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Reviewed work(s):

Source: *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Vol. 75 (1985), pp. 20-25

Published by: [Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies](#)

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THE BACKGROUND TO THE GRAIN LAW OF GAIUS GRACCHUS

By PETER GARNSEY AND DOMINIC RATHBONE

One of the measures carried by Gaius Gracchus in the course of his first tribunate in 123–2 B.C. provided for the regular sale of grain to citizens of Rome at the price of 6½ asses per modius. Gracchus also, presumably by the same law, provided for the construction of state granaries.¹

The sources for the law are meagre.² None of them is contemporary, and those later writers who do comment on the law furnish few details. What is known of its content is conveyed in a brief sentence from Livy's Epitomator supported by a scholiast on Cicero's *pro Sestio*, and in a few words of Appian. The Epitomator and Scholiast give the price at which the grain was sold. Other sources give the impression that the grain was given away—with the single exception of Plutarch, for whom the law 'lowered the market price for the poor'. Appian gives the information that the distribution was monthly and to each citizen. That citizenship was the main criterion of eligibility—and that poverty was not a criterion at all³—is confirmed by the well-known anecdote in Cicero involving L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Piso had been the main opponent of the bill; now that it was law, he turned up to receive a share of what he regarded as his property ('*mea bona*'). The rest is inference from later developments in the food distribution system: that only residents of Rome were eligible, that freedmen were included, that male citizens could receive from the age of 14, that the allowance per recipient was already 5 modii a month.⁴ Or it is guesswork: the number of recipients, the cost to the treasury, the relation of the price set by Gracchus to 'normal' or for that matter abnormal market prices.⁵

On the purpose of the law, the primary sources are tendentious and uninformative. Their accounts are unashamedly anti-Gracchan. We are told that Gracchus introduced largesse on a huge scale, that the law encouraged indolence among the plebs and drained the treasury, that although it was welcome to the mob, it was not in the interests of the state. There is no open acknowledgement of the need for some kind of regular distribution of grain. The closest approach to an admission of this kind is Cicero's characterization of the bill of M. Octavius, which at some unknown date replaced the Gracchan measure, as '*modica . . . et rei publicae tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae salutaris*'.⁶ Cicero predictably divulges nothing of the content of the Octavian law, either here or in the *Brutus*, where it is merely stated to have 'abrogated' the Gracchan law. In effect, for Cicero and the rest of the sources, the law of Gracchus was a straightforward political measure, one which fitted in with his general strategy of undermining senatorial government in Rome.

The relevance of political considerations to the framing of the grain law can be acknowledged. However, to reach a full understanding of the significance of the law it is necessary to explore the historical background. Gaius might have been influenced by recent events, and in particular by problems of food supply in the decades immediately preceding his first tribunate. If his law was passed against a background of food crisis, then there is a case for arguing that social and economic aims were not entirely absent.

¹ Select bibliography: H. Last, *CAH* ix, 57 ff.; H. Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum* (1939), 364 ff.; P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.–A.D. 14* (1971), 376–7; H. Schneider, *Wirtschaft und Politik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten römischen Republik* (1974), 363 ff.; P. Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque* (1976), 126 ff.; G. E. Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome* (1980), 156 ff.

² Sources in Broughton, *MRR* I, 514; Greenidge and Clay, *Sources*, 32–3. Texts cited below: Livy, *Per.* Ix, cf. Schol. Bob. 2, 132, 135 Stl.; App., *Bell. Civ.* I, 21; Plut., *C. Gracch.* v; Cic., *Tusc. Disp.* III, 20, 48.

³ Recently stressed by R. J. Rowland, 'The "very poor" and the grain dole at Rome and Oxyrhynchus', *ZPE* XXI (1976), 69 ff.

⁴ Sall., *Hist.* III, 48M, cf. Licin. 34F.

⁵ For grain prices in Rome (but there is no information for our period) see N. Jasny, 'Wheat prices and milling costs in classical Rome', *Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute* xx (1944), 137 ff.; R. P. Duncan-Jones, *Economy of the Roman Empire* (2nd ed., 1982), 145–6, App. 8. It can be assumed that Gracchus' state grain was subsidized. How did he arrive at his price? He may have costed 5 modii at 2 denarii, supposing grain was rationed under his law at 5 modii per person per month. 5 modii at 6½ is 31½ asses, almost 2 denarii (= 32 asses). We suspect that 5 modii were sold for 2 denarii (or 8 sesterces).

