a trouble-maker. Xenophon as narrator confirms that the man’s ears were pierced, stating nothing as to his origin. Marinovich, less circumspect, classes him in her table as a Lydian ex-slave.

36 Iliad ii 211-278.

37 Though certainly we can gather that he usually attacked Achilles and Odysseus and that his criticism of Agamemnon was unusual. Iliad ii 220-222.

38 He is characterised as ametroepes ‘of unmeasured words’; his words were ou kata kosmon ‘improper’ and critical of the leaders, but usually raised a laugh among the men, Iliad ii 212-216.

39 Iliad ii 84-181; Anabasis v 6.37-7.4.

40 Iliad ii 200-206, cf. ii 188-194.

41 As Plato had learnt (for Socrates surely represents him): ‘Do you not know that [the masses and their favourite speakers] punish with disenfranchisement, fines and death one whom they do not persuade?’ Plato, Republic 492d. In Sparta and on Crete, claims the Athenian in Plato’s Laws (634de), young men were forbidden to question the merits of any law.
discussion or appeal, in the case of Athens; it might be death, so Demosthenes asserted, among the Locrians.42

DECISION-MAKING

The Ten Thousand inherited, renewed and maintained a well-defined hierarchy: generals, officers and men. But, for a long time after the initial meetings, they did not operate in practice in the way that this hierarchy might lead us to expect.43 What happened instead was that, Xenophon's plan having been approved, he was thereafter at the fore when operational decisions were needed. They were always discussed between Xenophon and Cheirisophus, sometimes with all the generals and occasionally with the officers; such discussions could conveniently and unobtrusively take place while the soldiers were busy cooking and eating.44 The soldiers were not consulted: the next assembly only occurred weeks later when further planning was needed. There was no framework for the debating of alternatives meanwhile. The outcome could have been disastrous if no mechanism had existed for getting useful ideas and information from individuals. Such a mechanism did exist and had nothing to do with the generals, officers or assembly. It was simply that anyone might come to talk to Xenophon while he was eating or sleeping.45

If authority for the time being rested with Xenophon and with those whom he wished to consult, this is not to say that the hierarchical structure of generals, officers and men was a sham; rather that one must examine what it achieved. It did not bring forward proposals; it did not encourage the discussion or amendment of proposals that individuals brought forward. It produced unanimous agreement to implement Xenophon's plan, usually by Xenophon's methods. Yet it showed sufficient resemblances to the typical town politics and army organisation of Greece to give a reassuring feeling of lawfulness.46 In a crisis such as this,

42 Demosthenes, Against Timocrates 139. Socrates inclined to attribute his own death to the fact that he persisted in asking unwanted questions: Plato, Apology 37c-d.
43 Nussbaum's thesis is in essence an exegesis of this hierarchical structure.
44 iii 5.7, 5.14. Other meetings of the generals: iii 3.20, 4.21 etc. By emphasising Xenophon's priority at this stage of the march I may seem to take a controversial position: I state it thus firmly because I am less interested in the form of leadership (see below) than in the power of decision.
Most later scholars have followed Diodorus (xiv 27.1) who thought that 'they gave the leadership to one of the generals, Cheirisophus the Lacedaemonian'. Roy, 'Mercenaries' (293-4) shows the insecure basis of this opinion. Diodorus held it, in all likelihood, because Cheirisophus commanded the troops that headed the line of march. A minority has emphasised the role of the generals as a whole: Anderson (118) says that all the way from the Tigris to Sinope 'the army was directed by the majority vote of the generals' (my emphasis), following Rex Warner's tendentious translation of Anabasis vi 1.18 ek tes nikoses (Xenophon, The Persian expedition, Harmondsworth 1949, 218). Most committees do not reach most of their decisions by 'majority vote': it is rather an expedient in cases where argument has failed to effect the prevalence of one point of view. I see no evidence in Anabasis books iii-iv that anything during the period they cover was decided by any majority vote.
Roy, 'Mercenaries' (290-295) gives attention to the extent to which individual generals still commanded their individual units, whose make-up, however, varied during the course of the retreat. And in 'Evidence' Roy points out that in books iii-iv of the Anabasis Xenophon tends to mention incidents involving men of his own unit (the rearguard) much more predominantly than in books v-vi. This is potentially of great importance for assessing his position in the hierarchy: it can hardly show intentional bias, and therefore must reflect the limits on his powers of observation and sources of information. But these limits, during the march through Armenia, would have been (as Roy observes) imposed by geography even if they were not imposed by hierarchy. In darkness, bad weather and broken terrain the rearguard simply did not know what the vanguard was doing.
A final detail which must be given due weight is that, late in the retreat, there was formal discussion of the choice of a single commander (vi 1). Up to that point, certainly, there was no formal single commander (and at that point the honour went to Cheirisophus, Xenophon apparently declining it).
45 iv 3.10. Nussbaum 7, 29 plays down this point precisely because it has nothing to do with the overt hierarchy of command.
46 Even in an ad hoc grouping without laws or constitution men could be accused of anomia, lawlessness (v 7.34).
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unanimity and reassurance were both of the first importance. 47

