We Are Who?: A Pragmatic Reframing of Immigration and National Identity

JOHN JACOB KAAG
University of Massachusetts, Lowell

I. Introduction

On October 1, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice defended the newly formed National Security Strategy, commenting that, “after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security—a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called ‘Good War,’ or the Cold War” (Rice, Wriston Lecture). Many commentators have echoed this point. The attacks on the World Trade Center threatened a particular civilian population but also posed an existential threat to American identity. Ironically, hundreds of undocumented migrant workers were killed in the attacks on September 11. In the wake of these attacks, many scholars and politicians overlooked this irony and sought to respond to questions that surfaced as the products of nation confusion and crisis: What is it to be an American citizen? What is the meaning and value of national identity? Who are we? Samuel Huntington provides a type of answer in his aptly titled Who Are We?: The Challenges to American Identity, a work that aims to renegotiate the boundaries of national identity and that outlines the dangers that accompany America’s current domestic policy and, more specifically, its stance on immigration and cultural diversity.

This paper seeks to provide a critical appraisal and a pragmatic revision of Huntington’s thesis. If successful, it will accomplish three objectives. First, it will briefly present Huntington’s characterization of American identity. His particular reading of American history underpins the model of national identity that Huntington develops in Who Are We and helps explain his position on Hispanic immigration. This exegesis will focus on the ways in which Huntington characterizes the recent influx of Mexican immigrants as being fundamentally different from previous forms of immigration and, in its unprecedented
character, as posing an unprecedented threat to American identity. Second, it will offer a pragmatic alternative to Huntington’s conception of identity, an alternative that takes its cues from the description of the social self provided by the American pragmatist Josiah Royce. Royce’s description stands in marked contrast to Huntington’s reassertion of a domestic monoculturalism. Providing this pragmatic alternative will involve a brief reframing of the history that Huntington employs in his account for, as Royce observes, “my idea of myself is an interpretation of my past—linked also with my hopes and intentions as to my future” (Royce, Problem of Christianity 218). This project is developed in the spirit of Royce’s other works; he wrote a history of California, one of the first historical pieces to acknowledge the role of various ethnic groups in the region. Such a historical interpretation will take account of particular instances when shared projects and common concerns foster a type of cross-cultural dialogue. In the midst of this dialogue, the voices involved remain distinct yet harmonious. Royce’s notion of provincialism provides a way of thinking through these instances, a way of understanding cultural differentiation as a complement, rather than a threat, to American practice and identity.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this paper proposes specific measures that may be taken in order to alleviate the unique challenges that have become associated with Mexican immigration in the United States. These challenges should not, as Huntington suggests, be portrayed as a general and ominous threat to a monocultural national identity but rather as specific tasks to be addressed through educational, political, and economic policies. In reference to these policies, Royce’s work proves particularly instructive. His concepts of provincial loyalties, interpretation, and mediation may effectively motivate political and educational reforms. These policies are not simply pragmatic by virtue of being inspired by a nineteenth-century pragmatist. For them to be truly pragmatic, they must also be exact in pinpointing the most pressing consequences of Mexican immigration and in accessing the resources that both communities have to address these consequences. This given approach extends a Roycean pragmatism into the political sphere, along the lines that Jose Orosco explores, but also reflects a type of political realism that Huntington, the consummate realist, has seemingly forgotten (Orosco, “Cosmopolitan Loyalty” 204–213).

II. Huntington on American Identity

Huntington’s argument that Mexican immigration poses a clear and present danger to American identity rests on his understanding of the meaning and
construction of the nation’s cultural character. To the existential question that arose in the aftermath of 9/11, Huntington attempts to answer in the cultural voice of America:

America’s core culture has been, and at the moment, is still primarily the culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth century settlers who founded American society. The central elements of that culture can be defined in a variety of ways but include the Christian religion, Protestant values and moralism, a work ethic, the English language, British traditions of law, justice, and the limits of government power, and a legacy of European art, literature, philosophy and music. (Who Are We? 40)

According to Huntington, these cultural elements, unique in their Protestant ethos, generated a set of national values which he, following the lead of Gunnar Myrdal, terms the “American Creed.” He elaborates in broad and unusually moralistic strokes, suggesting that this set of values is defined by its emphasis on individualism, personal freedom, equality, justice, and fair opportunity. This creed has been given voice, virtually without interruption, for three hundred years. Huntington identifies a single hiccup in the creed’s enactment, stating “the only major exception was the effort in the South to formulate a justification for slavery” (Who Are We? 68). Huntington’s rendering of America’s cultural core, and the values that this culture arguably generates, will be analyzed in detail in the coming sections. The association of Anglo-Protestant culture and the aforementioned creed may constitute a logical bait-and-switch that becomes apparent in light of an alternative interpretation of American history. It seems unlikely that the voice of the American Creed has been as continuous as Huntington’s historical account suggests. Despite the questionable nature of Huntington’s unilateral stance on immigration, it has earned a certain cache among policymakers and the general populace. In advocating for restrictive border policies, Texas Congressman, Lamar Smith, says “Immigration should further the national policy aims of the United States. We should always ask how immigration is contributing to America’s national interest” (Gimple and James, “Congressional Politics”).