⁶ Cic., *de off.* II, 72, cf. 74; *Brutus* 62, 222.

On the reconstruction of Heichelheim, grain prices in the Mediterranean region as a whole, after the low levels of 160 to 140, rose dramatically by 138 and reached a new peak in 127, before returning by *c.* 120 to the levels of 138.⁷ These rises were adduced by Heichelheim as the main and common explanation for the actions of the Gracchi, the revolt of Aristonikos and the slave rebellions in Sicily and Athens. Some scholars have accepted Heichelheim's picture;⁸ most have just ignored it. It is time that the case against it was put. It may first be noted that the grain law was only one item on the Gracchan 'programme', and that Aristonikos, whatever steps he may have taken to attract servile support, was primarily resisting Roman annexation. Secondly, we may doubt whether the evidence, which comes mainly from Egypt, actually shows dramatic rises in the price of grain.⁹

A more recent synthesis of the evidence shows that the 'market' and 'penalty' prices in copper drachmai for wheat in the period *c.* 130–50 remained fairly stable at a level which appears to be almost exactly twice that of the price level implied for wheat by the prices of olyra attested in the period *c.* 170–30.¹⁰ This change in price levels almost certainly does not indicate genuine price inflation, but resulted from a 'retariffing' of the copper drachmai, which were probably not circulating coinage but just notional units of account.¹¹ A comprehensive new study of Ptolemaic grain prices is overdue, not least because of the continuing growth of evidence. We refrain from that undertaking here, since it is in any case to be doubted whether grain prices in Egypt either reflected or determined grain prices elsewhere in the Mediterranean basin, at least to the extent necessary for Heichelheim's argument. Clearly Egypt rarely took or needed imports of grain, and we do not believe that its exports were ever large enough to do more than reduce exceptional and temporary high prices in a small number of Greek cities.¹² And, more generally, climatic considerations render it implausible that grain yields and hence local grain prices co-varied throughout the Mediterranean, while the assumption that regional economies were so interlinked in this period as to even out these discrepancies is quite untenable.

There is, therefore, little to commend the idea that the *lex Sempronia frumentaria* was a response to a problem of international dimensions. This is not, however, to say that at Rome itself there was no background of high prices and shortages of grain. Some general points about supply and demand must first be made. A new development from the end of the Second Punic War was the regular availability, in addition to other sources of supply, of tax and rent grain, the former as the tithe from Sicily and Sardinia (plus whatever was exacted as tax from the African province after 146), the latter drawn from confiscated property (*ager publicus*) mainly in Sicily and Campania. Meanwhile the population of Rome was steadily expanding, reaching perhaps a figure of around one quarter of a million inhabitants in the time of the Gracchi, with a total annual demand for wheat of around 7½

⁷ All dates in the text are B.C. F. M. Heichelheim, 'On ancient price trends from the early first millennium B.C. to Heraclius I', *Finanzarchiv* xv (1954–5), 498 ff. (at 506–8); based on his *Wirtschaftliche Schwankungen der Zeit von Alexander bis Augustus* (1930), especially 51–2, 67–8, 72–7, 118–22 (Table VIII).

⁸ Notably A. H. Boren, 'The urban side of the Gracchan economic crisis', *AHR* LXIII (1957–8), 890 ff. repr. in R. Seager (ed.), *The Crisis of the Roman Republic* (1969), 54 ff.

⁹ Heichelheim, *Wirtsch. Schwank.*, 74 claimed as evidence for Italy the 'rise' from the price of wheat in the Po valley given by Polybius II, 15, 1 to that of Gaius' *frumentatio*, but these prices are not directly comparable. In fact, in terms of silver weight the Gracchan price is almost exactly the same as the price charged at Rome in 203 and 201 for wheat sold cheaply by the then aediles. See P. Garnsey, T. Gallant, D. Rathbone, 'Thessaly and the grain supply of Rome during the second century B.C.', *JRS* LXXIV (1984), 30 ff., at 43 n. 55.

