J.S. Mill’s Views on Democracy after 1848

Vasilis Grollios
University of York, UK

Abstract
In his philosophical anthropology Mill assimilated a moderate form of capitalist values. Viewed from the perspective of class, this made it impossible for him to fully applaud socialism and democracy. Many commentators confuse these two terms and, as a result, do not understand that Mill tried to promote working class interests and its social power only to the extent that they would not assail the foundations of the capitalist mode of production. Contrary to these mainstream interpretations, in this article I emphasize that Mill’s views on democracy are strongly connected to the value-laden content that the capitalist mode of production contributes to exploitation, liberty and equality. As such, Mill was not a democrat but instead was afraid of a fully fledged democratic system because it would lead to socialism.

Keywords
class interests, class struggle, common good, socialism

Introduction
In what way did J.S. Mill integrate democratic principles into his theory and, in particular, the demand for ‘one man, one vote’? To what extent can his liberalism reflect the demands of the working class for equal participation in the process of decision making and the form that social change should take? Can his reasoning on democracy correspond to his ideals of liberty and equality? In 1840 Mill wrote that the future would show whether ‘democracy will be that social regeneration which its partisans expect, or merely a new form of bad government, perhaps somewhat better, perhaps somewhat worse, than those which preceded it.’ (1977d [1840]: 152). Most commentators fail to appreciate that at that time Mill was clearly not committed to the prospect of democracy. Yet, the question is, whether after 1848 he changed his view on this?

My analysis in this article focuses on his writings after 1848. Although his writings prior to 1848 are also of some relevance, it was not until after 1848 that Mill’s views on democracy became
more radical. But how much more radical did they really become? The French Revolution had a clear influence on Mill’s political thinking. First, I will analyse Mill’s writings as they relate to the theme of democracy as well as how others have interpreted it. I will attempt to identify the extent to which the values of the capitalist mode of production were adopted in Mill’s later theory on democracy.

Contrary to mainstream interpretations of his thought, I will support the radical conclusion that Mill’s thought, although very close to the socialist and democratic theory of his time, was neither socialist nor democratic. I will attempt to demonstrate that Mill adopted all the values that provide a foundation for the capitalist mode of production and that his theory was restricted to an understanding of ‘capital’ that finally made his political philosophy incapable of promoting equality and liberty for all citizens. What he really tried to do was merely to mitigate class inequalities while at the same time maintaining the dominance of the capitalists over the working class while leaving aside the issue concerning the roots of class exploitation and injustice. Thus, his demand for self-improvement and for free development of all the inherent capabilities of the personality was destined to remain, to a large degree, a utopia for the masses and a reality only for the capitalist class.

Democracy in Mill’s Writings

In a newspaper article in 1848 he wrote that there is no reason for Englishmen to be afraid that the erroneous opinions of the working class might come to dominate, should suffrage be extended. As proof of the validity of his argument, he made reference to the events taking place at that time in France. In Mill’s view, if the working class was permitted to become a powerful social force, workers would gain a considerable degree of political awareness from the ensuing discussions in parliament and the press (Mill, 1986a [1848]: 1105).

He remained committed to the view that, first and foremost, the interests of the property-holding classes must not be threatened. The problem in Mill’s view was how the workers would finally be convinced to accept their employers’ interests (Mill, 1986a [1848]: 1106). This would happen, according to Mill, when their wishes were heard in parliament as this would eliminate their feelings of injustice (Mill, 1986a [1848]: 1107). Thus, the representation of working class interests in parliament was not intended to fulfil their demands in and of themselves, but rather to mitigate the intensity of mass mobilization.

In the same year, in another article, Mill stressed that those who rejected the need for reform in England distorted the events in France. It was impossible for them to express their opposition to these events on the pretext of ‘fear of the unknown’. Democracy survived among our neighbours, said Mill, even if they deny it. (Mill, 1986b [1848]: 1112).

Mill’s desire for the expansion of suffrage was not based on his belief that the working class had become as mature as they could be. He thought that when they became fully mature, they would not demand restriction of the property rights of their wealthy fellow citizens. Thus, according to Mill, the workers’ rejection of the capitalist mode of production was the main indicator of their immaturity. Clearly, Mill was still afraid of decisions by the masses.

The absence of trust in the multitude’s critical judgment, on his part, was also made clear by the fact that he considered it a mistake for a president or prime minister to be elected directly by the people. He believed that people usually vote for those who are mediocre, or have obtained fame through non-political activities. Indeed, he stressed the great possibility that the election of the French president directly by the French people might be considered the biggest mistake ever made by the French constitution (Mill, 1985 [1849]: 362).
In a letter in 1858, he expressed the notion of democracy as the representation of all minorities in proportion to the number of people. If, for example, a minority constitutes one third of an electoral district, it must have a commensurate number of representatives (Mill, 1972 [1858]: 559).

He repeated this view in one of his speeches in parliament in 1867: ‘Those classes … if they amount, say, to a third of the whole electoral body, this system would enable them to obtain a third of the representation’ (Mill, 1988a [1867]: 185). In the same speech, he also stated that every opinion must carry the same political strength as the proportion of people who embrace it (Mill, 1988a [1867]: 185). Mill made himself even clearer when he suggested that he would like to see the majority rule and, at the same time, the minorities represented (Mill, 1988b [1867]: 208).

Anyone who had not read Mill’s writings apart from those already mentioned here, would perhaps conclude that this philosopher was one of the more democratic of his time. However, the fact that he did not understand that within the capitalist mode of production the interests of the bourgeoisie were destined to be opposed to those of the working class resulted in Mill’s attempt to find a compromise between these two opposing social forces in order to find a way of balancing their conflicting interests.

