Appendix

Tanzania—Non-Democracy and Independent Media

Although Tanzania became a multiparty state with the elections of 1995, it remains in practice a one-party state because of the domination of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Since 1995, Tanzania has a Polity Index score of -1, which certainly places it in the non-democratic category (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). In spite of this authoritarian government, the media in Tanzania are at least somewhat independent. According to Reporters Without Borders (2010), Tanzania has “noticeable problems,” but remains “one of Africa’s top 10 respecters of media freedom.” Indeed, Reporters Without Border’s 2010 Press Freedom Index ranks Tanzania at 41, which is just behind Spain and Portugal and ahead of France and Italy. Freedom House (2010) has consistently ranked Tanzania as “Partly Free.” According to International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX 2008: 368), the media environment in Tanzania continues to improve and is approaching “near sustainability,” meaning that Tanzania has “legal norms, professionalism and the business environment supportive of independent media,” but that more time is needed to ensure that these characteristics will endure.

Tanzania enjoys a wide range of media, including both state-owned and private newspapers, radio stations and television stations; however, many of these news outlets are only available in urban areas. While the government does not restrict internet activity, less than two percent of Tanzanians have access. Although there are constitutional provisions for media freedom, libel laws and other provisions make it possible for government to ban newspapers and punish journalists (Freedom House 2010). In addition to these legal restrictions, the government allocates advertising revenue to sympathetic media outlets and withholds it from critical media (Freedom House 2010). Additionally, journalists in the semiautonomous Zanzibar face a much more restrictive environment.
than their mainland counterparts. Ownership of private media is concentrated, with three groups controlling many of the news outlets (Ewald 2010). Ewald (2010: 233) attributes recent improvements to news media to competition between private media groups, especially with the entry of the Nation Media group into the Tanzanian media market in 2003:

> The improved salaries, management, editing, equipment enhanced working conditions for journalists and improved the quality of their work. This development has challenged the media sector in Tanzania and has led to improvement of most papers inducing better researched stories and more investigative journalism.

Dependence on advertising revenue does limit independence in that editors are wary to run negative stories about advertisers (IREX 2008). Thus, Tanzania is a non-democracy with media that is not completely, but at least somewhat independent.

With this combination of regime type and media environment, our model predicts some watchdogging, some repression and minimum protest. Indeed, media observers report that although the government can and does ban news outlets and subject journalists and their employers to arrest and punitive fines, news organizations, in particular privately-owned newspapers, do criticize government policies (Freedom House 2010; Reporters Without Borders 2010). There are also indications that journalists in Tanzania view watchdog reporting as part of their job. A survey of Tanzanian journalists conducted in 1999 revealed that they viewed providing “accurate, timely, investigative news and analysis” to be their primary responsibility (Ramaprasad 2001: 546).1 Thus there is some watchdog reporting, but there is also a great deal of self-censorship as journalists and their employers seek to avoid clashes with government officials (Freedom House 2010).

Repression of physical integrity rights remains a problem in Tanzania, but not to the degree that it does in Myanmar. Tanzania’s scores on the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index were in the middle range for most years from 2000 to 2009.2 Although politically motivated killings by the
government were rare, there are ongoing problems with abuse by police and prison guards (U.S. Department of State 2010). According to Amnesty International (2009), the government initially failed to prosecute suspects in the ritual killings of albino people; however, there were some convictions in 2009 (U.S. Department of State 2010).

There were very few news reports of protest in Tanzania for the years 2000 to 2009, and most of these were in Zanzibar rather than the mainland (Agence France-Presse 2001). In January of 2001, hundreds of people protested against the semiautonomous Zanzibar government and called for new elections (Agence France-Presse 2001). Most of the protesters were members of the Civic United Front, the main party challenging the Chama cha Mapinduzi party (Agence France-Presse 2001). According to international news reports, the government sent in army troops to reinforce police, 32 people were killed, and nearly 400 were arrested (Agence France-Presse 2001). Members of the Civic United Front also protested following the elections in 2005 and reported that security forces killed five of their members (Reuters 2005). It is important to note that these protests took place in Zanzibar where the media policies are far more restrictive than on the mainland and, in keeping with our model’s predictions, there were few reports (actually none in the New York Times, according to our search of the Lexis Nexis database) of protest on the mainland against the government there from 2000 to 2009. Thus, mainland Tanzania, a non-democracy with somewhat independent media experienced little to no protest, some repression and some watchdog reporting.