¹⁰ T. Reekmans, 'The Ptolemaic copper inflation', in E. Van't Dack and T. Reekmans, *Ptolemaica (Studia*

Hellenistica 7, 1951), 61–119 (especially tables on pp. 111–13). The particularly high price cited by Heichelheim, *Wirtsch. Schwank.*, 121 for 162/1 B.C. derives from misinterpretation of the text (*UPZ* 52; see Reekmans, 89 n. 1). Reekmans omits text 10 in K. Sethe, *Demotische Urkunden zum ägyptischen Bürgerrecht vorzüglich der Ptolemäerzeit* (1920), which gives a penalty price for wheat equivalent to 6,000 copper drachmai, twice the normal rate; however, since it is an isolated case and since penalty prices were always arbitrary, it is not good evidence for generally high grain prices in Egypt at that time.

¹¹ Reekmans (n. 10), 98 believed the 'real' price of grain remained stable; for these copper drachmai as units of account, see A. Gara, 'Limiti strutturali dell'economia monetaria nell'Egitto tardo-tolemaico', in B. Virgilio (ed.), *Studi Ellenistici* 1 (1984), 107 ff. We owe this reference to Dr. Dorothy Thompson.

¹² cf. D. W. Rathbone, 'The grain trade and grain shortages in the Hellenistic East', in P. Garnsey, C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity* (1983), 45 ff.

million modii.¹³ This figure is not high. According to the evidence that we have for 70 B.C., this demand could have been met almost solely from Sicilian supplies.¹⁴ That the grain supply of Rome was not in chronic crisis in the second half of the second century is also suggested by the absence of any attempt to arrange for the delivery to Rome or to its armies of the wheat tithe of the new province of Asia.¹⁵ The problems sporadically attested between 150 and 123 B.C. are to be attributed partly to crop failures or deficiencies in one or more of the main, normal areas of supply, and sometimes to the interruption of supplies by piracy and rebellion, but they often also coincided with periods of major troop deployments by the Roman state, which required the mobilization of unusually large quantities of grain as military supplies. The armies which gained and maintained Roman control of foreign grain-exporting regions themselves formed the main competition to the populace of Rome for consumption of available supplies.¹⁶ As state-organized enterprises in a militaristic society, the armies often took precedence.

In the period after 150 the first recorded upsets in the grain supply of Rome are dated in 142 and 138.¹⁷ In the former year subsistence crisis was combined with an outbreak of epidemic disease ('fames et pestilentia'); in the latter the tribune C. Curiatius is said to have reacted to rising food prices by challenging the consuls to initiate senatorial action to buy grain. The consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, however, persuaded the angry crowd that he was the best judge of the situation;¹⁸ what action, if any, was taken is unknown. The shortage may have been connected with the outbreak of the first slave revolt in Sicily (assuming it began in 139 rather than 135), and we may also note that in this period Rome had seven or eight legions in the field and was engaged in the war against Numantia in Spain.¹⁹ Sicily, disrupted by war and under occupation by two legions in 134–2, could not have sent its normal tithe to Rome in these years. But no crisis is attested in the imperfect historical record until 129 (or possibly 130). In this year the aedile Q. Caecilius Metellus (later Balaricus) is found arranging shipments of Thessalian wheat to Rome 'because the situation in his country at the present time is one of dearth (*aphoria*)'.²⁰ A deficient crop in one or more of the grain-supplying regions must be postulated, perhaps exacerbated by the mobilization of two extra legions for the Illyrian campaign of the consul C. Sempronius Tuditanus.

The legionary count for the following years is worth scrutinizing. The number of legions in the field fell to five in 128 with the successful conclusion of the Illyrian war, and remained at that point until 125 when it rose to seven and in the next year to nine. The outbreak of war in Gallia Transalpina and Sardinia made the difference. Transalpine Gaul took a minimum of two legions in the period 125–1, and no fewer than four in 124 (and 121), the year in which Gaius Gracchus stood for the tribunate. Meanwhile Sardinia became a problem area, requiring two legions in 126–3. These wars must have forced the diversion of supplies from Rome, and of course the disruption of production and tithe collection in Sardinia.