Now it was common enough for a settled city, when under threat, to look beyond its constitution for the guidance of a tyrannos, a dictator. Many of the precepts in Aeneas Tacitus’s handbook on Defence under Siege, aimed at the perpetually warring small towns of western Greece, are framed on the assumption that their user will have monarchical powers. 48 But there is one particular circumstance in which we can observe early Greeks acquiescing naturally in the leadership of one man, and that is when setting out to found a colony. On such an expedition there is no room for disagreement. The essential decisions must be made by the oikistes, ‘founder’, as they were already (though the word is not used) when Nausithous led a fictional colony from Hypereie:

Taking them from there godlike Nausithous led them and sat them in Scherie ... and drew a wall round the town and built houses and made temples of gods and divided up fields. 49

The founder’s task was to rule as long as single rule was needed, that is, from the beginning when the oracle was consulted to the end when laws had been established, grain had been sown and the new town was succeeding. Over that period his rule was indispensable and highly honoured, ‘godlike’ indeed, for he had been divinely chosen and would be honoured as a hero with rites and appropriate sacrifices after his death. 50 From earlier migrations, indeed, beyond the reach of history, later Greeks still retained, or thought they did, not only the fact of each town’s foundation or refoundation, but also the founder’s name and affiliation (whether offspring of Ion or of Aeolus or of Heracles). 51

PURCHASE OF FOOD

So far we have looked at the political life of the Ten Thousand. Their economic life is equally instructive. Their continuing most urgent need, more insistent even than the need to find a way home, was for a regular supply of food, 52 and for this reason food will be prominent in the sections that follow.

We can observe throughout the retreat that it was not seen as part of the duty of the leader or leaders of such a group as this to supply food to followers. 53 His obligation was a more...

47 The less that immediate danger threatened and the nearer that the Ten Thousand got to Greek civilisation and to their homes, the less they were inclined to follow one leader’s lead without question, cf. Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ (288): ‘The conduct of the army changed markedly after reaching the Black Sea.’ Danger had concentrated their minds: in any case, there had been fewer realistic choices in the mountains of inland Asia Minor. It is worth remembering, too, that the regular formal training between battles undergone by a serving army reinforces habits of discipline; the lack of this particular kind of conditioning was no doubt beginning to take effect.

48 Aeneas makes much use of impersonal constructions, but, when these are dropped, the second person singular is used (e.g. ix 1-3), the reader being envisaged as wielding power sometimes over military, sometimes over civilian activities.

49 Odyssey vi 1253

7-11, already quoted in this connection by Graham, 29. Hekas andrion alphestaon has been omitted: see n. 96 below.

50 Unlike the general of an army, he was not there to follow and interpret the directions of the home government. The home government might occasionally try to exert a paternalistic authority, but typically the colonists were on their own. Graham discusses all this on pp. 29-39.

51 J. Bérard in L’expansion et la colonisation grecques jusqu’aux guerres médiques (Paris 1960) 36-57 collects and discusses these traditions. In general see Malkin on similarities between oecist, king and general.

