Flamininus and Philip

Philip's campaigns from 200—198 B.C. against the Romans had resulted in a number of reverses and he had asked for a conference to negotiate. Flamininus also found this a useful move to gain time while the question of his future appointment was being discussed in Rome. The conference took place in November 198.

When the time that had been fixed for this conference came round, Philip set out from the port of Demetrias for the Malian Gulf. He himself travelled in a beaked ship together with five galleys, and was accompanied by the Macedonians Apollodorus and Demosthenes who were his secretaries, by Brachylles from Boeotia, and by Cycliadas the Achaean, who had been driven out of the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With Flamininus came King Amyntander of Athamania and Dionyssodorus, the representative of King Attalus of Pergamum, while the various Greek nations and city states were represented by Aristaenus and Xenophon from Achaea, the admiral Acesimbrotus from Rhodes, and the general Phaeneas together with several other statesmen from Aetolia. Flamininus and those who accompanied him arrived at the sea shore at Nicaea, gathered on the beach and stood waiting there. Philip, however, after bringing his ship close to the land, remained on board and when Flamininus asked him to come ashore, he rose from his place on the ship and refused to disembark. Flamininus again addressed him, this time to ask what he was afraid of, to which Philip retorted that he was afraid of nothing except the gods, but that he distrusted the majority of those who were present and above all the Aetolians. When the Roman general showed his surprise and remarked that the same danger applied to all those present and that the odds were equal, Philip answered that he was mistaken, for if anything were to happen to Phaeneas there were plenty of men to take command of the Aetolians, but if Philip were to lose his life there was no one at that moment to succeed him on the throne of Macedonia.

All those who were present thought that in opening the conference in this way the King had shown a singular lack of tact, but Flamininus urged him to speak on whatever topics had persuaded him to come. Philip said that it was not for him to speak first, but rather for Flamininus, and went on to invite him to explain what he, Philip, should do to have peace. The Roman general replied that his duty dictated an answer which was both simple and clear. He demanded that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece, restore to each of the states the prisoners and deserters he was holding, hand over to the Romans the region of Illyria which he had seized after the treaty that had been made in Epirus, and on the same principle give back to Ptolemy all the towns he had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

2. After saying this Flamininus made no further comment, but turned to the rest of the delegates and asked them to speak according to the instructions of those who had sent them to the conference. Dionyssodorus, the representative of King Attalus of Pergamum, was the first to rise. He declared that Philip must surrender those of the King's ships he had taken at the battle of Chios, together with the crews captured in them, and must restore to their original condition both the temple of Aphrodite and the sanctuary of Athena Nicephoros near Pergamum which he had destroyed. He was followed by the Rhodian admiral Acesimbrotus, who

1. When the time that had been fixed for this conference came round, Philip set out from the port of Demetrias for the Malian Gulf. He himself travelled in a beaked ship together with five galleys, and was accompanied by the Macedonians Apollodorus and Demosthenes who were his secretaries, by Brachylles from Boeotia, and by Cycliadas the Achaean, who had been driven out of the Peloponnese for the reasons I have already described. With Flamininus came King Amyntander of Athamania and Dionyssodorus, the representative of King Attalus of Pergamum, while the various Greek nations and city states were represented by Aristaenus and Xenophon from Achaea, the admiral Acesimbrotus from Rhodes, and the general Phaeneas together with several other statesmen from Aetolia. Flamininus and those who accompanied him arrived at the sea shore at Nicaea, gathered on the beach and stood waiting there. Philip, however, after bringing his ship close to the land, remained on board and when Flamininus asked him to come ashore, he rose from his place on the ship and refused to disembark. Flamininus again addressed him, this time to ask what he was afraid of, to which Philip retorted that he was afraid of nothing except the gods, but that he distrusted the majority of those who were present and above all the Aetolians. When the Roman general showed his surprise and remarked that the same danger applied to all those present and that the odds were equal, Philip answered that he was mistaken, for if anything were to happen to Phaeneas there were plenty of men to take command of the Aetolians, but if Philip were to lose his life there was no one at that moment to succeed him on the throne of Macedonia.