It is of interest to follow his thinking more closely. In 1859, he wrote a text setting out his thoughts on parliamentary reform. He wrote that not all people should have the same rights, since they are not to the same extent worthy of them. Those who did not know how to write, read, or solve mathematical calculations, and lacked contact with the minds of the most wise and virtuous, were not as deserving. (Mill, 1977b [1859]: 323). Thus, Mill proposed plural voting as a means of discerning the most virtuous. The criterion for judging the intellectual cultivation of citizens was by their profession, namely the position that they held in the market. The unskilled worker should have one vote, the educated two, a foreman or supervisor three, a trader or farmer three or four, and a lawyer, doctor, priest or a man of letters and arts, five or six (Mill, 1977b [1859]: 325).

A few pages later in the same text, and contrary to his previous comments, he reports that ‘a third of the people ought not indeed to have two-thirds of the representation, but every third of the people is entitled to a third of the representation’ (Mill, 1977b [1859]: 329).

Full acceptance of the capitalist market model as a criterion in Mill’s thinking is clear. The aforementioned proves that, according to Mill, professional success is the general criterion for judging success in life. He deeply appreciated the greater ability of some people to consume and to maximize their benefits. He considered these, however, to be privileges that could only be obtained by those who held the very few high positions in the hierarchy of the capitalist mode of production. He was not fully opposed to the egotistic and self-centered human model promoted by capitalism, he only desired some form of mitigation.

We know how inhumane the 19th century living conditions were for the majority of the population: poverty and destitution were the norm. For these people, it was quite normal not to come into contact with the minds of wise men, which was Mill’s desire, since most of them were forced to leave school and begin work in factories during childhood.

That Mill did not consider people victims of a brutal, exploitative system that inevitably degrades them as human beings led him to form a political theory that punished them for something they were not responsible for. Mill’s thinking, by considering them as low class people, may be characterized not only as anti-democratic, but also as challenging some basic achievements from the Enlightenment.

At this point, it is also worth examining the methodological basis of Mill’s thinking on human nature. He elaborates on this, specifically, in the sixth volume of *The System of Logic*. One would expect, he wrote, that the basic differences in the mental state of humans could be explained by reference to the difference in level of education and exposure to diverse stimuli that citizens had
Critical Sociology 37(6)

(Mill, 1974 [1843]: 859). A few lines later, he stressed that the laws governing character formation came from the general laws of the spirit. He called this ethology, or the science of character (Mill, 1974 [1843]: 869). He believed that these general laws, if combined with empirical observation, would help us understand the process of character formation (Mill, 1974 [1843]: 859). He desired a combination of a priori knowledge and empirical observation (Mill, 1974 [1843]: 859).

However, despite his continual references to the general laws of the spirit, he did not specify one iota of their content. Assuming that such knowledge is known, he did not describe it, leaving the reader with unanswered questions as to its characteristics and source. He was also unclear regarding the empirical data which could be combined with the general laws of the spirit. What was their nature? All kinds of empirical data exist in society. Which must become the focus for those trying to identify the general laws of the spirit of an era?

Mill’s lack of clarity is not accidental. The lack of a dialectical method of examining empirical facts made Mill incapable of making connections between empirical data and examining them as they developed for the purpose of reaching a general conclusion. Marx, on the other hand, tried to do exactly what Mill seemed incapable of doing. At a very young age, Marx wrote ‘we have to grasp the intrinsic connection between private property, avarice, the separation of labour, capital and landed property; the connection of exchange and competition, of value and the devaluation of men’ (Marx, 1975 [1844]: 271). For Marx, man creates his own nature, through his work (Marx, 1975 [1844]: 305).

It is important to stress how low Mill’s appreciation for manual occupations was. This belief has its origins in the separation initiated by Mill between high quality and low quality pleasure. Mill believed that the former could result only from intellectual work. Mill’s reference to labour was selective. On the one hand, he referred to it when he wanted to justify the plural voting system – a strategy that restricts the fully fledged demand for democracy – but, on the other hand, he ignored it when he referred to the spirit’s general laws. It is obvious that he did not connect the raising of consciousness with labour activity. I believe that in Mill’s political theory the empirical data content comes straight from the structure of the market; that is, from the values\(^1\) of the capitalist mode of production, which he accepts.\(^2\)

In a speech in 1867, he made this point manifest, declaring ‘manufacturing and commercial populations are always the leaders on the side of progress’ (Mill, 1988e [1867]: 127) and that ‘to this class … we must look mainly for success for the future’ (Mill, 1988e [1867]: 128). This opinion is based by Mill on the argument that this happens because they are able to follow development ‘in the economic department of things with facility’ and ‘have made their own position and their own fortunes’ (Mill, 1988e [1867]: 128) Thus, according to Mill, the self-made successful businessman is the most appropriate person to promote political progress.

Mill’s disparaging opinion of manual labourers can also be detected in his reference to the wrong choice of electing Louis Napoleon as the President of France, on the basis of votes by illiterate peasants who did not have any serious engagement in public affairs. In the next paragraph of the same text, he reiterated the risk to society’s progress if the working class took power, since its members had such a low level of intellectual and moral development (Mill, 1977b [1859]: 327).