It happens that Gracchus served as quaestor in Sardinia to the consul Aurelius Orestes in 126–4, a longer term than was customary because his opponents wanted to keep him out of Rome for as long as possible. During his term of office he managed to upstage his commander twice. First, he managed to persuade Sardinians, where Orestes had failed, to give clothing and other aid to the Roman soldiers during a harsh winter—this by virtue not only of his diplomatic skills, but also of his ancestral links with the island.²¹

¹³ cf. Garnsey, Gallant, Rathbone (n. 9), 40 n. 42. For revised date of this inscription see Appendix below.

¹⁴ Tithe of 3 million modii plus second bought tithe also of 3 million modii, plus further purchase of 800,000 modii: Cic., *Verr.* II, 3, 163.

¹⁵ cf. Rickman (n. 1), 42–5.

¹⁶ Examples in Rickman (n. 1), 44.

¹⁷ *Obsequens* 22. Orosius v, 4, 8–11 reports a *pestilentia* in Rome in 142 but makes no mention of food shortage. We cannot be sure of the date or significance of the fragment of Lucilius, 'deficit alma ceres, nec plebes pane potitur' (5 fr. 214, Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* (Loeb) III, 66).

¹⁸ Val. Max. III, 7, 3; cf. Plut., *Cato Maior* VIII, 1 for a

comparable anecdote about the elder Cato's (died 149) opposition to an 'unseasonable' popular demand for a grain distribution.

¹⁹ Figures for legions here and below are taken from Table XIII in Brunt (n. 1), 433.

²⁰ See Appendix below for revised date of this inscription.

²¹ Plut., *C. Gracch.* vi. Orestes had proposed to requisition clothing from the Sardinian communities; they protested to the Senate, which vetoed the requisition. Then Gaius persuaded the Sardinians to give supplies 'voluntarily'. This looks uncommonly like the kind of improper pressuring for which Gaius next year attacked Fabius (see n. 23).

Sempronii Gracchi had presided over the conversion of the island into a province in 238 and its pacification in 177. Secondly, Gaius secured grain for the soldiers from Micipsa, son and successor of Massinissa as king of Numidia, this time advertising his link with the Cornelii Scipiones—Africanus (his grandfather) and Aemilianus had built up strong links with the Numidian kingdom. Micipsa made the mistake of sending envoys to the Roman senate to inform them of his gift. 'The senators were displeased and turned them away', says Plutarch, who sees the two incidents as a foretaste of the demagogic behaviour that Gaius would display as tribune. The point of sharper relevance for us is that in Sardinia Gaius had had first-hand experience of a dislocation of grain supplies in a surplus-producing province which regularly contributed to the feeding of Rome.

Two more items from these years are worth mentioning. First, a plague of locusts in the hinterland of Carthage and Utica in 125–4 caused immense destruction of crops and human and animal life.²² By itself this need not have made much impact on the consumer in Rome. As recently as 21 years before, Rome had not been drawing grain from Carthaginian North Africa on a regular basis at all. The level of the Sicilian harvest in these years would have been crucial, and on this we have no information. Secondly, in 123 Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus as propraetor in a Spanish province collected and sent a consignment of grain to Rome; for this he was denounced by Gaius Gracchus to the senate, who were persuaded to send payment for the grain to the cities from which it had been drawn. Plutarch is not interested in providing details: we would like to know whether this grain was an unnecessary bonus, arranged by Fabius to win himself popularity, or whether it was a reaction to a genuine shortage.²³

To sum up: recent disruption in Sicily, Sardinia and North Africa, the three main sources of Rome's grain outside Italy itself, and food shortage actual or feared, had made sufficient impact on Romans, civilians and soldiers, to provoke a skilful and liberal-minded politician to produce a scheme to improve the food supply of the capital. It is not easy to reconstruct the pre-existing system, and in particular to determine the frequency of *frumentationes* and the terms under which grain was released on such occasions. It seems certain that private enterprise played a crucial role in providing grain for Roman consumers.²⁴ At the same time, there must frequently have been surplus state grain to dispose of, and the question arises how far the responsible officials, who were the aediles, were prepared to play the market. It is wishful thinking to believe that aediles were always uninterested in selling grain profitably for the benefit of the treasury, or to put it in another way, that they made a habit of undercutting private merchants by offering grain at below-market prices. As it happens, it is only when grain was in excess, and therefore cheap, that the price at which aediles sold is recorded. Not surprisingly, the price is low, 2 asses (in 200 and 196 B.C.) and 4 asses (in 203 and 201 B.C.).²⁵ These instances tell us nothing about the regular behaviour of aediles. We can conjecture that their pricing practices were erratic, reflecting the attitudes of the men in office and the weight of senatorial opinion at the time. As for the incidence of *frumentationes*, it is a plausible guess that they were occasional rather than regular in normal years—that is, in years of neither glut nor shortage. On the supply side, Rome controlled adequate supplies of grain. But the system was vulnerable in two main ways. First, storage was inadequate.²⁶ Second, the way in which emergency supplies were mobilized was 'dilettantist'.²⁷ The case of Metellus and the Thessalian grain illustrates this vividly. In that instance the alleviation of a food