All those who were present thought that in opening the conference in this way the King had shown a singular lack of tact, but Flamininus urged him to speak on whatever topics had persuaded him to come. Philip said that it was not for him to speak first, but rather for Flamininus, and went on to invite him to explain what he, Philip, should do to have peace. The Roman general replied that his duty dictated an answer which was both simple and clear. He demanded that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece, restore to each of the states the prisoners and deserters he was holding, hand over to the Romans the region of Illyria which he had seized after the treaty that had been made in Epirus, and on the same principle give back to Ptolemy all the towns he had taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator.

2. After saying this Flamininus made no further comment, but turned to the rest of the delegates and asked them to speak according to the instructions of those who had sent them to the conference. Dionyssodorus, the representative of King Attalus of Pergamum, was the first to rise. He declared that Philip must surrender those of the King's ships he had taken at the battle of Chios, together with the crews captured in them, and must restore to their original condition both the temple of Aphrodite and the sanctuary of Athena Nicephoros near Pergamum which he had destroyed. He was followed by the Rhodian admiral Acesimbrotus, who

1. The peace of Phoenice, made in 205, which had ended the First Macedonian War.

2. The towns in Thrace taken by Philip in 200.
BOOK XVIII

requested that Philip should evacuate the Peraea which he had seized from the Rhodians, withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia and Euromus,1 allow the Perinthians to resume their political union with Byzantium, and evacuate Sestos and Abydos and all the commercial ports and harbours in Asia Minor. When the Rhodian delegate had finished, the Achaean delegates demanded that Corinth and Argos should be restored to them undamaged. Afterwards the Aetolians began by insisting, as the Romans had done, that Philip should evacuate the whole of Greece, and went on to require that he should hand back to them undamaged those cities which were formerly members of the Aetolian League.

3. After Phaeneas the Aetolian had put forward these demands, a man named Alexander of Isus,2 who had the reputation of being both an experienced statesman and an able orator, rose to speak. He attacked Philip on the grounds that he was neither sincere at the present moment in proposing a peace settlement, nor courageous in his manner of waging war when this was required of him. When he attended assemblies and conferences he was constantly setting traps, watching his opportunity and generally behaving as if he were at war, but in war itself he pursued a policy which was both unjust and ignoble. Instead of meeting his enemies face to face, his practice was to retreat before them burning and plundering cities as he went, and by this course of conduct, though he was defeated himself, he spoiled the prizes of the victors. The earlier kings of Macedonia had behaved in precisely the opposite fashion, for they constantly fought one another in the open field, but very seldom razed or devastated cities. This practice was made clear to all in the war which Alexander waged in Asia against King Darius, and again in the long-drawn-out struggle between Alexander’s successors in which they all took the field against Antigonus for the mastery of Asia. And the successors of these rulers down to the time of Pyrrhus had followed the same principle. They had always been eager to give battle in the open field, and had done everything in their power to conquer one another by force of arms, but they had spared the cities, so that whoever proved the victor should rule over them and be honoured by his subjects. But for a man to abandon war, yet at the same time destroy the very objects for which a war is waged, was not just madness but the height of madness. Yet this was exactly what Philip was now doing, for when he made his forced march back from the pass in Epirus,1 he destroyed more cities in Thessaly, in spite of being a friend and ally of that country, than anyone who had actually made war on the Thessalians. Then, after he had elaborated his case at length with many more examples, Alexander finally used the following argument. ‘Why,’ he asked Philip, ‘when the city of Lysimachia was a member of the Aetolian League and was under the rule of a military governor provided by them, had he expelled this officer and installed a garrison of his own? And why had he sold into slavery the people of Cius, which was also a member of the Aetolian League, when he himself was on friendly terms with the Aetolians? And finally, on what pretext was he now occupying the cities of Echinus, Phthiotic Thebes, Pharsalus and Larissa?’2