Similarly, the election of Louis Napoleon by the peasants was also severely criticized by Marx in *The Class Struggles in France*. He characterized the French peasants as the class ‘that represents barbarism within civilization’ and that they had the physiognomy of Napoleon himself. Thus, he characterized this class as well as its symbol, Napoleon, as ‘clumsily cunning, knavishly naive, doltishly sublime, a calculated superstition, a cleverly stupid anachronism, a world-historic piece of buffoonery’ (Marx, 1978 [1850]: 80).
Despite Marx’s disparaging and condescending view of the peasants, he at least avoided proposing a system of plural voting and he most certainly did not go so far as to suggest that those who could not read or write should have their voting privileges revoked. In short, Marx attempted to explain the structural circumstances that led the peasants to vote for Napoleon and understand their way of thinking based on the sociological data of the era. He aimed to highlight the social conditions that demanded amendment, in order for the peasants’ behaviour to change and not, as Mill unfortunately did, to justify their social marginalization, curtailing the demand for social equality.

Continuing our analysis of the mature Mill’s views on democracy, we focus on his text *Considerations on Representative Government* as well as his speeches in parliament during his term of office as Member of Parliament.

In the former text he did nothing more than confirm the views that we have already identified in his theory. He stated that participation in public affairs should be in line with a community’s general progress (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 412). He did not consider that the greater the lower social strata’s participation in community affairs, the more it would contribute to the upgrading of their political cultivation. His desire was, first, that the working class show serious examples of mature behaviour and only then would it be appropriate to concede more extended political rights to them. If he had had greater confidence in the educational role of democratic institutions, he would have applauded the concession of equal civil rights to everybody without hesitation.

The only concession he was willing to make came from his desire to see a social experiment which was then the real reason for welcoming the presence of members of the working class inside parliament. The prospect of democracy, in his thinking, depended on this kind of experiment. His fear of legislation in favour of the interests of the working class clearly outweighed the democratic nature of his thinking (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 446).

He stressed that democracy had to tackle the issue of preventing domination by class interests without, at the same time, sacrificing its popular character. (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 467). He appeared to be not at all optimistic that this problem could be solved in the near future.

The undemocratic nature of Mill’s political philosophy is not only apparent in his doubt about the long-term possibility of the successful operation of democratic institutions but is also made evident in his inability to equate the general or collective interest with that of the lower social strata, who were victims of theft of their labour power by their capitalist-employer.3 Mill attempted to find a middle road between aggressors and victims, a compromise that would satisfy both sides. Because of this, however, he was forced, to a large extent, to sacrifice the demand for social equality in order to ensure the smooth running of the capitalist mode of production.

At the same time, and in the attempt to be perceived as conciliatory, Mills felt the educated class should not be bestowed too many privileges such that they would be able to carry out legislation favourable only to them (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 467). However, Mill seemed not to take into account one aspect of the decision-making process in parliament, namely that in order for some decisions to be voted on and thus become law they had to be voted for by the majority of the Members.

If his proposition became reality, and neither members of the working class nor members of the upper social strata constituted the majority in parliament, then there was a serious possibility of a hung vote between parliamentarians for and against the various bills. In such a case, parliamentary life would lead to deadlock. He did not understand that it was almost inevitable that one party, which Mill himself expected to promote certain interests, would have the majority of the Members of Parliament.

In the same text he stressed the fact that the main criterion for assessing the political culture of a citizen should be his or her profession (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 475). It is important to emphasize
here that even if someone who did not know how to read or write and was receiving financial help passed the written exam which Mill had set, she or he would acquire the right to only a single vote. The number of votes accorded a citizen would ultimately have depended on his or her profession (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 476).

This means that in Mill’s political philosophy, the citizen of the lower social strata was stigmatized by the nature of his or her profession which, in turn, restricted their political rights. He believed that the capitalist system could provide everyone with the same opportunities to secure jobs that would rank them in the upper social strata.

Unfortunately for the supporters of Mill, this is an illusion. Yet, even if this were feasible within the framework of the capitalist mode of production, it would be wrong to gauge a citizen’s intellectual ability by the nature of his or her work. Indeed it is inevitable, in every society and in every era, that some people will be unskilled workers. Therefore, Mill implicitly admits there will always be a part of the population whose political education is considered inferior to that of their fellow citizens and thus is considered incapable of making decisions on equal terms with the latter about the future of the society in which they live.

The fact that the citizen who happens to belong to the working class is trapped, according to Mill’s theory, as a victim of the unjust structure of society, without serious prospects of liberation, is also clear in another part of Considerations on Representative Government.

Mill considered it possible that society may not fulfill its duty towards its citizens and thus may not make basic education accessible to all. In such a case, according to Mill, the citizen-victim had no other choice but to obediently tolerate the injustice (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 470). In simple terms, Mill could not understand that the structure of society in his era was the main reason for the lack of access to basic education experienced by the majority of the working class.

The fact that Mill encouraged the worker to tolerate this injustice, rather than stand up against it and seek a better life, which would lead, of course, to a class struggle, demonstrates how remote Mill’s political philosophy was from being able to formulate a theory of equality and freedom that would defend and promote working class interests.

We can conclude, from the above, that Mill obviously did not consider plural voting a temporary measure. This interpretation is in full accord with Mill’s writings. He clearly states that he did not consider the system of plural voting as something undesirable that we were forced to tolerate only temporarily. The right to equal votes was not a good thing in itself. It was “less objectionable than inequality of privilege grounded on irrelevant or adventitious circumstances, but in principle wrong” (Mill, 1977c [1861]: 478). However much we consider Mill an optimist in relation to the capacity of the working class for intellectual development in the future, he continues to consider them unworthy of acquiring voting rights equal to those of their employers.

Further analysis of Mill’s views on democracy leads us to examine his parliamentary speeches, since they are his last texts on the subject. Mill’s parliamentary speeches in 1866 are a clear demonstration of the philosopher’s efforts to reassure his colleagues by stressing that the working masses must only be represented in parliamentary life, and not dominate it. The ultimate goal must be for their views to be heard so that Members of Parliament understand their way of thinking, making it easier for them to decide on matters of concern to the working class (Mill, 1988c [1866]: 65). Thus, a commentator would have little difficulty in concluding that, according to Mill, prevention of the passage of bills that were contrary to the interests of their own voters would not be the main objective of the working class representatives inside parliament.

