Classics in
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The Social Self [1]
George Herbert Mead (1913)
First published in Journal of
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 10, 374-380.
Recognizing that the self can not appear
in consciousness as an "I," that it is
always an object, i.e., a "me," I wish to suggest an answer to
the question, What is involved in the self being an object? The first answer
may be that an object involves a subject. Stated in other words, that a
"me" is inconceivable without an "I. " And to this reply
must be made that such an "I" is a presupposition, but never a
presentation of conscious experience, for the moment it is presented it has
passed into the objective case, presuming, if you like, an "I" that
observes -- but an "I" that can disclose himself only by ceasing to
be the subject for whom the object "me" exists. It is, of course, not
the Hegelism of a self that becomes another to
himself in which I am interested, but the nature of the self as revealed by
introspection and subject to our factual analysis. This analysis does reveal,
then, in a memory process an attitude of observing oneself in which both the
observer and the observed appear. To be concrete, one remembers asking himself
how he could undertake to do this, that, or the other, chiding himself for his
shortcomings or pluming himself upon his achievements. Thus, in the redintegrated self of the moment passed, one finds both a
subject and an object, but it is a subject that is now an object of
observation, and has the same nature as the object self whom we present as in
intercourse with those about us. In quite the same fashion we remember the
questions, admonitions, and approvals addressed to our fellows. But the subject
attitude which we instinctively take can be presented only as something
experienced -- as we can be conscious of our acts only through the sensory
processes set up after the act has begun.
The contents of this presented subject,
who thus has become an object in being presented, but which still distinguish
him as the subject of the passed experience from the "me" whom he
addressed, [p. 375] are those images which initiated the conversation and the
motor sensations which accompany the expression, plus the organic sensations
and the response of the whole system to the activity initiated. In a word, just those contents which go to make up the self which
is distinguished from the others whom he addresses. The self appearing
as "I" is the memory image self who acted
toward himself and is the same self who acts toward other selves.
On the other hand, the stuff that goes to
make up the "me" whom the "I" addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this action
of the "I." If the "I" speaks, the "me" hears. If
the "I" strikes, the "me" feels the blow. Here again the
"me" consciousness is of the same character as that which arises from
the action of the other upon him. That is, it is only as the individual finds
himself acting with reference to himself as he acts towards others, that he
becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, and only as he is affected
by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is affected by that of
others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.
The differences in our memory presentations
of the "I" and the "me" are those of the memory images of
the initiated social conduct and those of the sensory responses thereto.
It is needless, in view of the analysis
of Baldwin, of Royce and of Cooley and many others, to do more than indicate
that these reactions arise earlier in our social conduct with others than in
introspective self-consciousness, i.e., that the infant consciously
calls the attention of others before he calls his own attention by affecting
himself and that he is consciously affected by others before he is conscious of
being affected by himself.
The "I" of introspection is the
self which enters into social relations with other selves. It is not the
"I" that is implied in the fact that one presents himself as a
"me. " And the "me" of
introspection is the same "me" that is the object of the social
conduct of others. One presents himself as acting toward others -- in this
presentation he is presented in indirect discourse as the subject of the action
and is still an object, -- and the subject of this presentation can never
appear immediately in conscious experience. It is the same self who is
presented as observing himself, and he affects himself just in so far and only
in so far as he can address himself by the means of social stimulation which
affect others. The "me" whom he addresses is the "me,"
therefore, that is similarly affected by the social conduct of those about him.