Brazil—Democracy with (Somewhat) Controlled Media

After two decades of military rule, democracy was restored to Brazil in 1985. Since 1988, Brazil has had score of 8 on the Polity Index, meaning that it is a democracy, but that it is not as fully institutionalized a democracy as the Netherlands (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Although Brazil has free and fair elections, it is somewhat lacking in executive constraints and corruption remains a
problem (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). As the largest media market in South America, Brazil has nearly 7000 radio stations, more than 3000 newspapers and hundreds of television stations (Moreira and Helal 2009; Freedom House 2010). New media is also widely available with nearly 40 percent of the population using the internet (Freedom House 2010). While Brazil’s media environment is vibrant and offers a wide range of news and entertainment, journalistic independence is threatened by a combination of legal, political and commercial pressures.

Freedom House (2010) has consistently ranked Brazil as “partly free” since 1998, whereas Brazil’s position on the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index (2010) has shifted from 54 (2002) to 84 (2007), but generally remained somewhere in the middle, well below the Netherlands and well above Myanmar, and usually below Tanzania. Although the constitution provides for freedom of the press, prior to 2009, libel, slander and “subversive” reporting were criminalized, rendering journalists and their employers subject to lengthy prison terms and harsh fines (Freedom House 2010). Even with the overturning of the 1967 Press Law, journalists remain vulnerable to both civil and criminal defamation suits (Freedom House 2010). A case point, in 2009, one congressman filed 44 defamation suits following reports linking him to corruption (Freedom House 2010). Licensing of broadcast media is also an issue. In 2003, several thousand radio stations complained that the government did not respond to their license applications (Freedom House 2004). In addition to lawsuits and licensing, media workers in Brazil are also subject to harassment and violence. Since 1992, 21 journalists have been killed in Brazil, making it one of the most dangerous countries for journalists; however, recently there have been prosecutions in connection with several of these deaths, indicating an end to impunity for those who kill journalists (Committee to protect journalists 2010).
Journalistic independence in Brazil is also compromised by commercialism and clientelism because most of the media outlets are owned by a handful of media conglomerates, and many are linked to political parties or actually owned by politicians (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002; Moreira and Helal 2009). In particular, the Globo organization (and, as some have argued, prior to his death in 2003, the political views of Globo owner Roberto Marinho) dominates the television landscape with 70% of the television market share, several radio stations, a popular internet portal, and the newspaper (O Globo) with the second highest circulation in the country (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002; Noam 2009). Moreover, “One in every five legislators on the powerful Committee on Science, Technology, Communication, and Information has business connections to radio and television stations. Hundreds of politicians nationwide are either directors or partners in some 300 media companies” (Freedom House 2010). Religious groups also own and influence many media outlets. For example, the Catholic Church owns 5% of the radio stations in Brazil and is also linked with about 1200 community radio stations (Moreira and Helal 2009). This pattern of concentrated ownership and political influence contributes to clientelism which in turn limits the ability of media to function independently. According to Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002: 189), “Clientelism tends to break down the autonomy of social institutions, and journalism is no exception. It forces the logic of journalism to merge with other social logics – of party politics and family privilege, for instance. And it breaks down the horizontal solidarity of journalists.” Consequently, Brazil is a democracy in which media independence is limited.

For the combination of democracy and controlled media, our model predicts maximum watchdogging and maximum protest and some repression. Since Brazil is not a fully consolidated democracy and media independence is only partly constrained, we expect these predictions to be close rather than exact. Certainly there is evidence of repression of physical integrity rights in Brazil. From 2000 to 2009, Brazil’s score on the CIRI Physical Integrity Index ranged from 2 to 4. These
low to mid-range scores indicate that the government had some, but not all that much respect for these rights, meaning that there were cases of political imprisonment, torture, murder and disappearance (Gingranelli and Richards 2010). According to Amnesty International (Amnesty International 2007; Amnesty International 2008), there are indications of “systematic human rights violations” both at the hands of police and organized criminal gangs in Brazil. For example, in 2006 alone, police killed more than 1000 people in cases that for the most part were not investigated, but instead dismissed as “resistance followed by death” (Amnesty International 2007). There is also ongoing repression of landless workers and indigenous people (Amnesty International 2009). Thus repression remains a problem in Brazil, though not to the extent that it does in Myanmar.