One year later, in another of his speeches, it becomes even clearer how removed his thinking was from a policy that would directly promote working class interests. Attempting to ease the misgivings of the Conservatives who were also Members of Parliament, he assured them that the
plural voting system which he proposed could be considered as both a liberal and a conservative measure. He guaranteed that manual workers would not predominate in numbers in the parliament and expressed the opinion that the Conservatives’ fears that their interests would be assailed had no solid foundation (Mill, 1988a [1867]: 182–3).

The very next page confirms how remote Mill’s thinking was from the classical interpretation of democracy, as has been pointed out in the foregoing pages here. He wrote that ‘honest democracy does not mean the displacement of one privileged class, and the installment of another in a similar privilege because it is more numerous or a poorer class … That is not what the working class want. The working class demands to be represented, not because they are poor, but because they are human’ (Mill, 1988a [1867]: 184).

In 1867, although the Chartist movement had preceded it, ‘there was in Great Britain not even the shadow of a socialist movement, or of any movement with a thought-out plan for changing the basis of the social system. There were, no doubt, individuals with revolutionary and socialist ideas. But there was no socialist movement’ (Cole, 1941: 43). Rather than characterizing it as a disadvantage, as an obstacle to the fulfilment of the democratic ideal, Mill instead welcomed this fact. From this it should be evident how remote his political philosophy was from providing a coherent theory of the labour movement within the framework of his philosophy of democracy.

In order to highlight this aspect of Mill’s thinking, it is of interest to refer to Marx, who, in his Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association (which was of great strategic importance, taking into account the organizational problems of the English labour movement) emphasized that however important the principle of cooperative work was, if it remained as an idea among only a proportion of workers it would not be capable of liberating the whole working class and reducing the wage earners’ misery (Marx, 1985 [1964]). The fact that the workers were numerous was not sufficient in itself. They must be led by knowledge. This was the only way for them to take power.

Following this, it becomes even more obvious that Mill ignored and did not want to promote the class content of the term ‘democracy’ according to the classical interpretation in the 19th century. Instead, he stressed only the general humanistic content of the term. However, this content cannot constitute a political theory that can promote freedom and equality for the majority of citizens, namely the working class.

The same year, in an attempt to persuade his colleagues in parliament to give voting rights to women, he told them that the substance of constitutional freedom is for people to decide on whether they are governed well (Mill, 1988d [1867]: 154). But that was exactly the kind of political freedom that in his political agenda he restricted for the majority of his fellow citizens: those who were illiterate or were receiving financial assistance from the state. A careful reader of Mill’s work cannot ignore this deficit of freedom and, ultimately, of democracy, in his thinking.

Having examined Mill’s views on democracy after 1848 and analysed their development, I will move on to refer to other commentators’ interpretations in order to provide a more complete picture of this issue.

Interpretations and Comments

Very few commentators on 19th century liberal thought and Mill’s political philosophy have attempted to analyse liberty and equality as components of his reform program in the framework of his social philosophy and in connection with his political economy. Therefore, equally, very few researchers have made the effort to study the issue of democracy in Mill as based in the economic and historical context of his time. Doubtless, such an effort is essential in order for the
commentator to clarify the precise character of liberty and equality in Mill’s thinking and to bring to the fore their problematic aspects.

I will start by commenting on the studies that are close to my own interpretation and thereafter I will refer to those that are largely opposed to it. One of the best known and certainly most significant studies is that of C.B Macpherson. He placed Mill in the developmental model of democracy because, according to him, Mill considered that democracy would allow for more active involvement and participation in public affairs. Participation in such affairs would give people the motivation to develop their potential and their culture (Macpherson, 1966: 47). However, according to Macpherson, this goal was not realized in Mill’s political agenda (Macpherson, 1966: 50). Macpherson writes that exclusion from the right to vote reflected the acceptance of market principles, ones which were essentially responsible for the lack of working class cultural development (Macpherson, 1966: 57).

Although he did not undertake an exhaustive analysis of all Mill’s references to democracy, he came to the correct understanding that the least culturally developed people, knowing that their propositions would not prevail, would only develop a feeble incentive to participate. As such, their intellectual and moral potential would not be extended (Macpherson, 1966: 60). The great significance of Macpherson’s book is that he understood the contradiction that exists in Mill between the relations of capitalist production and the democratic ideal of equal participation. In this way, Macpherson reached the conclusion that Mill was not an advocate of social equality (Macpherson, 1977: 62–3).

Another respected commentator is Graeme Duncan. Duncan perceived democracy as a demand that leads society closer to socialism. He was correct in noting that according to Mill ‘the stress would be on citizen participation in community life rather than in decision-making at the most significant points’ and that ‘if, for Mill, participation is supported simply for its supposed educative or moralizing effects, it would not need to amount to self-government or self-determination’ (Duncan, 1998: 77).

He also supported the view that Mill did not examine carefully all the ways in which democratic citizens can play a creative and useful role in political life (Duncan, 1998: 83). He believed, as I do, that Mill was not a strong supporter of participatory democracy, since his analysis contained many elitist elements (Duncan, 1998: 84). For Duncan, Mill’s separation between the educated and the non-educated corresponded to that between rich and poor, with the result that the former, who would hold the power, would also have no interest in promoting any radical changes (Duncan, 1998: 79).