²² Livy, *Per.* LX; *Obsequens* XXX; Orosius v, 11, 1–3.

²³ Plut., *C. Gracch.* vi, with Broughton, *MRR* 1, 512. For the Roman tradition against accepting grain as a gift see e.g. Livy xxxvi, 4, 5–9, XLIV, 16, 2, and the Thessalian inscription, cf. Garnsey, Gallant and Rathbone (n. 9), 44. App., *Pun.* 136, to the effect that the *staseis* in Gaius Gracchus' tribunate occurred because of *aporia*, is not clear evidence of food crisis at Rome in 123. In *Bell. Civ.* 1, 9 where the Italian race is said to have been reduced to *aporia* and *oligandria*, *aporia* means 'poverty' in the sense of landlessness, and not 'food shortage'.

²⁴ See e.g. Livy xxx, 38, 5; xxxviii, 35, 5; cf. P. Garnsey, 'Grain for Rome', in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C. R. Whittaker (eds.), *Trade in the Ancient Economy* (1983), 118–30, at 121 ff.

²⁵ Livy xxxi, 50, 1; xxxiii, 42, 8 (2 asses); xxx, 26, 5 ff.; xxxi, 4, 6 (4 asses).

²⁶ For a terse statement see G. E. Rickman, *Roman Granaries and Store Buildings* (1971), 149–50.

²⁷ The word is P. Veyne's. His discussion in *Le pain et le cirque* (1976), 446 ff. is especially to be recommended.

shortage in Rome depended on the chance that surplus grain stocks would be located somewhere, that the key Roman official should have had foreign contacts in the appropriate place, and that private shippers could be found to transport the grain once acquired.

We are now in a better position to assess the law of Gracchus. Although the details of his arrangements have not survived, his main achievement was clearly to introduce consistency and regularity into the grain supply of Rome where previously unpredictability had prevailed. The guaranteed ration for a fixed number of recipients meant that the minimum annual demand for grain by the state was in principle predictable, and the provision of storage facilities under state control placed the authorities in a better position to build up stocks against bad harvests and disruptions to supplies. The populace of Rome was less at the mercy of speculators for financial profit and less reliant on occasional distributions of grain obtained on the initiative of individual magistrates and promagistrates seeking political gain; the latter had therefore less cause to pressure their foreign friends to provide grain. The law is another example of Gaius' well-attested interest in protecting both subjects and allies on the one hand and the Roman populace on the other from improper exploitation by the ruling élite.²⁸ This was a long way, it must be stressed, from instituting a grain dole. The recipients had to pay for their rations, and the survival of the very poor continued to depend on the charity of the very rich.

Only from the time of Gaius Gracchus is it possible to talk of Rome having a system of grain supply and distribution. A final question is from where he drew the inspiration for this novel scheme. Military service may hold the key. Roman footsoldiers of the time each received a monthly ration of 4 modii of wheat, for which deductions were made from their pay 'at the set price' by the quaestor—the office held by Gracchus in trying conditions in Sardinia.²⁹ The provisioning of armies required the planned accumulation of grain supplies; the earliest possible Roman 'official' granaries appear to have been those built by Scipio Aemilianus in 134 at Numantia.³⁰ The similarities between these practices and the Gracchan system suggest that they provided at least a partial model. We cannot rule out in addition the possibility that the Greek world had something to offer in the way of precedent and example, though we would insist that regular distributions of grain cannot be shown to have been common practice in Greek cities in the Hellenistic period.³¹ In the end we may have to say that the contribution of Greece was made not through the provision of a specific model which Gracchus could follow, but in confirming the conviction that he certainly already possessed, that it was the duty of a state to ensure that its population was adequately fed. Rome, in contrast with the Greek cities, had the necessary funds. In Gaius Gracchus it had produced a politician who was prepared to tap those funds for the benefit of the ordinary citizen. As Florus put it, in words of Gracchan inspiration, 'what could be more just than that a people in need should be maintained from its own treasury?'³²