This statement of the introspective
situation, however, seems to overlook a more or less constant feature of our
consciousness, and [p. 376] that is that running current of awareness of what
we do which is distinguishable from the consciousness of the field of
stimulation, whether that field be without or within. It is this
"awareness" which has led many to assume that it is the nature of the
self to be conscious both of subject and of object -- to be subject of action
toward an object world and at the same time to be directly conscious of this
subject as subject, -- "Thinking its non-existence along with whatever
else it thinks." Now, as Professor James pointed out, this consciousness
is more logically conceived of as sciousness -- the
thinker being an implication rather than a content,
while the "me" is but a bit of object content within the stream of sciousness. However, this logical statement does not do
justice to the findings of consciousness. Besides the actual stimulations and
responses and the memory images of these, within which lie perforce the organic
sensations and responses which make up the "me," there accompanies a
large part of our conscious experience, indeed all that we call self-conscious,
an inner response to what we may be doing, saying, or thinking. At the back of
our heads we are a large part of the time more or less clearly conscious of our
own replies to the remarks made to others, of innervations which would lead to
attitudes and gestures answering our gestures and attitudes towards others.
The observer who accompanies all our
self-conscious conduct is then not the actual "I" who is responsible
for the conduct in propria persona --
he is rather the response which one makes to his own conduct. The confusion of
this response of ours, following upon our social stimulations of others with
the implied subject of our action, is the psychological ground for the
assumption that the self can be directly conscious of itself as acting and
acted upon. The actual situation is this: The self acts with reference to
others and is immediately conscious of the objects about it. In memory it also redintegrates the self acting as well as the others acted
upon. But besides these contents, the action with reference to the others calls
out responses in the individual himself -- there is then another "me"
criticizing approving, and suggesting, and consciously planning, i.e.,
the reflective self.
It is not to all our conduct toward the
objective world that we thus respond. Where we are intensely preoccupied with
the objective world, this accompanying awareness disappears. We have to recall
the experience to become aware that we have been involved as selves, to produce
the self-consciousness which is a constituent part of a large part of our
experience. As I have indicated elsewhere, the mechanism for this reply to our
own social stimulation of others follows as a natural result from the fact that
the very sounds, gestures, [p. 377] especially vocal gestures, which man makes
in addressing others, call out or tend to call out responses from himself. He can not hear himself speak without assuming in a
measure the attitude which he would have assumed if he had been addressed in
the same words by others.
The self which consciously stands over
against other selves thus becomes an object, an other
to himself, through the very fact that he hears himself talk, and replies. The
mechanism of introspection is therefore given in the social attitude which man
necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism
of thought, in so far as thought uses symbols which are used in social
intercourse, is but an inner conversation.
Now it is just this combination of the
remembered self which acts and exists over against other selves with the inner
response to his action which is essential to the self-conscious ego -- the self
in the full meaning of the term -- although neither phase of
self-consciousness, in so far as it appears as an object of our experience, is
a subject.
It is also to be noted that this response
to the social conduct of the self may be in the role of another -- we present
his arguments in imagination and do it with his intonations and gestures and
event perhaps with his facial expression. In this way we play the rôles of all our group; indeed, it is only in so far as we
do this that they become part of our social environment -- to be aware of
another self as ' a self implies that we have played his role or that of
another with whose type we identify him for purposes of intercourse. The inner
response to our reaction to others is therefore as varied as is our social
environment. Not that we assume the roles of others toward ourselves because we
are subject to a mere imitative instinct, but because in responding to
ourselves we are in the nature of the case taking the attitude of another than
the self that is directly acting, and into this reaction there naturally flows the
memory images of the responses of those about us, the memory images of those
responses of others which were in answer to like actions. Thus the child can
think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his own acts in the
remembered words of his parents. Until this process has been developed into the
abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains dramatic, and the self
which is a fusion of the remembered actor and this accompanying chorus is
somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social. Later the inner stage
changes into the forum and workshop of thought. The features and intonations of
the dramatis personae fade out and the emphasis falls upon the meaning
of the inner speech, the imagery becomes merely the barely necessary [p. 378]
cues. But the mechanism remains social, and at any moment the process may
become personal.