In his book on Mill and Marx, Duncan was even more specific in referring to the fact that in Mill’s political theory the liberal ideal runs against the institutions that embody it. These institutions were conservative because they could not follow the radical character of the measures that a liberal theory implies (Duncan, 1973: 239). From Duncan’s point of view, this is also confirmed by the fact that the majority of citizens did not need to judge public affairs by themselves but instead only choose the rulers who would make the decisions (Duncan, 1973: 261).

Paul Smart followed the same path as these previously mentioned commentators. For example, in one of his articles he supported the opinion that Mill made his more conservative side more evident through his references to the character of representative government because at that point his fear of the working class was widespread (Smart, 1990: 317). For Smart, Mill’s final goal was not liberty but the promotion of cultivated people to positions of power. However, this is not entirely accurate since Mill’s understanding of liberty would result in strengthening the capitalists’ position in society even further. Only one of the results of this empowerment would be the assumption of governmental posts by people from this class. Smart reaches the point of characterizing the
The constitutional framework of the principles of representative government as inegalitarian because of the privileges it accorded to intellectuals (Smart, 1990: 322).

The most important part of Smart’s article is his recognition that in Mill’s scheme the intellectual elite expressed society’s real interests (Smart, 1990: 321). However, Smart, like the majority of Mill scholars, has not undertaken a careful analysis of the concept of freedom in the light of the social foundations of Mill’s political philosophy; that is, in the framework of the reform programme that stems from his social policy. This would, almost certainly, lead them to take into account Mill’s examination of the capitalistic mode of production. This is the main reason why Smart did not, as he should have done, connect Mill’s notion of the common good with the promotion of specific class interests. Thus, Smart’s examination requires expansion.

The crucial point is the promotion by the intellectual elite of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the entrepreneurial spirit, not so much because it has its origins in this class, and therefore a sentimental connection with the promotion of its wishes, but more so because the intellectual elite’s theory of liberty and equality will not be capable of promoting working class interests given that the latter come into conflict with the interests of the former. My analysis aims to make this fact as evident as possible through an attempt to directly link the relations of capitalist production to Mill’s liberal democracy.

J.H. Burns came to the conclusion that in Mill’s philosophy democracy was a highly problematic term. Having underlined the fact that Mill’s enthusiasm for the events of 1848 in France did not remove his reservations about democracy, Burns pointed out that Considerations on Representative Government did not add any new material to Mill’s analysis of democracy and also that Mill’s examination of this term had a diachronic coherence in its meaning (Burns, 1998: 60, 65). Up to this point, Burns’ remarks are not problematic.

However, problems in his analysis come to the fore when he attempts to explain the reasons for which Mill’s viewpoint cannot be considered democratic. In Burns’ view, this happens because Mill’s theory is opposed to the democratic assumption that ‘men are equal in the moral and intellectual qualities required by the exercise of political power’ (Burns, 1998: 66). The adoption of this assumption, according to Burns, would require a truly democratic theory on Mill’s part.

In order to characterize a political philosopher as a democrat, it is not necessary for him to believe in such a thing. We have seen in the foregoing Marx’s derogatory comments about the French peasants with the important difference that Marx was not in favour of the same undemocratic measures as was Mill. Although it is impossible for all citizens to have the same level of political culture, to provide equal political rights to everybody is a necessary educational tool and incentive in order to cultivate their political thought.

Mill’s conception of democracy fails, among other things, mainly because he identified the notion of the common good with that of bourgeois, namely capitalist, interests. Even if we assume that it is feasible for the intellectual elite to remain above class contradictions and serve the general good impartially, that general good, as was perceived by Mill’s liberal democracy, could not assimilate basic working class demands.4 The roots of the problematic nature of Mill’s thinking, whereby he promoted democracy and the workers’ demands to the extent that he could be included among the socialists, can be detected in his erroneous analysis of the nature of capitalism. Ellen Wood was right to place Mill at the beginning of a tradition in political philosophy that, while it strongly deplores capitalism, did not base its disapproval on a historical analysis of capital (Wood, 1978: 239).

I would also like to comment on an article by Richard Arneson, one of the most stimulating liberal philosophers of our time. He considered that there was a contradiction, not between Utilitarianism and On Liberty but between Considerations on Representative Government and
In particular, the non-qualification of equal votes for all in Considerations on Representative Government could not keep pace with On Liberty’s anti-paternalism, namely with the perception that we should not deprive the mentally healthy person of her freedom to pursue good, as she perceived it (Arneson, 1982: 44). However, Arneson continues, Mill showed his paternalism, and hence the undemocratic element in his thinking, when he wrote that parliament should not plan laws, they should be formed by a special committee. Parliament, according to Mill, should have the power only to reject or approve them. Also, Arneson focused on the fact that, in the plural voting system, the will of the majority and its freedom to seek the good as it perceived it would be restricted by a supposedly enlightened minority (Arneson, 1982: 45–6).

Arneson’s comments are in step with mine. This becomes even more obvious in his writing that, for Mill, citizens need not be strongly involved in public affairs since the essence of democracy was only collective control and not collective participation in the management of these issues (Arneson, 1982: 53). Arneson did not believe that Mill embraced participatory democracy. However, he did not try to base his conclusion on Mill’s social philosophy and the acceptance on Mill’s part of the capitalist mode of production; that is, the rationale of the defense of property. He simply highlighted the fact that Mill may have rejected paternalism for self-regarding actions but that he finally accepted it for other-regarding ones (Arneson, 1982: 55). Without a doubt, this is an interesting conclusion, but in my opinion not an in-depth criticism of Mill’s theory.