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²⁸ cf. *ORF*³ 48, V, 28; 48, XII, 44; App., *Bell. Civ.* 1, 22; with A. N. Sherwin-White, 'The Lex Repetundarum and the Political ideas of Gaius Gracchus', *JRS* LXXII (1982), 18 ff.

²⁹ Polyb. vi, 39, 12–15; cf. G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (1969), 90. Soldiers were also charged for clothing and for replaced equipment, until Gaius himself abolished the charge for clothing. See Plut., *C. Gracch.* v; cf. Diod. Sic. xxxv, 25, 1.

³⁰ Rickman (n. 26), 251–2.

³¹ *contra*, e.g., W. W. Tarn, G. T. Griffith, *Hellenistic Civilization* (3rd ed., 1952), 107 ff.; A. R. Hands, *Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome* (1968), 95 ff.; Rickman (n. 1), 156–7. The issue cannot be debated here. For a stimulating discussion of Greek influences on the Gracchi, see Cl. Nicolet, 'L'inspiration de Tiberius Gracchus', *REA* LXVII (1965), 142 ff.

³² Florus II, 1.

APPENDIX

Our previous provisional dating of the Thessalian grain inscription and our identification of the Metellus involved were made without the benefit of the text of two other decrees inscribed on the same stone.³³ The three decrees were inscribed, without separate paragraphing, by the same hand, and presumably had all been passed at the same meeting of the *koinon*. The third decree authorized the erection of equestrian statues in honour of Timasitheos and Diotimos, sons of Hermias, from Larisa. Both brothers are already attested as *stratego*i of the *koinon*, probably in the period *c.* 146–135, and the tenure of a Petraios, presumably to be identified with the current *strategos* in the grain decree, has tentatively been assigned to the period *c.* 130–125.³⁴ Assuming that the honours to Timasitheos and Diotimos were voted some time after they had been *strategos*, these inscriptions support the dating of Petraios relative to them. The only known Q. Caecilius Q.f. Metellus who is likely to have been aedile in the decade around 130 is the man later called Baliaricus (son of Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus), who was consul in 123 and thus aedile in 129 at the latest.³⁵ Probably, therefore, the inscription should be dated to 129.

129 was not a favourable year for seeking surplus grain or shipping in the eastern Mediterranean. Surplus grain cannot have been available either from Asia, where in 131–129 two legions were suppressing the revolt of Aristonikos, or from Syria, whose resources must have been mobilized in 129–8 to support Antiochus VII's fatal campaign against Parthia, or from Egypt, which Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II was gradually reconquering from Cleopatra II in *c.* 130–127. Metellus envisaged looking for shippers at Rome; the Romans and Italians active on Delos may well have already committed their spare vessels to supplying the Roman army in Asia and perhaps also to aiding the return of Ptolemy VIII.³⁶

The Romans did not ordinarily seek grain for Rome in the East. That they did so on this occasion is to be explained with reference to harvest shortfall in the West, and the needs of the additional consular army in Illyricum.

³³ Garnsey, Gallant and Rathbone, art. cit. (n. 9 above); for the new texts see C. J. Gallis, *Arch. Delt.* 31 (1976, publ. 1984), B 1 (Chronika), 176–8, with pl. 127.

³⁴ H. Kramolisch, *Demetrios II: Die Strategen des thessalischen Bundes vom Jahr 196 v. Chr. bis zum Ausgang der römischen Republik* (1978), 61–77.

³⁵ These considerations go against the identification

with Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, consul in 98 and thus aedile by 104, suggested by G. Manganaro, 'Ancora sulle rivolte "servili" in Sicilia', *Chiron* 13 (1983), 405–9.

³⁶ cf. *Inscr. Delos* 1526 = *OGIS* 135, with P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (1972), I, 122 (n. 242), 155.