4. When he had made these points Alexander concluded his harangue, whereupon Philip had his ship manoeuvred closer to the shore and stood up on the deck to reply. He told his audience that Alexander had delivered a speech in the typically theatrical and Aetolian style. ‘We all know,’ he said, ‘that nobody willingly destroys his own allies, but that through changes of circumstance commanders are obliged to do many things which are contrary to their choice.’ While the King was still speaking, Phaeneas, who suffered from particularly weak eyesight, interrupted him and told him that he was talking nonsense. ‘The truth is,’ he said, ‘that you must either fight and conquer, or else obey those who are stronger than you.’ At this, weak though his position was, Philip could not refrain from indulging his special line in sarcasm, and so he turned to Phaeneas and said, ‘Yes, even a blind man can see that’, for he was quick at repartee and had a special knack for making his opponents look small. Then addressing Alexander again, he said, ‘You ask me why I annexed Lysimachia. The reason was to prevent it from being depopulated by the Thracians because of

1. Towns in the province of Caria on the mainland of Asia Minor, north of Rhodes.
2. A town in southern Aetolia, north-east of Naupactus.

1. A pass from which Philip had been driven out by Flamininus.
2. These four cities had earlier belonged to the Aetolians and been taken by the Macedonians.
your own neglect; and indeed this is what happened, since the present war has forced me to withdraw the soldiers who according to you were acting as a garrison, but who were really there to protect the place. As for the people of Cius, it was not I who made war on them, but when Prusias did so I merely helped him to capture the city, and this was your fault as well. Time and again both I and the other Greek states sent envoys to ask you to remove from your statutes the law which allows you to take “plunder from plunder”, and you always replied that you would rather remove Aetolia from Aetolia than repeal this law. ¹

5. When Flamininus remarked that he did not know what the King meant, Philip tried to explain to him that it is a custom among the Aetolians to plunder not only the persons and the territory of those with whom they themselves are at war, but if any other peoples are at war with one another and are at the same time friends and allies of theirs, the Aetolians are allowed to give help to both parties and likewise to plunder the territory of both without any public decree having been passed to that effect. In other words, in the eyes of the Aetolians there are no properly defined limits either of friendship or of hostility, but they are ready to treat as enemies and make war upon all states which are in dispute about anything.

‘So what right have they,’ Philip went on, ‘to condemn me now, if when I was on friendly terms with the Aetolians and in alliance with Prusias I acted against the people of Cius in order to help my own allies? But what is most outrageous of all is that they should attempt to put themselves on the same footing as the Romans and demand that the Macedonians should withdraw from the whole of Greece. To use such language is arrogant enough in the first place, but while we may endure this from the Romans, it is quite intolerable coming from the Aetolians. In any case,’ he continued, ‘what is this Greece which you demand that I should evacuate, and how do you define Greece? Certainly most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks! The countries of the Agrae, the Apodotae and the Amphilochians cannot be regarded as Greek. ¹ So do you allow me to remain in those territories?’

6. At this Flamininus could not repress a smile, whereupon Philip added, ‘That is all I have to say to the Aetolians. So far as the Rhodians and King Attalus are concerned, I believe a fair-minded judge would consider it more just for them to give up the captured ships and the crews than for me to restore them. It was not I who first took up arms against Attalus and the Rhodians, but they against Macedon, as everybody acknowledges. However, since you have requested this, Titus, I agree to cede the Peraea to the Rhodians, and the ships and the surviving members of their crews to Attalus. As for the damage that was done to the sanctuary of Athena Nicephorus and the shrine of Aphrodite, it is not in my power to do anything else towards restoring them, but I will send plants and some gardeners to tend the place and see to the growth of the trees that were cut down.’ Flamininus smiled once more at the irony in the King’s words, and Philip then turned to the Achaeans. He began by recounting all the favours that they had received from Antigonus and later from himself; then he quoted the exceptional honours which the Achaeans had conferred on the rulers of Macedon, and finally he read out the decree according to which they had abandoned him and transferred their alliance to Rome, and he made this the occasion to enlarge upon the fickleness and ingratitude of the Achaeans in general. In spite of their action, however, he undertook to restore Argos to them, but in the case of Corinth he said he would consult with Flamininus.