I will continue my analysis with interpretations on a different wavelength to my own. In this context, Dennis Thompson’s John Stuart Mill and Representative Government cannot be ignored. From the outset, Thompson admitted that Mill could not be considered a supporter of participatory democracy, but at the same time he hesitated to describe him as an elitist. He believed that Mill’s thinking was so complex that he could not be labeled (Thompson, 1976: 5). This is far removed from my own point of view in that Thompson felt that Mill’s thinking was ‘a “connected exposition” of a democratic theory that, with some success, combines the values of both participation and competence’ (Thompson, 1976: 9).

Thompson was aware of the problematic nature of Mill’s democracy in relation to the measures that would encourage the citizen to become active in public affairs (Thompson, 1976: 51). According to Thompson, Mill did not worry lest a political tyranny be created through the occupation of the important posts by members of a specific class. He wrote that ‘Mill’s description … sounds elitist, and to some degree it is’ (Thompson, 1976: 80). But, in his opinion, this disadvantage was tempered by the fact that the elite fulfilled mainly an educational role (Thompson, 1976: 80).

The biggest problem in Mill’s democratic theory was, if we follow Thompson’s view, that the actual institutions Mill proposed for achieving his goals were much too modest compared to his educational aims and his goal for participation of the masses in political issues (Thompson, 1976: 178–9). Thus, ‘a further problem remains: the theoretical indeterminacy of the balance between the principles of participation and competence’ (Thompson, 1976: 181–2).

Thompson could not understand the ties that connected the intellectual elite with the upper social strata in Mill’s scheme and that the general interest that this elite defended involved the interests of the powerful social classes. This is due to the fact that Thompson did not undertake a thorough analysis of Mill’s political economy. Had he done so, he would have succeeded in connecting Mill’s thought with these specific class interests. Instead, I underline the fact that, even if Mill’s hopes were materialized, the living conditions of the majority of the working class would not permit the majority of its members to become part of this intellectual elite.
There is no evidence to support Thompson’s claim that Mill was not afraid of the seizure of power by members of one single class and the possible imposition, on their part, of a form of political tyranny. On the contrary, Mill attempted to temper the concerns of his conservative colleagues in parliament, stressing that there was no risk of working class deputies taking the majority of seats in parliament. He also believed that the criterion of political culture was inextricably linked with success in the capitalist mode of production. This would certainly prevent members of the lower social strata from being considered as having developed a political culture commensurate to that of their bourgeois fellow citizens.

It must be acknowledged, however, that Thompson was aware of the fact that Mill’s demand for social change was not too radical. Nevertheless, this did not seem to concern him a great deal. Although he admitted the existence of the gap between Mill’s demand for increased participation and the practical measures that he proposes for making this a reality, he did not try to explain it. If Thompson had tried to discern the roots of this gap, he would no doubt have seen more clearly the problematic elements of Mill’s social theory and he would also have agreed with the conclusion that I favour, namely that Mill’s social philosophy did not, in the end, succeed in constructing a successful democratic theory.

Bruce Baum believes that Mill develops liberalism in a democratic direction (Baum, 2003: 420). He perceived as very important the fact that Mill wanted the education of citizens to be improved, as well as the fact that Mill connects the improvement of the educational system with the reduction in class inequalities, something that makes us very optimistic about the future prospects of Mill’s democratic scheme (Baum, 2003: 421). Baum’s view is that Mill did not make himself clear enough on the capabilities workers had to cultivate in themselves so as to become equal members inside his democratic system of governing (Baum, 2003: 418). Baum expressed the view that this possibility was open and feasible for the majority of the workers (Baum, 2003: 420).

Baum, in his dissertation on Mill, approaches Thompson’s interpretation and admits that Mill sacrificed popular power to government by specialists thereby reducing the prospects of self-government (Baum, 2000: 264). He wrote that Mill’s notion of political democracy, in the framework of his representative democracy scheme, made his ideas vulnerable to criticism from the point of view of participatory democracy. He also believed that Mill was not as specific as he should have been concerning the equality he proposed in order that the political liberty of all could be materialized (Baum, 2000: 265). In another article, Baum emphasized that Mill is indeed opaque on the measures needed to increase economic liberty and that Mill did not clearly answer the question concerning a choice between some form of socialism or a form of reformed capitalism (Baum, 1999: 526).

As far as Baum’s comments are concerned, a more fitting commentary could be that Mill certainly radicalized the tradition of liberalism. However, through a more detailed analysis, this article has attempted to argue that Mill committed himself to an erroneous interpretation of the capitalist mode of production, which also finally determined his notion of liberty and equality. In order to attain socialism, he would have had to modify the basic principles of his political economy. Socialism is not the development of liberalism on a more radical path, as Baum would have it, but rather it is a quite different understanding of how a society ought to be structured since it has a very different interpretation of the nature of ‘capital’ and therefore of the roots of exploitation. Contrary to Marx, for Mill capital is not a social relationship which unavoidably leads to exploitation and injustice, but just the result of saving (Mill, 1965 [1871]: 69).

Baum did not make any reference to this fact in his writings. He could not see that Mill’s philosophy was neither committed to the prospect of socialism nor to that of democracy according to
the term’s classical interpretation. My problem with Mill is not just that he did not promote his political principles sufficiently, but that the content he attributed to democracy took him far from the principles of socialism, leading him in other directions.

Unlike Baum, I support the view that Mill exhausted every possibility of radicalizing his liberalism. This characteristic makes his political philosophy a highly stimulating one. Hence, to become even more radical, Mill needed to ascribe a different content to liberty and equality. Baum erroneously accused him of not being sufficiently radical, writing that Mill did not specify the measures that would promote equality – although he could have – implying that he did not do so due to a lack of interest (Baum, 2000: 265). Instead, Mill was trying directly to link his political ideas with the historical data of his time. His involvement in political life, through the development of parliamentary action, demonstrates great interest in and anxiety to change society towards his perception of freedom and equality.