52 E.g. iv 1.8-9.

53 Pritchett (34-41) shows that the commander of a classical Greek army saw his obligations similarly, and compares the South Vietnamese system under which a soldier, from his pay, purchased his own rations, the army undertaking only that rice would be available to him for purchase; other food he obtained as best he could. So Roy, ‘Mercenaries’ (311) deduces from Anabasis i 5.6 that Cyrus ‘provided food, but evidently did not feel obliged to provide good food’ (by which, I take it, Roy means a balanced diet).
abstract one: to ensure that in one way or another it was possible for them to get it, by foraging, by negotiation, by capturing a village and its supplies, or by purchase.\textsuperscript{54} If purchase was the choice he would have to try to make sure they could afford it. So we are told that Lycon the Achaean said at an assembly at Heraclea:

I am surprised, men, that the generals have not tried to supply us with the wherewithal to buy food; those presents will not make even three days' food for the army, and there is nowhere to stock up before we go on.\textsuperscript{55}

On this occasion Lycon suggested negotiation with (that is, blackmail of) Heraclea. The more usual way for the Ten Thousand to build up resources was to seize booty which could later be sold or exchanged.\textsuperscript{56} An examination of the framework in which they exchanged booty for food places them in an interesting historical context.

A market organised within an army, comparable to a modern Naafi, must have become a necessity in the Near East very early, as armies there grew too large to be supplied by the towns en route. Cyrus's army therefore had had its travelling market, run by Lydians; the Greek mercenaries had used it\textsuperscript{57} but had also visited shops or markets in towns.\textsuperscript{58} Xenophon's description of the travelling market suggests that it was something unusual in his experience.\textsuperscript{59}

At any rate thirteen hundred years later the Persian Arabic geographer Ibn Khurdâdhbih, d. 912, implies in his \textit{Book of Routes and Provinces} that the institution had still not been adopted by Greeks:

There is no market in the Roman [Byzantine] camp. Each soldier is obliged to bring from his home the bread, oil, wine and cheese that he needs.\textsuperscript{60}

During the retreat we may observe that the Ten Thousand had no market of their own, as an Asiatic army might have done, but benefited from a different custom. Towns on their route (not only Greek cities like Trapezus\textsuperscript{61} but also Macronian\textsuperscript{62} and other native villages) were ready to arrange irregular markets for them. In all probability they were already accustomed to

\textsuperscript{54} For discussion of these choices see iii 2.21, v 1.6, v 5.13-19. Griffith (266) oversimplified when he wrote that the Ten Thousand 'were marching through a hostile country, taking what they could get without paying for it.'

\textsuperscript{55} vi 2.4. This earliest occurrence of \textit{siteresion}, meaning booty or coin to exchange for food, cannot help to elucidate the relation of the term to \textit{misthos}, 'wage' (as hoped by Griffith (268-272), Pritchett (3-6 and 51-2) since the Ten Thousand got no wages, as Marinovich (162/146-7) observes.

\textsuperscript{56} E.g. vi 6.38: 'They got a lot of human and animal property (\textit{andrapoda kai probata}): in six days they arrived at Chrysopolis in Chalcedonia and stayed there seven days selling booty.' This procedure had a long history. In an episode of the \textit{Iliad} a ship arrived from Lemnos with a cargo of wine which the Achaaeans bought, 'some for bronze, some for fiery iron, some for hides, some for whole cows, some for slaves (\textit{andrapodessi}).' \textit{Iliad} vii 472-5. This, incidentally, is the only occurrence of any form of \textit{andrapoda} in the Homeric epics, because it is one of the few places in the epics where slaves are seen as liquid assets. It may be argued, following Zenodotus and Aristophanes of Byzantium (cited by the \textit{Iliad scholia}) that the line is a late addition to the epic because this word is late. \textit{Andrapoda} is certainly formed by analogy from \textit{tetrapot} (itself an unexceptionable compound attested in Linear B). But about its date all that can really be said is that the link between the two words was no longer felt by the fifth century, for by that time they had established dissimilar singular declensions, \textit{e.g. tetrapoun} Herodotus ii 68, \textit{andrapodon} Pherecrates \textit{fr.} 220 Kassel-Austin.