Without evaluating the historical consequences of the cultural core that Huntington exposes, it seems possible, and indeed necessary, to outline the way in which Anglo-Protestantism functions in his account of national identity. “Throughout American history,” Huntington writes, “people who were not white Anglo-Saxon protestants have become American by adopting America’s Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. This benefited them and the country” (Who Are We? 61). Huntington outlines two versions of American
identity, describing them metaphorically as the “melting pot” and “tomato soup” models. According to Huntington, both models provide a coherent picture of national identity, based exclusively on versions of immigrant assimilation. Overlooking the subordination, segregation, and discrimination that accompanies the process, Huntington comments that “assimilation, particularly cultural assimilation has been a great, perhaps the greatest, American success story” (Who Are We? 183). The “tomato soup” model, the concept for which Huntington advocates throughout the course of his work, describes the process by which members of ethnic communities sever their historical cultural connections in order to assume a truly American identity. “Americans were determined,” Huntington writes, “to maintain an America that might eventually become a melting pot through ethnic intermarriage but would remain staunchly tomato soup in its Anglo-Protestant cultural identity” (Who Are We? 131).

It is worth noting that Huntington dismisses almost out of hand the concept of cultural pluralism proposed by Horace Kallen in the early 1900s. He suggests that Kallen’s notion of a “nation of nationalities” was unable to advance a cohesive American identity and criticizes the concept as a flight of liberal imagination. This flight, however, gained traction in the revisionism of the 1970s and, according to Huntington, contributed to the deconstruction of the Anglo-Protestant values that had long grounded American nationalism. In the spirit of Allan Bloom and Leo Strauss, he argues that the “multiculturalists” of the 1990s assumed the banner of Kallen’s cultural pluralism, elevated the position of subnational groups, and, in so doing, jeopardized the unity of Americans’ beliefs and practices. Huntington laments that, due to the poor judgment of this liberal resurgence, “(a)ssimilation and Americanization are no longer identical” (Who Are We? 200). This brief discussion of Kallen’s cultural pluralism will be revisited in the attempt to provide a pragmatic response to Huntington’s rendering of immigration and national identity. Kallen earned his doctorate in philosophy at Harvard in 1908 under Royce’s direction, appropriating and modifying what he called his teacher’s “ethic of openmindedness” (Kalen, “Reflections” 31–39). Royce anticipates Kallen in his belief that a return to provincialism, an acknowledgement of regional loyalties, provides a way of dampening the effects of international tensions and a way to negotiate the pluralism that defined the character of the American Southwest of the 1880s. Huntington’s assault on Hispanic immigration is therefore an assault on Kallen’s cultural pluralism, but also a critique of Royce’s social and political thought. In the section after next, I will attempt to provide a Roycean response to Huntington’s argument.
III. Huntington on Hispanic Immigration: Enemy at the Gates?

Extending the rhetoric of confrontation and assault that served him so well in his *Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington attempts to prophesize another battle, this one waged on American soil (Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations” 22). This is a domestic battle in which loyal Americans will defend their cultural core, their very identity, against an unprecedented immigrant onslaught. “Historically,” he writes, “the substance of American identity has involved four key components: race, ethnicity, culture (most notably, language and religion), and ideology. The racial and ethnic Americans are no more. Cultural America is under siege” (*Who Are We?* 257). Indeed, according to Huntington, the walls have already been breached. The enemy continues to enter—at a rate that has steadily increased since the establishment of the 1965 Immigration Act—through a virtually unprotected gate: the two thousand mile swath of land that separates Mexico from the American Southwest. Huntington argues that Mexican immigration poses a threat to American national security’s demographic character and cultural disposition.

“Mexican immigration,” Huntington remarks, “is leading toward the demographic *reconquista* of the areas American took from Mexico by force in the 1830s and 1840s, Mexicanizing them in a manner comparable to, although different from, the Cubanization that has occurred in southern Florida” (*Who Are We?* 221). The contiguity of the two nations—one defined by third-world poverty, the other by first-world affluence—has encouraged an ever-increasing number of Mexican migrants to make the economically viable move of crossing the shallow river into America. This demographic concentration of this “cultural invasion” has dramatically altered the identity of the cosmopolitan centers of the Southwest. At the turn of the millennium, “64 percent of the Hispanics in Los Angeles were of Mexican origin, and 46.5 percent of Los Angeles residents, while 29.7 percent were non–Hispanic whites.” Huntington prepares his reader for the cultural fallout of these demographic trends with a final figure: “By 2002, 71.9 percent of the students in the Los Angeles Unified School District were Hispanic . . . predominantly Mexican, with the proportion increasing steadily” (*Who Are We?* 221).