Baum reached the point of sharing Mill’s optimism to the extent that, in his scheme, the majority of working class citizens could, after some time, become equal members with those of the upper social strata. Without any doubt, the workers’ position would be upgraded if Mill’s political agenda was followed, but even at that time their position would be degraded compared to those who would have reached the highest posts in the hierarchy of the market system.

Concerning the importance Baum attributes to the improvement of workers’ education and its role as a means of upgrading their social position, it can be argued that the key obstacle to the promotion of workers’ political education was their social position. Thus, even if their education was improved, their social position would continue to be below that of their employers. If Baum had carried out a more careful analysis of the social presumptions which limited Mill’s labour policy, he would have come to different conclusions.

One of the more recent books referring to Mill’s political philosophy is John Skorupski’s (2006). According to Skorupski, the virtues of a citizen who has a democratic political consciousness are better implemented by Mill’s vision than the vision of a socialist. Moreover, he writes that if we examine Mill in the framework of his historical context, we will conclude that he committed himself to the path of democracy. Skorupski expresses such an opinion because he considered Mill an egalitarian in relation to his proposals on how political debate was conducted and political decisions were made (Skorupski, 2006: 86).

However, just two pages later, he writes that, for Mill, democracy was not always the best system. This fact led Skorupski to the conclusion that Mill was first a liberal and then a democrat, basing his argument on the claim that ‘he does not think democracy is always the best system, and even in sufficiently advanced conditions, in which it is the best system, it is still justly constrained by principles of liberty’ (Skorupski, 2006: 88).

I would dare to comment that Skorupski has not studied the historical context of Mill’s time in much detail. He separated the demand for democracy from that of socialism, which demonstrates insufficient understanding of the findings of English political history in the mid-19th century. Although he does not make any reference to Mill’s labour policy, Skorupski is convinced that Mill was an egalitarian as far as the decision-making process was concerned. Mill’s praise for the plural voting system did not trouble Skorupski at all.

Apart from the above, Skorupski contradicted himself. On the one hand, he supported the view that Mill was a democrat, but on the other, that democracy for Mill was not always the best system of governing since he was first a liberal and then a democrat. I agree with this last remark on the condition that the demand for democracy and liberalism can be interpreted differently to that provided in Skorupski’s book.
I believe that the materialization of democratic principles presupposes the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and, thus, the restriction of the liberty of the owners of the means of production. This would confer a different meaning on the term ‘democracy’ from that which Skorupski attributes to it. The simultaneous existence of democracy and class contradictions is an oxymoron. Mill did not have a problem with this, since he did not think that an increase in the wealth of the owners of the means of production inevitably became an obstacle to democracy.

The only book that specializes in Mill’s theory of democracy is Nadia Urbinati’s *Mill on Democracy* (2002). She writes that Mill’s integration into the democratic tradition is a contentious issue for his commentators (Urbinati, 2002: 1). In Urbinati’s book, we find the strongest defence of the plural voting system. According to her, Mill, in an attempt to deal with the possibility of political tyranny by the majority, was not driven to solutions that assail political equality. For Urbinati, ‘insofar as his core arguments for indirect ruling or “government by discussion” were arguments for a deliberative form of politics, they were arguments for democracy’ (Urbinati, 2002: 9). She agrees with Charles Beitz’s comment that ‘it is a democratic theory that incorporates explicitly anti-egalitarian procedural elements in order, one might add, not to diminish the value of political freedom and the plurality of voices in the legislative’ (Urbinati, 2002: 63).

She insists that plural voting did not contradict the principle of equality (Urbinati, 2002: 95). According to her, it was a system which would favour everybody, since it promoted the emergence of the most capable (Urbinati, 2002: 96). She characterizes Mill as a moderate democrat whose anti-egalitarian measures aimed to promote the common good and as a philosopher who eventually managed to justify political inequality by claiming that it would serve the general good, and the interests of the disadvantaged in particular (Urbinati, 2002: 97).

Mill’s proposition of plural voting demonstrated his discontent with the organization and functioning of contemporary democracy and not with democracy in itself (Urbinati, 2002: 100). According to Urbinati, Mill ‘used plural voting to counter the growing social homogeneity modeled on the commercial spirit of the middle class’ (Urbinati, 2002: 103).

Another reason concerning the basis on which she includes Mill among the democrats is Mill’s consideration that government was ultimately accountable to the will of the people and not to certain professionals (Urbinati, 2002: 94). According to her, Mill ‘argued that the general interest did not exist prior to public debate, but could emerge from it’ (Urbinati, 2002: 82). Indeed, Mill believed it was possible for the Members of Parliament, after they had listened to all the relevant views on an issue, to make a decision which might be contrary to the interests of their class or their electorate.

At the same time, Urbinati is convinced that Mill’s critique on social justice was radical and democratic in that he focused on the relationship between the political institutions and the citizen’s character (Urbinati, 2002: 191). She also points out that Mill aimed to expand democracy rather than implement socialism (Urbinati, 2002: 190–91).

I am forced to express deep criticism of Urbinati for remaining at a formal level of analysis in reading Mill’s philosophy without also attempting to evaluate Mill’s political equality and taking into account his social policy measures. She concluded that Mill was treading the democratic path simply because he applauded pluralism; that is, where decisions were taken only after all relevant opinions had been expressed.