7. When he had concluded his address to the other envoys, he turned to Flamininus, remarking that the discussion now rested between himself and the Romans, and asked whether it was the general’s wish that he should retire from these towns and places in Greece which he himself had conquered, or whether the withdrawal should also include those he had inherited from his ancestors. At this Flamininus remained silent, but Aristaenus was primed and ready to speak on behalf of the Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the Aetolians, and they were only prevented from doing so by the fact

¹ Allowing for a measure of Macedonian rhetoric, it is quite true that Thucydides had regarded the Amphilochians, who lived at the eastern end of the Ambracian Gulf, as barbarians.
BOOK XVIII

that the hour was growing late and the day was drawing to a close. Thereupon Philip requested that they should all provide him with written statements setting out their terms for a peace settlement; he pointed out that he was alone and had no advisers to consult, and so wished to reflect upon their various demands. Flamininus was by no means displeased at the evident mockery in Philip's tone, but he did not wish the others to see this, and so made fun of Philip in his turn by saying, 'Of course you are alone by this time, Philip: you have killed off all the friends who could give you the best advice.' At this the Macedonian King smiled sardonically and said nothing. All the envoys then handed their demands in writing to Philip, the terms of which corresponded to those I have already described, and after arranging to resume the conference the next day at Nicaea, they separated. The next morning Flamininus and all the others came punctually at the appointed time, but Philip did not appear.

8. Near the end of the day, by which time Flamininus had almost given up hope, Philip arrived towards dusk, accompanied by the same suite as on the day before. He made out that he had spent the time poring over the envoys' demands in a state of great perplexity and uncertainty as to how to meet them. The other delegates were convinced, however, that his purpose was to prevent the Achaean and Aetolian delegates from delivering their accusations by reducing the time available for discussion; for on the previous day, just as he was leaving, he had noticed that both these delegations were on the point of attacking him and stating their grievances. So this time as he came up to the meeting-place, he requested that the Roman general should discuss the situation with him in private. The object of this meeting was that they should stop carrying on a mere skirmishing with words on both sides, and arrive at some definite solution of the matters in dispute.

When he repeated this request several times and pressed the idea strongly, Flamininus asked the rest of the delegates who were present what he should do. They urged him to meet Philip and hear what he had to say. Thereupon Flamininus called upon Appius Claudius, who was at the time military tribune, to join him; then he told the other members of the conference who had retired a little way from the sea shore to remain where they were, while he invited Philip to come ashore. The King then disembarked accompanied by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, met Flamininus, and held a private conference with him for a long time. It is difficult to say what passed between them on this occasion, but after they had parted Flamininus set about explaining the King's proposals to the rest of the delegates. He told them that Philip was prepared to give back Pharsalus and Larissa but not Thebes to the Aetolians, that he would restore Corinth and Argos to the Achaean and the Peraea to the Rhodians, but would not withdraw from the Carian cities of Iasus and Bargylia. To the Romans he would surrender all his possessions in Illyria together with all prisoners of war, and to Attalus he would return his ships and all the survivors of the crews who had been captured in the naval battles.

9. All those who were present immediately declared their dissatisfaction with the peace terms offered and insisted that Philip must begin by complying with their common demand, namely to withdraw from the whole of Greece; without this action all the rest of the concessions had neither value nor meaning. Meanwhile Philip could see that an animated discussion was going on, and as he was afraid of the accusations that would be launched against him, he asked Flamininus, as the hour was getting late, to adjourn the conference to the following day; at their next session, he said, he would either win the others over to his point of view or accept the justice of theirs. Flamininus agreed to this request, and after arranging to meet on the beach at Thronium they parted company.