The Mexican “siege” on America’s cultural core, however, cannot be fully understood by way of quantitative analysis. It is a particular quality of the average Mexican immigrant that makes this siege particularly dangerous to the foundation of American identity. Huntington defines this quality as a type of cultural stubbornness—as an unwillingness, and inability, to assimilate with America’s Anglo-Protestant cultural character. This stubbornness is reflected
in the relatively low rate of Mexican naturalization and the high degree of endogamy in the Mexican American population. According to Huntington: “Mexicans marry Mexicans” (Who Are We? 240). Unlike the immigrants who arrived from Europe and Asia in the nineteenth century, the recent Mexican migrants have been unwilling to disavow their “ancestral language.” A vast majority of Hispanics “emphasize the need for their children to be fluent in Spanish” (Who Are We? 232). Without examining the historical accuracy of his premises, Huntington suggests that this disregard for the English language sets the stage for a wholesale dismissal of America’s commitment to education. Without outlining the possible causes of dismissal, he attempts to illustrate “that even fourth-generation educational achievement (of Mexican-Americans) was significantly below the American norm in 1990” (Who Are We? 236). Huntington rounds out his observations on the socioeconomic character of the Mexican immigrant, commenting: “Few Mexican immigrants have been economically successful in Mexico; hence, presumably relatively few are likely to be successful in the United States” (236). The implication is fairly clear—Mexicans are unable to advance the Protestant work ethic that has distinguished Huntington’s identity.

The normative flavor of Huntington’s description of Hispanic immigration is often obfuscated by the sheer volume of seemingly unflavored facts. However, Royce, in his belief that facts always carry a particular normative weight, might have underscored the conclusion that Huntington occasionally belies. Huntington asks his reader to imagine that other immigration (presumably European and Asian) “continues as it has but somehow Mexican immigration was abruptly stopped.” The benefits of closing the border would be immediate and lasting:

Illegal entries would diminish drastically and the total number of illegal immigrants in the United States would gradually decline . . . the wages of low income Americans would improve . . . Debates over the use of Spanish and whether the English should be made the official language . . . would fade away . . . Bilingual education and the controversies it spawns would decline . . . The inflow of immigrants would again become highly diverse, which would increase the incentives for all immigrants to learn English and absorb American culture. (Who Are We? 236)

In the following section I will address other possible consequences of this cultural “absorption,” the assimilation that Huntington claims to be the mainstay of a viable immigration policy, and provide a pragmatic alternative to his argument in Who We Are?
IV. We Are Who?: A Roycean Vision of National Identity

One of the most marked social tendencies is in any age that toward the mutual assimilation of men in so far as they are in social relations with one another . . . But our modern conditions have greatly favored the increase of the numbers of people who read the same books and newspapers, who repeat the same phrases, who follow the same social fashion, and who thus, in general, imitate one another in more and more ways. The result is a tendency to crush the individual.
—Josiah Royce, Race Question, Provincialism, and Other American Problems

In 1910 the Mexican Revolution began. It was the twentieth-century’s first modern social revolution, destined to change Mexico’s society and economy. It would result in a flood of Mexican immigrants into the United States. Two years earlier, in 1908, Josiah Royce sought to address an impending flood of immigrants (primarily from Eastern Europe) in his Race Question, Provincialism and Other American Problems by proposing a model of national identity that stands in marked contrast to the domestic monoculturalism that Huntington advances nearly a century later. Among these “other American problems,” Royce observes that a homogenizing force has begun to change the character of the American cultural landscape and threaten the meaningful identities of individual citizens. His rendering of national identity, therefore, downplays the power of Anglo-Protestant assimilation for which Huntington advocates and seeks to “counteract the leveling tendencies of modern civilization” (Who Are We? 66). It is worth noting that Royce’s effort to acknowledge the budding pluralism in the American Southwest is not necessarily a function of what we might recognize as a liberal political mindset but rather of a careful realism applied to the demographics of a growing nation. He observes, “As our country grows in social organization, there will be, in absolute measure, more and not less provincialism amongst our peoples” (Royce, Race Question 59).

For Royce, this provincialism, framed as the love and pride which leads inhabitants to cherish as their own the traditions, beliefs, and aspirations of a given community, is not set against the concept of a cohesive national patriotism. Indeed, local loyalties, embodied in the willingness and freedom to assume the particular causes of a given community, create the foundation of a uniquely American identity. He elaborates by noting: “To be sure, as I hope, there will also be in absolute measure, more and not less patriotism, closer and not looser national ties, less and not more sectional misunderstanding. But
the two tendencies, the tendency toward national unity and that toward local independence of spirit, must henceforth grow together. They cannot prosper apart. The national unity must not kill out, nor yet hinder, the provincial self-consciousness” (Race Question 65). Royce’s remarks on the coemergence of national identity and provincial loyalties reflect hopefulness but not naivety. His comments are rooted in a particular reading of history that underscores the mutual strengthening of American identity and local affiliations. It a reading that includes the Declaration of Independence which affirms “that these United Colonies ought to, and of Right be Free and Independent States.” It is a reading that highlights the Articles of Confederation that reasserted the sovereignty of regional communities, in this case states, and laid the groundwork for the “more perfect Union” set forth in the preamble of the Constitution. It is a reading that takes account of regional and cultural tensions—such as land disputes between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over Wilkes-Barre and the Shay Farmer’s Rebellion of 1887—but emphasizes occasions when the nation was able to accommodate individual and provincial commitments while still preserving national cohesiveness. Frank Oppenheim reflects on Royce’s handling of provincial loyalties and broader social commitments when he writes that “Royce contextualized his mature ethics within a processing universe that was teleologically directed, via a “wise provincialism,” towards eventual union of members individuals and member communities within the Universal community” (Oppenheim 223). Royce negotiates this balancing act between the causes of individual provinces and those of a universal collective in his discussion of loyalty and mediation.