It is fair to say that the modern western
world has lately done much of its thinking in the form of the novel, while
earlier the drama was a more effective but equally social mechanism of
self-consciousness. And, in passing, I may refer to that need of filling out
the bare spokesman of abstract thought, which even the most abstruse thinker
feels, in seeking his audience. The import of this for religious self-consciousness
is obvious.
There is one further implication of this
nature of the self to which I wish to call attention. It is the manner of its
reconstruction. I wish especially to refer to it, because the point is of
importance in the psychology of ethics.
As a mere organization of habit the self
is not self-conscious. It is this self which we refer to as character. When,
however, an essential problem appears, there is some disintegration in this
organization, and different tendencies appear in reflective thought as
different voices in conflict with each other. In a sense the old self has
disintegrated, and out of the moral process a new self arises. The specific
question I wish to ask is whether the new self appears together with the new
object or end. There is of course a reciprocal relation between the self and
its object, the one implies the other and the interests and evaluations of the
self answer exactly to content and values of the object. On the other hand, the
consciousness of the new object, its values and meaning, seems to come earlier
to consciousness than the new self that answers to the new object.
The man who has come to realize a new
human value is more immediately aware of the new object in his conduct than of
himself and his manner of reaction to it. This is due to the fact to which
reference has already been made, that direct attention goes first to the
object. When the self becomes an object, it appears in memory, and the attitude
which it implied has already been taken. In fact, to distract attention from
the object to the self implies just that lack of objectivity which we criticize
not only in the moral agent, but in the scientist.
Assuming as I do the essentially social
character of the ethical end, we find in moral reflection a conflict in which
certain values find a spokesman in the old self or a dominant part of the old
self, while other values answering to other tendencies and impulses arise in
opposition and find other spokesmen to present their cases. To leave the field
to the values represented by the old self is exactly what we term selfishness.
The justification for the term is found in the habitual character of conduct
with reference to these values. Attention is not [p. 379] claimed by the object
and shifts to the subjective field where the affective responses are identified
with the old self. The result is that we state the other conflicting ends in
subjective terms of other selves and the moral problem seems to take on the
form of the sacrifice either of the self or of the others.
Where, however, the problem is
objectively considered, although the conflict is a social one, it should not
resolve itself into a struggle between selves, but into such a reconstruction
of the situation that different and enlarged and more adequate personalities
may emerge. A tension should be centered on the objective social field.
In the reflective analysis, the old self
should enter upon the same terms with the selves whose roles are assumed, and
the test of the reconstruction is found in the fact that all the personal
interests are adequately recognized in a new social situation. The new self
that answers to this new situation can appear in consciousness only after this
new situation has been realized and accepted. The new self can not enter into
the field as the determining factor because he is consciously present only
after the new end has been formulated and accepted. The old self may enter only
as an element over against the other personal interests involved. If he is the
dominant factor it must be in defiance of the other selves whose interests are
at stake. As the old self he is defined by his conflict with the others that
assert themselves in his reflective analysis.
Solution is reached by the construction
of a new world harmonizing the conflicting interests into
which enters the new self.
The process is in its logic identical
with the abandonment of the old theory with which the scientist has identified
himself, his refusal to grant this old attitude any further weight than may be
given to the other conflicting observations and hypotheses. Only when a
successful hypothesis, which overcomes the conflicts, has been formulated and
accepted, may the scientist again identify himself with this hypothesis as his
own, and maintain it contra mundum. He may not
state the scientific problem and solution in terms of his old personality. He
may name his new hypothesis after himself and realize his enlarged scientific
personality in its triumph.
The fundamental difference between the
scientific and moral solution of a problem lies in the fact that the moral
problem deals with concrete personal interests, in which the whole self is
reconstructed in its relation to the other selves whose relations are essential
to its personality.
The growth of the self arises out of a
partial disintegration, -- the appearance of the different interests in the
forum of reflection, the [p. 380] reconstruction of the social world, and the
consequent appearance of the new self that answers to the new object.
[1] Read at the Annual
Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, March, 1913.