\textsuperscript{57} i 1.5.6, cf. i 2.18.

\textsuperscript{58} i 1.5.10, cf. i 2.24.

\textsuperscript{59} In Greece itself even regular armies, like Asiatic caravans, required cities on their route to arrange markets for them (for references see Pritchett 45-6). These would be outside the walls: by contrast, markets for regular local trade took place inside town defences even at times of danger, though that meant opening the gates to aliens (Aeneas Tacticus 30.1-2).


\textsuperscript{61} iv 8.23.

\textsuperscript{62} iv 8.8, cf. v 5.18.
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doing so for the large caravans that were always a common vehicle of trade in southern Asia. These irregular markets, like the ‘camp markets’ for the 19th century caravan with which Charles Doughty crossed Arabia (similar caravan markets were observed in Arabia and Mesopotamia in 1184 AD by the Spanish pilgrim Ibn Jubayr), would be outside the town defences, for cogent security reasons. Small towns like Cotyora dared not allow the Ten Thousand to enter even singly, and large towns like Byzantium might regret it if they did. Yet a town clearly need not lose by providing a market for travellers while taking reasonable precautions: men trading unwanted booty for essential food are in a weak bargaining position.

In the Near Eastern context, therefore, towns that did arrange markets for the Ten Thousand were, by doing so, identifying them as a peaceful ‘caravan’ rather than a military force. Tissaphernes, offering a safe conduct, had specified that markets would be provided, and the Greeks themselves were ready to see such provision as a friendly act.

OWNERSHIP AND DISTRIBUTION OF BOOTY

Why, then, were the Ten Thousand unequally supplied? For we are told that some could afford to buy in the markets and some could not. Yet there had been small wages for any of them, and none since Cyrus’s death; and, in contrast with any group setting out to found a colony, those men who had assets had no doubt left them at home. Moreover, at the beginning of the retreat there had been a sharing of such booty as its possessors could not carry.

The only possible explanation is that the principle of ownership and distribution of newly acquired assets that might seem obvious to us in the circumstances (the principle of equal sharing or common ownership) must be obvious only from hindsight. We can in fact find two clues to the practice that was adopted. First, here it is in effect:

There was a lot of wood at the camp site, but any who reached there late got no wood. Those arriving first and tending the fires would not let the latecomers get near their fire if they did not hand over some wheat or whatever other food they might have.

Secondly, at Calpes Limen, towards the end of the march, an attempt was finally made to impose the principle of common ownership on newly acquired assets:

When the whole army went out, anything acquired by anyone off on his own was counted public (demosion).
This decree is stated as something new, and we may certainly infer from other sources that soldiers ‘off on their own’ generally expected to get the profit from their own seizure of booty.\textsuperscript{74} Although limited to ‘when the whole army went out’, the new decree was considered by some to be unacceptable, for the disagreement over it flared into a riot.\textsuperscript{75}

Now in the state warfare of classical Greece booty was distributed by the leader in the field, and what was not distributed in that way became the property of the state.\textsuperscript{76} The signs are that Xenophon, and the generals, did not take such responsibility for the booty acquired by the Ten Thousand. If we look for a closer model for what the Ten Thousand really did we shall find it in the \textit{Iliad}. According to Achilles’ two early speeches, the Achaeans at Troy did not keep a common store and a group that had captured some booty would decide on the sharing of it within itself (giving a generous share to its leader, as we shall next discuss).\textsuperscript{77} Whether or not the \textit{Iliad} story was in their minds, it seems clear that the Ten Thousand followed this pattern, and not that of the Greek armies of their time, even though it would have had evident advantages for many of them if their leader had had the responsibility for distributing booty and had done it fairly.