Royce conceptualizes a province as being constituted by individuals who “find themselves” together. They “find themselves”—in both an existential and a geographical sense—in a particular situation, region, or place. They “find themselves” together to the extent that they share this genus locus and call as their own the causes that negotiate the particular difficulties of this locus. It must be acknowledged that this description of provincialism sets the stage for intergroup conflict. Undoubtedly, causes that prove meaningful for individuals in one genus locus may diverge from the causes of that prove meaningful for another community of interpretation. Royce is always careful to note that the creation of loyal communities does not guarantee virtue or peace; indeed, provincial loyalties may lead to intense disagreement. This potentially problematic situation between two communities pursuing disparate causes, however, also sets the stage for intergroup mediation which, by way of a third-party interpreter, may bring these parties into harmonious relation. Griffin Trotter echoes this point, employing Royce’s conception of
interpretation to argue against the incommensurability that is often used to frame the conflicting outlooks and causes of various ethnic groups (Trotter, “Royce, Community”).

These interpreters, often residing at the borders of seemingly irreconcilable provinces, have the unique ability to equally express the interests of both communities while simultaneously reflecting a loyalty to a wider community in which these particular groups can be reconciled. This point will be taken up in detail in the coming sections. For now, it is sufficient to note that this process of intergroup interpretation may transform a dangerous dyadic situation into a triadic relation in which the purposes of each party can be more fully realized. Royce comments that in this third party of interpretation, “the Community, the Individual and the Absolute would be completely expressed” (Royce, Problem of Christianity 319). This “Absolute” is not realized in loyalty to any one particular cause, but rather in a loyalty to a guiding principle: the “loyalty to loyalty” (Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty 108). This principle seeks to protect the freedom and willingness of individuals to develop loyalties in genus loci, while guarding against the impingement of any one form of loyalty on another. In practice, this ideal situation rarely obtains, but it does seem to provide some guidance in reformulating the purpose and meaning of national identity.

National identity, according to Royce, ought to be constructed in the service of the formation of the ideal community that has begun to take shape—one in which a diversity of minds, volitions, and causes are brought into harmony for the sake of a collective cause. It is in this sense that he entreats us in the Problem of Christianity, “to judge . . . every national . . . enterprise by the one test: Does this help towards the coming of the universal community?” (Royce, Problem of Christianity 430). Once again, the collective cause for which this universal community strives is not determined by inertia of a dominant cultural ethos, but rather it emerges in, and as, the active communication between unique provinces of interpretation. It emerges in and as a loyalty to loyalty. Royce is always careful to avoid the rendering of communication provided by Bergson and Hegel who prefer to speak of an “interpenetration” of minds as the ultimate melding of individual volitions into one great undifferentiated mind. Instead, he proposes a model which recognizes the integrity of individual minds, respects the diversity of minds and wills, and yet urges these minds to see in this diversity a commitment to a common purpose, namely, the fuller expression of the purposes of each (Braun 235). Oppenheim highlights the way in which Royce regards the purposes of each as being fully fulfilled in the cooperation of the community, echoing Royce’s comment made in 1914: “Nothing can be
more disastrous in human life than the effort to think of our moral problems in terms of our conflicting interests as detached individuals... but when common human activities have made of us something which is of the nature of the community, then we can speak of this community in the first person plural” (Oppenheim 223). He suggests that to speak in the spirit of the “first person plural” is not to loose one’s distinctive voice but rather to find it in a fruitful conversation with others.

For Royce, the flourishing of an ideal American identity is the flourishing of pluralism in America. In “Provincialism” Royce reflects on this pluralism, providing an instructive point on the handling of “strangers” and immigrants: “The stranger, the sojourner is an inevitable factor in the life of most American communities. To make him welcome is one of the most gracious of tasks that our people have become expert. To give him a fair chance is the rule of our national life” (Royce, Race Question 77). Here, Royce defines the “national life” of the United States as an openness to difference. The United States “give (the stranger) a fair chance” to the extent that they allow him/her to situate individual goals and causes in the context of a broader community. Following in the footsteps of Jane Addams, Royce believes that the nation’s identity and moral growth depend on the preservation of difference. Royce periodically spent time at Hull House and was affected by Jane Addam’s social-political thought. In 1922 Addams stated, “All other forms of forms of growth begin with variation from the mass, so the moral changes in human affairs may also begin with a differing group or individual, sometimes with the one who at best is designated as a crank or a freak and in sterner moments is imprisoned as an atheist or a traitor” (Addams 81). It is with this point in mind that we are to understand Royce’s insistence that the pursuit of national loyalty cannot preclude or subsume the realization of provincial loyalties or loyalty tout court. In the Philosophy of Loyalty he writes,