She ignored the prerequisites Mill posed in order for a citizen to be able to take part in the decision-making process on an equal footing with his fellow citizens. As I have attempted to explain, these presuppositions are value-laden and either restrict or even exclude from such a process most citizens belonging to the lower social classes.
Paul Kern (1998) expressed a very interesting opinion in his article on the plural voting system. He considered that Hare’s system had, as its goal, to guarantee the hegemony of the elite, ‘elite being defined in terms of both property and intelligence’, and not to promote democracy or to ensure the representation of minorities (Kern, 1998: 169). Mill supports Hare’s system precisely for this reason. They both agree that ‘democracy is not a decision-making institution but merely a means for creating a decision-making body’ (Kern, 1998: 175). I support Kern’s concluding thoughts that the ‘Hare plan viewed voting, not as a basic right and a weapon against oppression, but as a moral exercise in which a decision-making body would be created’ (Kern, 1998: 175). Mill, indeed, also shared this view. Kern wrote that Hare’s goal was to preserve the status quo. Although this is not so accurate in Mill’s case, I will agree with Kern in his conclusion that their fear lest the working class might actually rule revealed a lack of confidence in the future direction of democratic politics (Kern, 1998: 176).

In the context of the above, I support the view that Urbinati was wrong to consider Mill a moderate democrat whose far-reaching goal was to serve the common good. Mill, instead, interpreted the capital owners’ interest as the common good. This element does not allow us to describe him even as a moderate democrat. The strong connection that the term ‘democracy’ had with the ‘social question’ and the popular demands of this era becomes clear only if the social content of the term is examined.

This is not achieved in Urbinati’s book, which is the main reason that led her to believe that, among other things, Mill tried to diminish middle class influence. On the contrary, Mill’s fear was of the working class. Because Urbinati seemed to ignore the social content of the term democracy, she dissociated it from that of socialism, noting that Mill wanted rather to expand democracy than to implement socialism. This is contradictory. One either assumes that Mill is a socialist, and therefore a democratic thinker, or, as I do, that he is neither a socialist nor a democrat, where the latter concept includes the demands of the working class, despite the fact that he described himself as a socialist and his thinking approaches, to a large extent, both these concepts.

One criticism which took account of some of the historical developments of Mill’s era is that of Zimmer (1976). He supported the view that within the narrow framework of the English parliamentary system Mill could be characterized as a democrat (Zimmer, 1976: 4). He based his view on the fact that at a time when property was the main requirement for the right to vote, Mill endorsed almost everyone’s right to vote (Zimmer, 1976: 6).

As I have already attempted to highlight, according to Conservative circles, which dominated the parliament of the time, Mill was clearly of a more progressive mindset. Zimmer overlooks the fact, however, that the call for the provision of universal suffrage had been formulated as a political demand since the late 1770s and was not abandoned thereafter; indeed, it had already been integrated by the Chartists in their programme (Clark, 2007: 243). Thus, the context of comparing Mill’s ideas to the intellectual diversity of his time is very limited in Zimmer’s article.

In conclusion, in this article, I have attempted to highlight the importance of connecting Mill’s views on democracy with his views on economic and, thus, with the promotion of specific class interests. Mill himself made this connection when he wrote that for such actions which are ‘prejudicial to the interests’ of others, the individual is subjected to legal punishment (Mill, 1977a [1859]: 292). The crucial question is this: did he, in the word ‘interests’, include capitalist ones? I have tried to prove that he certainly did.

Although I cannot analyse all aspects of the internal tension between liberty and equality in his political philosophy in this article, it can be concluded from the above that the liberty of capital of which he approves, even in this radicalized liberal form, still deals a serious blow to social equality and keeps the multitude in a subjected state.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that not all of Mill’s views on democracy should be dismissed. I may indirectly stress, in my article, the greater importance of Marx’s standpoint on this theme, but Mill’s views can still be of great interest to a researcher in political philosophy. I do not have the space to elaborate on this here; however, I would like to stress that the fact that he connects political economy to social philosophy and extensively elaborates on the ‘social question’ makes his political theory one of great value and interest and in my view differentiates him from contemporary liberal political philosophy.

I also believe that he succeeds in giving a strong philosophical foundation to the welfare state and to social-democratic policy, which unfortunately today is considered by many to be too radical. According to Millian standards, we should be opposed to all this fear of ‘protectionism’ which has the goal of promoting the free market, namely the unrestrained and unfettered function of the capitalist mode of production. Millian democracy strikes a serious blow to current neoliberal policies, including cutting state expenses for social needs, promoting the independence of markets, and restraining the role of the state in policy formation. If Mill could see the current excessive power that the European Bank has over the European Parliament, meaning the obvious democratic deficit in the decision-taking process of the economic policy of the European Union, he would turn in his grave.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the supervisor of my PhD thesis (of which this article is a part), Professor Yannis Plangesis, for his strong support and his valuable comments; Professor Emmanuel Angelidis for his important corrections; and also the two anonymous Critical Sociology reviewers.

Notes
1 The acceptance on his part of these values (productivity, competition, frugality) may not be so obvious in his better known works, usually referred to by commentators on his theory on democracy, but it is crystal clear in his essay on civilisation (1977 [1836]) and in his articles on the condition of Ireland (1986c [1846–7]).
3 Mill’s philosophy is definitely radical according to the standards of his time. We characterize his political theory as undemocratic when compared to the classical notion of democracy that attributes a class content to the term. For more on this see the first chapter of Macpherson (1966).
4 In a very interesting article, Ellen Wood (1981: 185) addresses this accusation in relation to the entire tradition of liberal democratic forms.
5 For a review of Baum’s book that stresses the class content of democracy see Grollios (2009).
6 For their application to social philosophy see Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (1965 [1871]). This is something that I also stress in Grollios (forthcoming).
7 See also Bonefeld (2005).

References


Smart P (1990) Some will be more equal than others: J.S. Mill on democracy, freedom and meritocracy. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 76: 308–323.