The next day the whole conference arrived in good time at the appointed place. This time Philip made a short speech in which he appealed to all the envoys and above all to Flamininus not to break off the negotiations for peace now that the majority were in a conciliatory mood, but if possible to reach an agreement among themselves on the points which were still in dispute. If that proved impossible, he would then send an embassy to the Senate and either persuade that body to accept the various controversial issues, or else carry out its decision. The response of all the Greek envoys

1. This was an unprecedented proposal, for hitherto consultation with the Senate had followed a preliminary agreement with the Roman general in charge on the spot. Flamininus hoped to obtain an extension of his command in Greece, or failing that to be entrusted with the task of making peace.
was that they should continue the war and disregard Philip's offer. However, the Roman general's view was that while he was well aware of the unlikelihood of Philip's agreeing to any of their demands, still, as his request in no way interfered with their freedom of action, it was quite possible to grant it. None of the proposals which were being discussed at this conference could in fact be ratified without reference to the Senate, and apart from the necessity of ascertaining its opinion, the present moment was in various ways a convenient one. The winter would prevent the armies from taking the field, so that not only would no time be lost by using this period to consult the Senate, but it would be in the interests of all concerned to do so.

When the Greeks noticed that Flamininus was by no means averse to referring the matter to the Senate, they quickly agreed to his plan. It was decided that Philip should be allowed to send an embassy to Rome, and that the other states should also send envoys to speak before the Senate and put their case against him. The conference had thus produced a result which Flamininus could approve and which corresponded closely enough to his original forecasts, and so he hastened to put together the fabric of his own plan, taking care to secure his position and allowing no undue advantage to Philip. For although he was granting him a truce of two months, he insisted that the King must complete his mission to the Senate within that period, and must immediately withdraw his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He acted vigorously on behalf of the allies by impressing on Philip that no hostile act was to be committed against them by the Macedonians during this period. He put these requirements into writing, and then proceeded to act on his own authority in carrying out his policy. In the first place he sent Amyander to Rome; he chose him partly because he was amenable and could easily be persuaded by Flamininus' friends there to follow any course they might propose, and secondly because his royal title would lend some glamour to the occasion and stimulate people's interest in meeting him. Next,
them, for the Macedonians had twice been defeated and had expended the greater part of their resources on land.

They wound up their case with an appeal to the Senate not to cheat the Greeks out of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themselves of the noblest claim to renown. This, or something very similar, was the gist of the speeches delivered by the Greek envoys. Philip's representatives had prepared a lengthy statement in reply, but they were prevented at the very outset from delivering it; for when the question was put to them as to whether they would withdraw from Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias they answered that they had no instructions on that subject.

12. When Philip's delegates were cut short in this way, they made no further statement. Thereupon the Senate, as I have mentioned above, proceeded to dispatch both consuls to Gaul and voted to continue the war against Philip. At the same time they placed Flamininus in charge of affairs in Greece. These decisions were quickly reported there, so that the whole business turned out very much as Flamininus had wished. In the event chance had played only a very small part: the outcome was very largely due to his own skill and foresight in handling the problem. If ever a Roman had proved himself to be thoroughly astute it was he, for both in the management of public affairs and in his private concerns he had exercised a degree of judgement and of practical capacity which could not be surpassed, and all this he had achieved as a young man, for he was still under thirty. He was the first Roman who had crossed to Greece in command of an army.

On Treachery

There has been much discussion of the context of this digression in Polybius' narrative, since it is not clearly indicated in any surviving fragment. The most likely theory is that it refers to the action of the Argive leaders, who in 198 B.C. seceded from the Achaean League and admitted Macedonian troops into Argos. They met a swift retribution when Philip handed them over to Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta.

13. I have often found myself marvelling at many of the mistakes which men make in the conduct of their lives, and particularly in the case of traitors. I wish therefore to say a few words on the subject in connection with the times of which I am writing. I am, however, well aware that this is no simple matter to investigate or even to define, since it is far from easy to say what kind of man we can properly regard as a traitor. We cannot, for example, consider as traitors men who of their own free will engage in combined action with certain kings and princes; nor again those who in times of danger cause their country to shift its existing attachments to other friendships or alliances. Far from it, since in practice such men have often proved to be outstanding benefactors of their country. There is no need for me to go back to the distant past for illustrations, since what I have to say can easily be observed in the times of which I am writing. Thus, for example, if Aristaenus had not in good time persuaded the Achaean to abandon their alliance with Philip and exchange it for one with Rome, it is clear that his whole nation would have been utterly destroyed. As it was, this action not only ensured the safety of each of the members of the League in the immediate crisis, but it was soon recognized that Aristaenus and his policy were responsible beyond all doubt for the growth in the power of the League which followed. The result was that he was in no sense regarded as a traitor, but universally honoured as the benefactor and saviour of his country. The same principle often applies to others who conduct their policy in a similar fashion and shape it according to the circumstances of the hour.