Suppose that my cause, like the family in a feud, or like the pirate ship, or like the aggressively war-like nation, lives by the destruction of the loyalty of other families, or of its own community, or of other communities. Then, indeed, I get a good for myself and for my fellow servants by our common loyalty, but I war against this very spirit of loyalty as it appears in our opponent’s loyalty to his own cause. (Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty 56)

It is worth noting that Royce’s concept of communication and co-emerging loyalties seems to emerge, albeit in ideal form, from a genuinely American experience. It stands opposed to Huntington’s portrayal of America as speaking in a single Anglo-Protestant voice.
V. Reinterpreting Histories

In paying attention to the pluralism that has defined the American experience, it seems appropriate, and only Roycean, to challenge Huntington’s claim that Protestantism has provided American identity its unifying cultural core by identifying moments of cultural pluralism in the nation’s history. Here, I provide a very brief critique of Huntington’s characterization of the history that may have defined the identity of those that made their way to the United States in the past two centuries.

Royce, profoundly and personally sensitive to the inevitable disjunctions between individual loyalties and dominant groups, might have pointed out that Protestants have historically disagreed over what that culture is. Indeed, Protestantism has assumed a pluralizing, rather than a homogenizing, function in the development of the nation’s identity. In the Second Great Awakening of the 1820s and 1830s, dissenting Protestants challenged the creedal tenets of the predominant Calvinist churches—churches, it is worth noting, that eschewed notions of American individualism in their belief that salvation was determined by an impersonal and capricious God. It is worth noting that Royce underscores the flourishing of religion as being integrally connected to the life of the community and would have flatly rejected this understanding of Protestantism (Kegley, “Josiah Royce: Sources” 221).

In providing an alternative interpretation to the myth of Protestant cultural hegemony, Royce might have also underscored the Catholic influence in the settler movements of Maryland and southern Virginia and the formative Quaker movements in Pennsylvania. Indeed, examples abound which draw into question the power of linguistic and cultural assimilation. German communities in the American Midwest rejected the Bennett Law in 1854 which dictated an English educational curriculum. Black nationalism, typified by the growth of the Nation of Islam and the Black Church, consistently challenged the partnership of American capital and Protestantism throughout the twentieth century. Zionism gained traction in the early 1940s in major American cosmopolitan centers, reasserting the Hebraic ideal while dramatically affecting the domestic and international politics of the United States. Horace Kallen’s participation in the Zionist movement shed light on the existence, if not the viability, of cultural pluralism in America. He describes this participation as “a reappraisal of my Jewish affiliation as required of my Jewish affiliation as required an acquiescence in my Jewish inheritance and heritage, an expanding exploration into the content and history of both, and a progressive greater participation in Jewish communal enterprise” (Kallen,
“The Promise” 11). Kallen argued that his ability to participate in a lively form of provincialism—migration scholars have recently begun to define such participation as “transnationalism”—depended in large part on the democratic tolerance that grounded his conception of American identity.

The emergence of provincial movements has, for better and for worse, defined the character of American identity. More often than not, these pluralizing forces have been ill-managed; nonetheless, they have helped create the somewhat ragged patchwork of our nation’s history. Retracing this history seems necessary, for, as Royce suggests, “At every moment of one’s life, the present self interprets the past self to the future self. It says, ‘So I have been. Memory tells me that. That at present this means to me. Therefore, let me act thus; let me go on so to future things?’” (Royce, “The Triadic Theory” 10–14: 11). As we, in Royce’s words, “go on” to address and revise a Mexican-American immigration policy, it seems appropriate to acknowledge the way in which local commitments have historically transformed the cultural landscape of America.

VI. Orchestrating Diversity: Establishing a Pragmatic Immigration Policy

At many points, Kallen revealed his indebtedness to his pragmatic teachers’ social and political thought. In an essay written in 1955, he echoes Royce’s notion of provincialism in envisioning “home-centered communities” which “thrive best when supported by a free trade with peers of different communal cultures.” He elaborates by noting that “the social orchestration which this intercultural exchange consummates actualizes the American idea and gives the culture of the American people the qualities that Whitman, and Emerson and William James . . . celebrated” (Kallen, “American Jews” 27). This guiding principle of “social organization” shares a marked resemblance with Royce’s emphasis on “harmony” in The Philosophy of Loyalty. Both notions speak to the emerging distinctness of individual chords in the midst of a deepening social complexity. Royce encourages individuals to strengthen commitments to their particular locales while, at the same time, he works to establish meaningful relations between these locales.