\textbf{THE PUBLIC PURSE}

The Ten Thousand came to possess a small amount of extra property, deriving from booty, which Xenophon, perhaps euphemistically, called ‘public’.\textsuperscript{78} Since we have seen that the leadership took no responsibility for the distribution of booty, we must take it that this was the leaders’ share out of booty that had been distributed among themselves by its captors. It was not hoarded (Xenophon may be telling the truth when towards the end of the story he emphasises his poverty, at last relieved by a risky but successful act of private brigandage in which he set himself up for life):\textsuperscript{79} it was used, and it had a very specific use. It helped to maintain control over subordinates and to win prestige among outsiders, both very important if the group was to survive. We are reminded of both purposes in the episode in which the Ten Thousand, re-entering Persian territory in Paphlagonia, needed to impress the governor’s ‘ambassadors’ with the adequacy of their resources.

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\textsuperscript{74} E.g. Plutarch, \textit{Agesilaus} 1.19. And even under the new rule quoted in the text, individuals retained their own booty if it was acquired ‘when the army stayed still’.

\textsuperscript{75} At any rate ‘Xenophon and the other generals ... pointed out that the reason for the trouble was the decision passed by the army’ (vi 6.8). It is worth remembering that a previous lack of central distribution of wealth would also have meant relative freedom from the interference of superiors.

There was an exception: gifts of supplies received by the group as a whole from towns en route were, not unnaturally, distributed in rations to all (e.g. vi 2.3-4).

\textsuperscript{76} Pritchett (85-92): the commander was answerable to the state for his disposal of booty. The question is taken up again in Pritchett’s new fifth volume, which I have not seen.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Iliad} i 122-9, 149-171, cf. also i 365-9 and ii 225-8. Garlan (49) (translation 74) is wrong to extrapolate backwards from classical armies and say that even in the \textit{Iliad} the king did the sharing-out.

\textsuperscript{78} And perhaps remembering that the Greek leaders at Troy drank \textit{demia}, ‘at public cost’, with Agamemnon and Menelaus, \textit{Iliad} xvii 250. See \textit{Anabasis} iv 7.27, vi 6.2 and 37. Pace Roy, ‘Evidence’ (44), iii [2.28 does not indicate the existence of a centrally managed treasury: the speaker does not claim authority over the assets under discussion or state that they are all in one place; he urges all to agree to discard them.

\textsuperscript{79} vii 8.
The generals ... treated [the ambassadors] to hospitality, and invited those of the rest of the men whom they thought most deserving ... They put on an adequate feast: they lay on camp beds to dine, and drank from horn cups, which they had been able to get there in the district.

What is said above, suggesting the identification of the 'public property' of the Ten Thousand with the leader's share of booty, is not merely internal inference. It is a widespread phenomenon for those held in honour to be given an unreasonably large share of wealth, or of food, so that they can retain prestige and power by redistributing it. The custom, well understood by Aristotle, is neatly encapsulated in the narrative of Odysseus in the Odyssey:

Taking the Cyclops's sheep ... we divided them so that I saw no one went cheated of a fair share; but to me alone, when the sheep were shared out, my well-greaved comrades gave an extra ram; offering this on the beach to Zeus ... I burnt the thighs ... Thus then all day till sunset we sat feasting on plenty of meat and sweet wine.

So the leader's extra sheep was the one that was sacrificed that day: it went partly up to Zeus in a (vain) attempt to win his favour; partly down to his comrades. With different details such customs are found elsewhere in the Odyssey (the portion of honour in hunting, and at meals; the distribution of food to beggars and orphans), in classical Greece (the 'bonuses' given by commanders for outstanding service, the generous rations of the Spartiates, the city's power to entertain, or to exclude from entertainment), in Macedonia and Thrace, in classical Rome, in medieval Europe and in many other societies.

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80 Or something of that kind. The fashion of reclining at meals had been familiar in the Near East earlier than in Greece (cf. J.-M. Dentzer, 'Aux origines de l'iconographie du banquet couché' in Revue archéologique [1971] 215-258). The fact that Xenophon specifies the furniture that had to be used suggests that reclining would not have been normal at the daily meals of the Ten Thousand; no doubt the fashion was adopted here in order to impress.

81 vii.3-4.

82 Athenaeus 556c-e, with reference to Iliad ii 226 and vii 467, citing Aristotle fr. 144 Rose: 'It is unlikely, comments Aristotle, that this mass of women was [given by the Achaeans to Agamemnon] for use, but rather for geras, just as his stores of wine were not built up for him to get drunk.'