14. From this point of view while Demosthenes, the Athenian statesman, deserves our praise on a great many counts, we must find fault with him on one: I am speaking here of his rash and ill-considered action when he bitterly attacked the most distinguished men in Greece, accusing Cercidas, Hieronymus and Eucampidas in

---

1. i.e. as the liberators of Greece.
2. i.e. the plan which lay behind the dispatch of the embassies to Rome.

---

1. A reference to the Peloponnesians who cooperated with Philip II and whom Demosthenes denounced as traitors.
or at any rate exceedingly rare, to find a stretch of country of say two or three miles or more which contains no obstacles of this kind. But even assuming that such an arena could be found, if the enemy refuses to come down into it, but prefers to traverse the country sacking the towns and devastating the territories of our allies, what purpose can the phalanx serve? If it remains on the ground which suits it best, not only is it unable to assist its allies, but it cannot even ensure its own safety, for the transport of its supplies will easily be stopped by the enemy when they have undisputed command of the open country. On the other hand, if it leaves the terrain which favours it and attempts an action elsewhere, it will easily be defeated. Or again, supposing that the enemy does decide to descend into the plain and fight there, but, instead of committing his entire force to the battle when the phalanx has its one opportunity to charge, keeps even a small part of it in reserve at the moment when the main action takes place, it is easy to forecast what will happen from the tactics which the Romans are now putting into practice.

32. The outcome indeed does not need to be demonstrated by argument: we need only refer to accomplished facts. The Romans do not attempt to make their line numerically equal to the enemy’s, nor do they expose the whole strength of the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx. Instead they keep part of the forces in reserve while the rest engage the enemy. Later in the battle, whether the phalanx in its charge drives back the troops opposed to it or is driven back by them, in either event it loses its own peculiar formation. For either in pursuing a retreating enemy or falling back before an oncoming one, the phalanx leaves behind the other units of its own army; at this point the enemy’s reserves can occupy the space the phalanx has vacated, and are no longer obliged to attack from the front, but can fall upon it from flank and rear. When it is thus easy to deny the phalanx the opportunities it needs and to minimize the advantages it enjoys, and also impossible to prevent the enemy from acting against it, does it not follow that the difference between these two systems is enormous?

Besides this, those who rely on the phalanx are obliged to march across and encamp on ground of every description; they must occupy favourable positions in advance, besiege others and be besieged themselves and deal with unexpected appearances of the enemy. All these eventualities are part and parcel of war, and may have an important or a decisive effect on the final victory. In all these situations the Macedonian formation is sometimes of little use, and sometimes of none at all, because the phalanx soldier cannot operate either in smaller units or singly, whereas the Roman formation is highly flexible. Every Roman soldier, once he is armed and goes into action, can adapt himself equally well to any place or time and meet an attack from any quarter. He is likewise equally well-prepared and needs to make no change whether he has to fight with the main body or with a detachment, in maniples or singly. Accordingly, since the effective use of the parts of the Roman army is so much superior, their plans are much more likely to achieve success than those of others. I have felt obliged to deal with this subject at some length, because so many Greeks on those occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat regarded such an event as almost incredible, and many will still be at a loss to understand why and how the phalanx proves inferior by comparison with the Roman method of arming their troops.

Affairs in Greece

FLAMININUS AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

This passage describes the peace settlement that was drawn up after the Romans’ decisive victory over Philip at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C.

44. At this time the ten commissioners who had been appointed to handle the affairs of Greece arrived from Rome bringing the decree of the Senate concerning the peace settlement with Philip. Its principal features were the following. All the rest of the Greeks both in Asia and in Europe were to be free and to enjoy their own laws. Philip was to hand over to the Romans before the beginning of the Isthmian Games those Greeks who were subject to his rule.