This approach to pluralism stands in marked opposition to the treatment of immigrants advocated by Huntington and other defenders of multiculturalism. As Jacquelyn Kegley notes, Royce repeatedly criticized the violence inflicted on “foreigners” in the name of American cohesiveness and nationalistic sentiments; most notably, perhaps, was the execution of a woman that, as Royce describes, was motivated by the fact “that she was not an American”
(Kegley, “Royce on Race” 218). This sort of action was commonplace in the American Southwest of the 1890s and risks are being reinvigorated in the current response to Mexican immigration. On this point, Royce is unequivocal: “The fearful blindness of the early behavior of Californians toward foreigners (in this case primarily ‘the American Indian’) is something almost unintelligible.” Kegley elaborates, noting that Royce “tackles head-on the insidious notion of ‘civilization,’ with its accompanying idea of ‘superiority’” in his “Race Problems and Prejudices” (Kegley, “Royce on Race” 219). The idea of a privileged civilized arena sets the stage for wholesale dismissal of the rights and values of those who might fall outside this superior mainstream. Such a dismissal, according to Royce, violates that spirit and principle of loyalty. Huntington’s description of America’s Protestant ethos resonates with the civilized superiority that might condone such exclusionary practices and risks framing the discourse surrounding immigration in pointedly disloyal ways. Kegley concludes by noting that, “for Royce, ‘genuine communities’ are those that seek to ‘increase community,’ and, for him, ‘exclusivity’ is not only an enemy of community, but a criterion by which one judges a community as ‘false’ or even as evil” (Kegley, “Royce on Race” 226).

Developing an inclusive and viable policy to accommodate the changing character of U.S.-Mexican immigration, on the other hand, might be established along pragmatic lines and would undertake, and seek to embody, such an orchestration of diversity. It would involve a reinterpretation of the challenge that Mexican immigration poses to the current educational, political, and economic trends of the United States. For a Roycean practitioner, Mexican immigration is not a threat. Mexican immigration is a fact. It does not lay siege to a monocultural American identity but rather tests particular U.S. institutions in very specific ways.

**Educational Institutions as Mediating Borderlands**

Royce anticipates the work of American social reformers such as John Dewey and Jane Addams in his belief that an educational pluralism underpins the institutions of good governance and the mechanisms of a sustainable economy (Royce, “A Plea for Provincial Independence”). In a language more faithful to Royce, communication, as described earlier, and a “thoughtful spirit of inquiry” must support the creation of ideal human communities. Indeed, Royce “believe(d) in persistent thoughtfulness as the most important factor in the higher (and communal) life of humanity” (Royce, “On Certain Limitations” 1125). In the spirit of Royce’s comments on importance of the establishment of thoughtfulness, it follows that educational reform must set the stage for
any reevaluation of the socioeconomic trends and, more specifically, of the socioeconomic effects of Mexican immigration. It is possible and important to conceptualize the borderlands between the United States and Mexico as a being occupied by marginalized and unrepresented individuals. As Gloria Anzuldua in her *Borderlands/La Frontera* notes, these individuals represent both communities (*mita y mita*) and, in so doing, have the ability provide a mediating perspective (*la facultad*) on a potentially dangerous dyadic situation. Here, I try to understand institutions as possible mediators. The educational and labor mechanisms may not occupy the precarious place of individuals in the physical borderlands, but dual-language educational programs and labor unions have the chance to serve as a Roycean mediators, defying the dyadic relations that currently characterize U.S.-Mexican dynamics.

In laying the groundwork for a vibrant bilingualism, dual-language education promotes a form of cultural mediation that seems in line with Royce’s social-political thought. A dual-language educational policy should be distinguished from “bilingual education” that, quite ironically, falls short in promoting bilingualism. “Bilingual education” refers to the programs established under the Bilingual Educational Act (BEA) of 1968 that sought to improve the poor educational performance of immigrant youths by creating transitional classrooms taught in these pupils’ native tongues. Despite the many revisions to the BEA, its guiding principle has remained constant: “school programs developed to aid limited English proficient students address a population needing special attention in order to become like a majority that is English monolingual or prefers to speak English, and they achieve this goal” (Linton 48). In contrast, dual-language programs are not transitional or remedial, but achievement based; bilingualism, biliteracy and academic performance are the primary objectives. “Two-way” classes are established in which Spanish is not regarded as a subordinate language but rather as a language to be learned on equal footing with English. As sociologist Rebecca Freeman notes,

> Dual-language programs in the United States ideally elevate the status of minority languages and speakers of those languages at school, and because these programs expect additive bilingualism for language minority and language majority students and communities in which they live, schools that promote learning two languages can be understood as contesting the legitimacy of monolingualism in Standard English as the unquestioned norm in mainstream U.S. schools. (Freeman 11)