83 The same word is used of Nausithous's division of land in the mythical colony of Scherie (see n. 49).

84 Odyssey ix 548-557; cf. xiv 231-3.

85 Odyssey ix 152-165; xiv 437-8; xv 310-316 etc.; Iliad xxii 492-8.

86 i 1.2, 4.12, 7.7, 9.17.


89 For the 'generosity' of Philip see Demosthenes xix 139-140 and passim; for Hellenistic Macedonia see Hippolochus quoted by Athenaeus 128a-130d.

90 For the gifts of food and valuables at Seuthes' banquet see Anabasis vii.3. Independent Thracian evidence of gift-exchange is provided by the pattern of provenance of gold cups originating from the royal court.

91 Goody (66) says of the Gonja, a Ghanaian tribe: 'Chiefs enjoyed the right to receive a portion of the palm wine collected, the fish caught, a leg of the wild animals killed and of the domestic animals sacrificed. ... Such tribute was ... recognised as a proper measure of support for an individual who had to entertain strangers and look after the affairs of the village.'

The 'leader's share' of a Greek army's booty, reserved for the state, served no very different purposes. The state entertained the gods and its own citizens with temples and sacrifices; it entertained ambassadors and 'those who seemed most deserving' in the prytaneion.
THE SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF FOOD

For these Greeks on this march, by contrast with Greeks in cities and Greeks in armies, there was no staple diet. They ate meat, pickled fish, fruit, vegetables or bread—whatever turned up—and were sometimes ill. They met with several foodstuffs that they had never had before; these included the palm hearts and fresh dates of Mesopotamia, both of which caused headaches, and the chestnut bread of the tower-dwellers.92

But after months of foragers’ fare one senses relief in Xenophon’s description of the very normal food to be had at Calpes Limen, where they remained for some time:

going out every day with the pack animals and the slaves they brought safely back wheat and barley, wine, pulse, millet, figs: the country had every good thing except olive oil.

Now there was also meat at Calpes Limen (sheep in the hills, cattle brought by boat from Heraclea: they had some of both) yet meat is not included in the list of ‘every good thing’.93

The omission is instructive.

A recurring epithet for men, groups of people, in the narrative of Odysseus is sitophagoi, siton edontes,94 ‘cereal eating’. Vernant takes this epithet as setting off men from gods on the one hand and animals on the other. Some Homeric passages do support him;95 but reflection shows that the eating of cereals is not consistently seen to be diagnostic as between gods and men or as between men and animals. They were included in several forms in divine sacrifices: some but not all animals eat them: some but not all men do. Within the category of men, however, the eating of cereals is the distinctive feature of civilised people, agriculturalists.96

Cereal was also the staple diet of the regular armies of civilised states in ancient times.97

92 ii 3.15-16, v 4.29. Efficient foragers concentrate their efforts on the most productive sources of food, taking into account the size of their community, and do not touch the less productive (E. B. Ross, ‘Food taboos, diet and hunting strategy’ in Current anthropology xix 1 (1978) 1-36). Such a large group as the Ten Thousand could not expect to make any serious difference to its food stocks by hunting. Therefore, although hunting was a hobby of Xenophon’s, mentioned in the Anabasis as a pastime during Cyrus’s advance (i 5.2-4), again in the digression about Xenophon’s estate (v 3.10), again as the occupation of a headman’s son-in-law (iv 5.24), the returning Greeks never gave time to it so far as we are told. For precisely the same reason, when he lists what foods were found in one village or another, Xenophon never mentions game: there would not have been enough of it to be useful.

93 vi 6.1. It is not a chance omission: the list appears again at vi 4.6. A little further on, at Byzantium, the foods in demand were barley, wine, olives, garlic and onions, vii 1.33-41. For similar statements, briefly characterising fertile regions just north of the range of the olive, see Strabo, Geography xi 11.1 and xi 13.7 on Bactria and Media.