In spite of the legal, political and commercial limitations on media independence, journalists in Brazil do see themselves as watchdogs. In a recent survey of journalists across 20 countries, those from Brazil on average categorized their role of acting as “a watchdog over government” as very important and second only in importance to their role of providing “citizens with the information they need to make political decisions” (Worlds of Journalism 2009). Media observers have noted that Brazilian media do report critically about government actions; however, “vigorous investigative journalism is practiced more often in the main cities than in the interior, where legal and physical threats feed a climate of intimidation” (Freedom House 2009). Hence, Brazilian media manage to engage in watchdogging, yet their ability, or perhaps their willingness, to do so varies across media outlets and regions, with more watchdog reporting in urban rather than rural settings.

There were many reports of protests in Brazil from 2000 to 2009 around a wide range of issues, from government corruption to the plight of landless workers to prison conditions. In 2001 alone, citizens celebrated May Day by washing the Brazilian flag to protest government corruption, the government threatened to send in the army to replace striking police, and trading at the Sao
Paulo stock market ground to a halt as workers there demonstrated against taxes on trading stocks (Rich 2001; Rohter 2001; Rohter 2001). In 2002, there was a series of attacks involving bombs and machine guns in Rio de Janeiro in protest against prison conditions, allegedly carried out by gangs whose leaders were incarcerated (New York Times 2003). An estimated 25,000 people demonstrated in Brasilia as lawmakers voted to slash pensions in 2003 (Reuters 2003). That same year, there were protests by indigenous Brazilians in conjunction with environmental groups in an effort to keep international energy companies out of the Amazon basin (Forero 2003). There were also demonstrations by the Landless Rural Workers Movement aimed at persuading the government to provide shelter to more than 115,000 families in 2004 (Benson 2004). In 2005, loggers convinced the government to allow them to resume logging in the Amazon after they made a number of threats, torched buses and blocked a highway (Rohter 2005). Also in 2005 there were a series of protests as news broke about a corruption scandal implicating a number of lawmakers, many with close ties to then President Luiz Inacia Lula da Silva. In September 2005, a rally in Sao Paulo drew thousands of protesters who demanded jail time for lawmakers caught up in the corruption scheme (Associated Press 2005). In March of 2007, people marched in Brasilia in protest of a lawmaker’s proposal for a national referendum to change a law that imposes three year prison sentences on women found guilty of having illegal abortions (Fisher and Rohter 2007). Also in 2007, a hunger strike by air traffic controllers in protest of poor working conditions grounded flights across the country (Reuters 2007). These are just some of the protests reported from 2000 to 2009, but they indicate that protest is not only a popular form of political expression but sometimes a means with which to bring about change, especially in the case of the demonstrations which resulted in the reopening of the Amazon to logging. Thus, as our model predicts, Brazil experienced widespread protest and watchdog reporting as well as some repression between 2000 and 2009.
While those journalists surveyed indicated that providing information and analysis was their top priority, they also indicated that reporting positive news in order to facilitate national development was also important (Ramaprasad 2001).


We acknowledge that part of this lack of news stories is due to the difficulty involved in getting information about what is going on in Tanzania; however, the fact that some stories are available suggests that large-scale protests would not escape international attention, especially with the availability of new media to disseminate such information.

Tanzania has been higher (meaning more free) than Brazil on the Press Freedom Index for 6 of the 9 years that Reporters Without Borders has compiled the index.

Compared to journalists from the other 17 countries, on the question of the importance of serving as a watchdog, the average score for Brazilian journalists was higher (meaning more important) than that of all countries except Egypt; however, since sample sizes for individual countries were not provided, it was not possible to determine if these differences in means are statistically significant.