Unfortunately, time does not permit a detailed investigation of dual-language programs, but brief examination of the mission statements of several schools provides an instructive snapshot. Oyster Bilingual School in Washington
D.C. seeks to provide the “opportunity to obtain competencies which will help (students) survive as individuals and as members of society . . . building a culturally pluralistic society (and) practices and programs that will insure the intellectual, physical, emotional and aesthetic well-being of all our students” (Oyster Bilingual School Website). Dual-language programs at DiLoreto Magnet School in New Britain, Connecticut, aims to create a “multicultural, dynamic school environment in which world languages and multicultural studies are celebrated on a daily basis as we move children into the next millennium of a multilingual and multicultural America” (Freeman 51). The public school districts of Los Angeles and Chicago have dedicated time and resources to back a similar pedagogical vision. In 1970, there was only one dual-language institution in the U.S., Coral Way Elementary in Miami. By 1990, the number had grown to seventy-three. Currently there are 266 programs in twenty-three states (Freeman 51). These institutions create a middle ground, a genuine Roycean third, that serves to mediate between two linguistic communities that are often portrayed as simply antagonistic (cf. Grande). The mediating community creates a space for creativity and flexibility which the antagonistic communities could not have established on their own terms (Pratt 606). Additionally, dual-language acquisition sets the stage for the process of transnationalism in which immigrants are able to maintain meaningful local interactions while developing meaningful national loyalties. The possibility of this mediation is reflected not only in pedagogical reform but also in potential revisions of labor and economic policies.

**Labor, Loyalties, and Transnational Communities**

I believe that the future will invent and will in due time begin very actively and productively to practice forms of international activity which will be at once ideal in their significance and business-like in their methods . . . to show us the way toward the united life of the great community.

——Josiah Royce, “The Hope of the Great Community”

At first blush, it seems unreasonable for one to expect that American labor sectors and agriculture unions to provide fertile spaces for Mexican-American integration to take root. Indeed, one could expect unions in the United States, a high-wage, labor scarce country, would favor restrictive immigration practices that keep out migrant workers who placed downward pressure on wages and compete with unskilled “native-born” workers. Here I take exception with this assumption, providing counterexamples that highlight two trends in Mexican American immigration. First, they point to the role that
U.S. unions, particularly the unions included in the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO), have had in the integration and equitable treatment of migrant workers from Mexico. These unions serve as notable examples of Roycean mediators that inspire loyalty in seemingly disparate groups. Additionally, these counterexamples underline the way in which particular labor markets, in this case the dairy industry in Wisconsin, may provide a framework to establish a pluralistic community based on cross-cultural loyalties.

In de facto regional labor markets that reflect high levels of illegal immigration, it is in the interest of U.S. unions to support governmental practices that aim to foster legal immigration and wage convergence. This type of convergence serves “native-born” workers insofar as it maintains their ability to offer competitive wages without being undercut by foreign-born workers who are willing to work for much less. Wage convergence benefits migrants in the sense that they are able to earn a wage that is commensurate with their “native-born” neighbors. This situation should remind us of a development of a Roycean community in which individual purposes are most fully fulfilled in the purpose of a wider community of interpretation. Unions stand to provide this wider sphere of interpretation and can become the advocates for provincial commitments. In their mediation of native-born and immigrant workers, unions have the ability to speak the words of encouragement that Royce voiced in 1908: “Organize through a willingness to recognize that we must often differ in insight, but that what we need is to do something together” (Royce, “On Certain Limitations” 1124).

It is worth noting that these theoretical tires have hit the road of practice. In the last five years, Mexican immigration has become a domestic political and organizational priority for the AFL-CIO, and labor has become a formidable domestic lobby in efforts to reform U.S. immigration policy (AFL-CIO). In February 2000, the AFL-CIO reversed its restrictive stance on asylum policies, calling for broad amnesty for undocumented workers and their families. This policy initiative reflected the organization’s public statement in 2001 that “labour and business together should design mechanisms to meet legitimate needs for new workers without compromising the rights and opportunities of workers already here” (AFL-CIO). Mexico’s President Vicente Fox took this statement seriously and, in 2001, sought to make the organization an important ally in his efforts to win legal status for Mexican illegal immigrants in the United States. (Greenhouse, “In U.S. Unions”). Even amid the xenophobia that characterized the aftermath of the events of 9/11, the AFL-CIO maintained its support for this legalization, reaffirming at its national convention...
in October 2001 that it would “stand with and stand up for immigrants in our workplaces, in our societies and our movements” (Watts 3).

This type of economic integration comes hand-in-hand with the cultural convergence described in the example of the Wisconsin dairy sector. Economic convergence based on common loyalties serves as both a harbinger and a correlate of a cultural convergence which supports, in Kallen’s words, “the inter-cultural exchange” that “actualizes the American idea” of cultural pluralism. A brief examination of the U.S. dairy sector illuminates valuable moments in which Roycean provincialism and cross-cultural loyalties seem to co-emerge.

Wisconsin needs Mexican immigrants; without an inflow of migrant workers, its population could not support its burgeoning dairy industry. Mexican migrants need Wisconsin; according to one account, 47 percent of the moneys made by migrants in the industry is sent as remittance to their Mexican communities of origin. Cross-border remittance might point to interesting forms of Roycean mediation, namely the existence of practices that bring separate communities in to a fruitful relationship. This being said, however, it seems doubtful that this description of mutual self-interest captures the spirit of Royce’s claims on the nature of a pluralistic community. Evidence of a genuine Roycean pluralism would only take the form of a community in which provincial loyalties were actively encouraged not at the expense, but rather in the name, of a loyalty to a broader community of interpretation.