95 Iliad xiii 322 with ‘a man who is mortal and eats the grains of Demeter’ does imply that immortals eat something different. The well known Iliad v 341-2, attributing to the gods a non-human physiology, states that they ‘do not eat cereal, do not drink fiery wine’. Early in the Odyssey, v 196-7, Calypso and Odysseus, goddess and man, eat different food in a passage with complex implications on which I have commented elsewhere: A. Dalby, ‘Men, women and food in early Athens’ in Ikinci Milleretlerasi Yemek Kongresi: Second International Food Congress, Turkey, 3-10 September 1988 (Konya 1990) 80-97, ns. 13, 17, 53.

96 And indeed the narrative of Odysseus is not so much about the difference between gods and men and animals; it is more about the difference between barbarism and civilisation. In one line in the frame narrative of the Odyssey (vii 130) the phrase hekas andron alphestaon may imply a similar classification, ‘far distant from barley-eating men,’ but the translation is disputed. In the narrative of Odysseus there is no unambiguous occurrence of sitos in its extended sense ‘food’.

97 Turkish and Bulgarian scholars consider that the fact that their warlike medieval ancestors had a regular supply of meat, dried and salted under their saddles, contributed to their success against opponents who fought on cereal food. The method (said to be precursor of modern Turkish pastirma) is first recorded of the Huns by Ammianus Marcellinus 31.2.3, quam inter femora sua equorumque (Gardthausen; vaporemque or equorum mss.) terga subseratam ... calefaciunt, [meat] which they warm by placing it between their own legs and their horses’ backs’, not, as Shaw (25) has it, ‘between the hind quarters of their horses’. On pastirma see M. G. Kaymak in Türk Folklor Arastirmalari no. 208.
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Greece that takes us as far back as the army that Archilochus had in mind and the army implied by one single formula in the *Iliad*, in the Near East, much further back still; and the army that marched up country under Cyrus was no exception.

On the other hand feckless nomads, pirates or raiders or primitive hunter-gatherers, ate whatever they could get, as the Ten Thousand had to do, and would not usually trouble to grind corn and bake bread. Interestingly the Greeks at Troy in the *Iliad*, by contrast with classical armies, were always eating meat: they ate sitos ‘cereal’ in only one clear instance during the *Iliad* narrative.

These various groups relied on finding food that was ready to eat or required brief and simple preparation. There is a corollary. No need was found to entrust the work of food preparation to slaves: and Greek women did not roast meat (or mix wine) for men. Citizen soldiers in their *syssitia*, ‘mess groups’ might have slaves to cook for them on campaign, but in the *Anabasis* narrative (though they certainly helped to bring the food back to camp) did not cook it, so far as we know: that was an operation that kept the men themselves busy.

A similar observation may be made if we compare Achilles’ entertainment of Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax, in the Greek camp outside Troy, with the domestic meals of the *Odyssey*. Here Achilles and Patroclus themselves, not their followers, cut up and roast the meat


98 Fr. 2 West.

99 *Iliad* xix 44: ‘And stewards were beside the ships, givers-out of sitos.’

100 Odysseus says that his crew (who will do very well, for our purposes, as pirates or raiders) took sheep and cows, slaughtered them, roasted them and washed them down with wine (*Odyssey* ix 39-46, cf. 154-165). They would naturally eat sitos when it was provided for them by Circe (*Odyssey* xii 327), whether accompanied by meat or not, just as they might have done at home. To catch birds and fish was tiresome (Odyssey xii 331) and to be provided with ready-to-eat cereal was a lucky chance. They ate what was available, and their diet differed markedly from that in the domestic settings of the *Odyssey*.

101 Shaw examines ancient views of the diet of hunter-gatherers and transhumant pastoralists, the *bios thereutikos* and *bios nomadikos* of Aristotle, *Politics* 1256a 30-40.

102 Food such as ‘might have been offered by any nomad chief’, as Reay Tannahill perceptively remarks in *Food in history* (Harmondsworth 1988) 60.

103 *Iliad* ix 216, where sitos is additional to meat and wine at Achilles’s dinner. But to the poet of the *Iliad* sitos was ‘bread’ and by extension ‘food’, and the word is used in the latter sense at xix 161, xix 163, xxiv 602. The Trojans’ food, less often described, naturally included sitos as well as meat, *Iliad* viii 47.