1. The Isthmian Games stood third in the order of the great Pan-Hellenic festivals (after the Olympian and the Pythian), and were held in June-July of each alternate year—in June 196 in this case.
and also the towns which he had occupied with garrisons. From the towns of Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasus, as well as Abydos, Thasos, Myrina and Perinthus he was to withdraw his garrisons and leave the inhabitants free. Flamininus was to write to Prusias of Bithynia in accordance with the decree of the Senate concerning the liberation of the city of Cius. Within the same time limit Philip was to restore to the Romans all prisoners of war and deserters and to surrender all his warships, with the exception of five light vessels and his huge flagship, in which the men rowed eight to an oar. He was to pay the sum of 1,000 talents, half of it at once and the other half in instalments spread over ten years.

45. When the contents of this decree became known in Greece all the city states and peoples took heart and were overjoyed, with the solitary exception of the Aetolians. They were disappointed at not having obtained what they expected, and complained bitterly of the decree, which they said was nothing but a verbal arrangement and ignored practical problems. From the actual terms of the decree they put about interpretations of the probable consequences which were calculated to confuse the minds of those who listened to such forecasts. They maintained that there were two distinct pronouncements in the decree which applied to the various cities garrisoned by Philip: one of these ordered him to withdraw his garrisons and hand over the cities to the Romans, and the other to withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. The cities to be set free were specifically named and were all of them situated in Asia; it was obvious therefore that those to be handed over to the Romans were all in Europe, that is to say Oreum, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias and Corinth.

This was surely a clear indication that the Romans were taking over from Philip the so-called 'fetters of Greece', and that the Greeks were not being given their freedom, but merely a change of masters.

These arguments of the Aetolians were repeated ad nauseam. But in the meanwhile Flamininus left Elateia in Phocis with the ten commissioners, travelled south to Anticyra, and at once sailed across the gulf to Corinth, where he proceeded to confer with the commissioners and consider the settlement of Greece as a whole.

1. For the significance of the last three of these see p. 503.
BOOK XVIII

'The Senate of Rome and Titus Quinctius Flamininus the proconsul, having defeated King Philip and the Macedonians in battle, leave the following states and cities free, without garrisons, subject to no tribute and in full enjoyment of their ancestral laws: the peoples of Corinth, Phocis, Locri, Euboea, Phthiotic Achaea, Magnesia, Thessaly and Perrhaebia.'

At the very beginning of this announcement a deafening shout arose, so that some people never heard the proclamation at all, while others were anxious to hear it again. The greater part of the crowd could not believe their ears, for what had happened was so unexpected that it was as if they were listening to the words in a kind of dream. They clamoured and shouted, each of them moved perhaps by a different impulse, for the herald and the trumpeter to come forward into the middle of the stadium and repeat the proclamation; they wished, no doubt, not only to hear the speaker but to see him, so difficult did it seem to believe what he was saying. But when the herald came forward into the centre of the arena, once more silenced the clamour with the help of his trumpeter, and read out exactly the same text, such a tremendous outburst of cheering arose that it is difficult for those who can only read of the event today to imagine how it sounded. When at last the shouting died away nobody paid the least attention to the athletic contests; the cheers of the crowd were replaced by a hubbub of chatter, people discussing the news with their neighbours or soliloquizing aloud, all talking like men beside themselves. Indeed, when the games were over they almost killed Flamininus with the unrestrained vehemence of their joy and gratitude. Some of them yearned to look him in the face and hail him as their saviour, others pressed forward to touch his hand, and the majority threw garlands and fillets upon him, so that between them they almost tore him to pieces. But however extravagant their gratitude may appear to have been, one could say with confidence that it fell far short of the importance of the event itself. For it was a wholly admirable action in the first place that the Roman people and their general should have made the choice to incur unlimited danger and expense to ensure the freedom of Greece, more remarkable still that they devoted to this ideal the force sufficient to bring it about, and most remarkable of all that no mischance intervened to frustrate their intention. Instead, every factor combined to produce this crowning moment, when by a single proclamation all the Greeks inhabiting both Asia and Europe became free, with neither garrison nor tribute to burden them, but enjoying their own laws.