This evidence seems to be available in the case of the Wisconsin dairy industry. In other industrial sectors the extreme power asymmetry between migrant workers and their employers is reflected in the high rates of employee turnover. Exploited and dissatisfied migrant workers, often unable to put down ethnic and familial roots in their new surroundings, frequently transfer jobs. High rates of employee turnover speak to the poor conditions of migrant labor but also to a less than ideal mode of production. Ideally, U.S. employers want to encourage the retention of foreign-born workers in order to maintain the teamwork and continuity of their workforce (Encina 26). This situation provides a possible avenue of cross-cultural loyalty that has been recognized by the Wisconsin dairy sector. Employers of Mexican migrants in Wisconsin report significantly higher rates (by some estimates, 50 percent higher) of employee retention than employers in the New York dairy sector and other parts of the country (Maloney, “Management of Hispanic Employees”). The difference between Latin American immigrants’ long-term work prospects in dairy in Wisconsin and New York is further underscored by the expression of future intentions by Hispanic migrant workers living in these respective places. In New York, 67 percent of the workers intend to
work for a certain amount of time and then return to their communities of origin. In comparison, only 37 percent of a sample of Latin American workers from Wisconsin expressed similar intentions. The number of women and children in the sampled immigrant communities has increased dramatically in the last decade, indicating the long-term prospects of ethnic community formation (Maloney, “Management of Hispanic Employees”).

These statistics begin to tell the story of the simultaneous flourishing of Roycean provincialism and the integration of loyalties in wider spheres of interpretation. The high rates of employee retention can, in large part, be attributed to the reception that Wisconsin employers have given incoming migrants. Perhaps more importantly for this current discussion, it can be attributed to the ability of workers to participate in Latin American-based interest groups, such as the Hispanic Consortium of Manitowoc County and the Hispanic Advisory Council to the Mayor, that advocate for ethnic communities in Green Bay, Wisconsin. These groups help to protect the cultural integrity—the language, beliefs, and customs—of migrant constituents while establishing cross-cultural programs that encourage integration based on a mutual respect between particular provinces of cultural interpretation. According to recent sociological studies conducted by the Centre for Immigration Studies, 83 percent of Latino/Latina migrant respondents from Eastern Wisconsin, an area with flourishing Latin American communities, claim to “feel a part of a wider community” (Valentine 73). The efforts of “native” U.S. employers and these groups have dramatically dampened the effects of cross-cultural discrimination in the workplace and in the community at large when compared with the experiences of workers from other areas of the country or from other sectors of the U.S. economy. This is not to say that the fostering of pluralism in America is an easy task. Far from it. These examples merely provide glimpses of hope in the otherwise bleak future; Huntington’s advocacy of domestic monoculturalism still holds sway in a surprising number of political and social venues. Royce’s observation in The Philosophy of Loyalty on America’s stance on flourishing provincial loyalties still seems to apply: “Here we meet, in the America of today with many signs that our political and social life form at present a poor school in the arts of loyalty to loyalty” (107).

VII. Conclusion

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the activities of the U.S. Department of Immigration and Naturalization were assumed under the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. Terror from abroad became
a crisis at home. Huntington and others seized this opportunity to frame it as a crisis of American identity in which a particular trend in immigration challenged the unified cultural core of an embattled nation. This framing contributed to the view that the pluralizing effects of Hispanic immigration constituted an imminent threat to the cohesiveness of the American creed and that the provincial loyalties of Hispanic communities in America should be overcome in the name of preserving America’s true identity.

Josiah Royce, on the other hand, suggests that this assault on provincial loyalties is an assault on loyalty on the whole and jeopardizes the pluralism that has, in both hopeful myth and historical practice, defined the U.S. He encourages his readers to marshal their energies to protect the principal of loyalty by protecting the local communities in which loyalties can be felt and lived. He suggests that “our American immigration problem is only one aspect of a world-wide need of moral enlightenment—a need characteristic of our time. One is tempted to adapt Lincoln’s great words, and to say that all nations, but particularly in America, we need in this day to work together to the end that loyalty of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from this earth” (Royce, Race Question 99). Royce’s words are important in their inspiration but also, and more importantly, in their practical application. This project has undertaken to provide evidence that Royce’s conception of pluralism and provincial loyalties may offer fruitful ways to rethink the relationship between the American cultural mainstream and hitherto marginalized communities. This evidence has often bordered on a type of interesting anecdote—a story about particular historical events, about particular educational practices, about particular labor relations. This anecdotal evidence does not necessarily indicate a shortcoming of the project, but rather reflects a Roycean approach to social policy. Policy should not respond to generalities and overarching questions found in Huntington’s Who Are We? but rather address the particular situations of local communities. Immigration policy should speak to us where we are—in the various schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods in which individuals live.

REFERENCES

Basch, Linda et al. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments,