104 Thucydides (i 11.1-2) in his rationalist way imagined the Greeks at Troy tilling the soil as well as plundering to get their supplies, and so ingeniously approximated their diet to that of regular armies.

105 Plato (*Republic* 404b-c) and the comic poet Eubulus noticed the limited culinary repertoire of the Greeks at Troy: ‘Where has Homer said that any of the Achaecans ate a fish? and meat they only roasted, because he has never shown any of them boiling it. Why, none of them even saw a whore …’ (Eubulus fr. 118 Kassel-Austin). Anthropologically, Eubulus’s juxtaposition (no boiled meat and no women) is suggestive. Goody (71) observes what a general rule it is in human societies that women may boil meat (among many other cookery operations) but men butcher and roast it.

106 Demosthenes, *Against Conon* 4. These mess groups could be stable enough to be the basis for a security system in Aeneas Tacticus’s recommendations (27.13). Presumably such groups worked together in a self-organised fashion on food collecting and cooking, as in the prisoner-of-war way of life that Jack Goody (84) has described from his own experience.

107 vi 6.2.


109 *Iliad* ix 190-668.
on spits; Patroclus on Achilles’s orders mixes the wine; Patroclus serves the bread and Achilles serves the meat; the detail is all set down very fully, as usual in the epics. Yet followers and maidservants were available to make a bed for Phoenix, and women were available to sleep with Achilles and Patroclus. In big houses in the Odyssey, such subordinates would have done much of the cooking and serving of food. Men of the society imagined by the poet of the Iliad, like the men whose adventures are narrated in the Anabasis, found it natural to prepare their food themselves, and no doubt placed importance on the links between equals that are reinforced by certain kinds of food preparation and by communal eating.

CONCLUSIONS

The primary aim of this paper has been to suggest, with examples, how the social behaviour, and indeed the success, of the Ten Thousand may be elucidated by reference to Greek societies of various kinds. Although historians have found similarities between the Ten Thousand and a settled city, and although aspects of their organisation and behaviour were naturally inherited from the army of which they had formed part, the points in which they differed from both cities and armies are very telling. In attempting to account for these differences we have traced similarities with colonising expeditions and with other mobile societies.

In comparing the Ten Thousand and the Greeks at Troy we need not exclude the possibility that members of the historical group might consciously imitate the literary one, though this is nowhere implied by Xenophon. The Athenians in sending their expedition to Sicily in 415 BC were, one suspects, all too strongly influenced by the story of Troy. Epic and history have always provided models of behaviour. But within the Ten Thousand, as in any large group of Greeks of their time, there was experience of migration, of localised fighting, of great armies, of established cities with various constitutions, and of new foundations; there is every reason to suppose that such experience influenced their practice in quite complex ways.

Xenophon seems to give a picture that is sufficiently trustworthy to make such juxtapositions worthwhile; he was, perhaps, sufficiently observant and honest to allow us to make some inferences in the opposite direction. In particular, if a social history of Greek migration and colonisation, more searching than that of Faure, is one day written, it may draw on the Anabasis for some of the colour that is so notably lacking in the narratives of colonisation themselves.

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110 G. Wickert-Micknat, Die Frau (Archaeologia Homerica iii chapter R) (Göttingen 1982) 53 observes the difference and attributes it to the fact that the Iliad is here depicting a ‘male society’. And we may be pressing the detail of an epic in an oral tradition rather far. The women were there at bedtime, in the poet’s imagination, but who can say they were there at dinner time?

111 Men setting out on a colonial venture might eat in mess groups, if we can take it that the detail is accurate in the story reported from Archilochus (fr. 293 West) by Demetrius of Scæpsis (fr. 73 Gaede) and relayed by Athenaeus (167d) that Aethiops of Corinth sold his share of land in Syracuse to his messmate on the boat for a honey-cake. Mess groups in civilian life in Greece were not so ubiquitous; see especially Athenaeus 138d-143e and 148f-150a.


113 As Malkin (102-4) says of Anabasis v 6: ‘Rarely do we get such a penetrating glimpse into the reality of the social position of the oikist as we do here.’